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Preface
On 7–8 October 2019 at the Palazzo Corsini in Rome, the Accademia Nazionale dei
Lincei and the US National Academy of Sciences convened the XXI Edoardo
Amaldi Conference with the patronage of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
International Cooperation and with support from the National Research Council
(CNR), National Institute of Nuclear Physics (INFN), Istituto dell’Enciclopedia
Italiana Treccani and the National Academy of Sciences Thomas Lincoln Casey
Fund. At the Conference, a diverse group of experts, eminent scientists, diplomats
and policy makers met to discuss challenges facing the international community
related to nuclear safety, security, safeguards, non-proliferation, and arms control,
as well as ideas for addressing those challenges. Speakers included the Presidents
of the Italian and US Academies of Sciences, five Nobel Laureates and Nobel Prize
awarded organizations, directors of international scientific organizations, leaders of
non-governmental organizations (ICAN and Pugwash), and nuclear experts and
officials from Argentina, CERN, China, CTBTO, the European Commission,
France, IAEA, Iran, Israel, Italy, ITER, NATO, Pakistan, the Republic of Korea, the
Russian Federation, the UK, the United Nations, and the USA.
The premise of the two organizing groups in the Academies, the Gruppo di
Lavoro per la Sicurezza Internazionale e il Controllo degli Armamenti (SICA) and
the Committee on International Security and Arms Control (CISAC), is that sci-
entists can play important roles in reducing risks and solving problems. Scientists
have a shared language and approach to reasoning and analysis, and they have
relationships arising from the international nature of science, so they can sometimes
make unique progress on diplomatic issues with technical dimensions and technical
issues with diplomatic dimensions. The Amaldi Conference brings together officials
who are responsible for addressing these international security issues and is
structured both to promote public awareness through the opening sessions broadcast
by RAI News and RAI Cultura, and through closed sessions among participants,
meant to encourage discussion. Productive side discussions among parties that
might not otherwise talk are key products of the Amaldi Conference, and those are
needed now as much as they ever have been.
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The international security environment is in flux: many national governments
have turned attention to domestic interests, questioned the international order and
even conducted military incursions into other nations’ territory. Militant groups
have proven to be resilient and willing to break fundamental norms. Meanwhile,
stabilizing influences such as treaties and international organizations are eroding
through diminished support.
More specifically, as the USA has expressed and acted on scepticism about
treaties, alliances and international organizations. NATO faces unprecedented
internal political conflict, and Russia has renewed its assertiveness in European and
Middle East affairs. China has established partnerships and flexed political muscle
in South Asia, Southeast Asia, Africa, and in international forums while also
exhibiting military strength while claiming domain over international waters. With
the termination of the Treaty on Intermediate Nuclear Forces in 2019 and the sunset
of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty in early 2021, there is a real prospect
of the end of nuclear arms control treaties between the world’s two largest pos-
sessors of nuclear weapons. Impatient with the pace of disarmament and motivated
by moral concerns, the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons
(ICAN) and 80 countries (as of this writing) have supported ratification of the
Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Pakistan continues to increase its
nuclear arsenal and espouses a policy of nuclear first use on its own territory in case
of invasion, while India reaffirms its conventional military strength and, decrying
terrorist attacks launched with impunity by groups in Pakistan, says any nuclear use
against Indian forces could result in nuclear reprisal. North Korea is repeating its
pattern of dangling the prospect of denuclearization and simultaneously threatening
resumption of missile and nuclear tests. With the US Withdrawal from the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action, Iran is stepwise reducing its commitment to the
agreement. The Middle East has seen chemical weapons used on civilian popula-
tions by both the Syrian government and terrorist groups, groups that have persisted
in Syria and Iraq despite overwhelming conventional forces fighting against them.
The widespread re-emergence of nationalism and narrow definitions of national
interests underlies and runs through this dangerous set of developments.
These issues and the puzzle of how to benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear
energy, as well as the intersection of basic scientific research with science diplomacy
and the challenges of international security, were addressed throughout the con-
ference. Nobel Peace Laureate Mohamed ElBaradei and CERN Director-General
Fabiola Gianotti gave keynote talks and participants heard remarks from Izumi
Nakamitsu, United Nations Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for
Disarmament Affairs, Federica Mogherini, High Representative for Foreign Affairs
and Security Policy—Vice-President of the European Commission, and Paul
Richard Gallagher, Secretary for the Holy See’s Relations with States.
We, the Editors, are pleased to present this volume capturing these remarks and
papers from each of the sessions. We thank the President of the Accademia
Nazionale dei Lincei, Prof. Giorgio Parisi, and the President of the US National
Academy of Sciences, Dr. Marcia McNutt, for their fundamental support to this
conference. Moreover, we thank the Director General of the Accademia Nazionale
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dei Lincei, Dr. Angelo Cagnazzo, and International Relations Officials, Marco
Zeppa, Pina Moliterno, and all Lincei staff, as well as Hope Hare and other staff and
leadership of the US National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine,
and finally the Authors and Session Chairs for their efforts, which made the
conference so successful.
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15 December 2019 Chair
International Security and Arms
Control Working Group
Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei
Raymond Jeanloz
Chair
Committee on International Security
and Arms Control
US National Academy of Sciences
Micah Lowenthal
Director
Committee on International Security
and Arms Control
US National Academy of Sciences
Wolfango Plastino
Scientific Secretary
International Security and Arms
Control Working Group
Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei
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Mohamed ElBaradei and Fabiola Gianotti
Security and Prosperity in Changing Times
Mohamed ElBaradei
International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, United Nations
e-mail: elbaradei@iaea.at
It is an honour for me to speak at this venerable Academy. The world recognizes
Italy as the birthplace of the Renaissance that ushered us from the middle ages into
modernity and humanism. Not many are aware, however, that Italy is also home to
numerous twentieth-century prominent scientists. Enrico Fermi, Edoardo Amaldi,
Rita Levi Montalcini and Carlo Rubbia to mention a few. They were among those
who pushed the frontier of our understanding of nature and ourselves. I am priv-
ileged to have had the opportunity to interact personally with some of them.
Our recent achievements in fields like health and medicine, communication and
artificial intelligence are incredible. Nonetheless, I am sure that we all agree that our
ability to steer these achievements towards peace and prosperity falls short. In terms
of peace, we continue to rely on force to settle our differences, and we rely for our
“ultimate security” on a system, “Mutual Assured Destruction” (MAD), that carries
the seeds of self-destruction. In terms of prosperity, there are around 800 million
people living in extreme poverty and sub-human conditions. We certainly have a
long way to go.
The advent of the technological revolution, similar to the renaissance, gives us a
unique opportunity to herald a new age. The instruments of change available to us
and the speed by which we can affect change are overwhelming. However, we need
to be clear where we want to go, make the right decisions and ensure that we
humans remain in the driver seat. This is the responsibility of all of us: scientists,
ethicists and policy makers. We have to step up to the plate and put our heads
together. In this, equity, cooperation and empathy are indispensable.
Let me start with the quest for prosperity, specifically what the nuclear community
could do. Energy is a key requirement for development. Every aspect of our basic
needs depends on it. It is unacceptable to let alone morally repugnant that around 1.1
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billion people have no access to electricity, the majority of them in sub-Saharan
Africa. We know that nuclear energy is a clean source of energy, a highly valuable
asset at a time of climate change crises. Yet its share in the global electricity supply is
shrinking. It was 14% in 2011 and is today around 11%. It is projected to decline to
around 3–7% by 2050. The chief reasons being serious concerns among the public
about the possibility of radiation contamination resulting from a serious accident and
fears regarding the safe disposal of high-level radioactive waste.
Unfortunately, the international community is in the habit of recognizing
warning signs only post-mortem. This has been the case with safeguards (after
Iraq), nuclear security (after 9/11) and nuclear safety, where we opted to ignore the
canary in the coalmine. Both after Chernobyl and Fukushima Daiichi, there was a
rush to strengthen nuclear safety through conventions, standards and review mis-
sions. Nevertheless, nuclear safety is still considered solely a national responsi-
bility, despite the likely trans-boundary impact of a severe nuclear accident. Could
we start thinking of nuclear safety not merely as a national responsibility but a
global concern and embark on legally binding safety standards and safety reviews?
I should mention here that the IAEA statute considers Agency “safeguards” to
cover both safety and proliferation issues. Could we also agree that there is an
urgent need for an international nuclear security architecture in which all states
adhere to IAEA recommendations and guidelines and put in place appropriate
national security frameworks?
Looking to the future, can scientists enable us to move to the next generation of
nuclear energy? Can they help us through fusion, described as the silver bullet for
energy scarcity and climate change, to generate abundant, safe and clean power and
move to a carbon-free economy? Recent news from ITER, the world’s largest
nuclear fusion experiment sends an optimistic message: we are six years away from
the “First Plasma”.
Can we soon see an operational high-level waste disposal facility to assure the
public that there is actually a safe technical solution to the waste issue? Finland has
started construction of permanent repositories for high-level waste and spent fuel
and the process of selecting a site is underway in other countries, Sweden and
France among them. It would be quite reassuring to see the first waste repository
commissioned in the not so distant future.
I turn now to peace including nuclear arms control and non-proliferation. There
is no denying that the status quo is very depressing. Experts everywhere agree that
the nuclear threat is more dangerous than at any time since the Cuban missile crises.
The nuclear arms control regime is literally collapsing with the only remaining
treaty expiring in a couple of years with no talk of renewal. All nuclear weapon
states are in a frenzy to modernize their arsenals including developing hypersonic
delivery systems and usable low-yield nuclear weapons. Moreover, all are engaged
in a blame game with no sign of reversing course.
Is it difficult to comprehend that the nuclear arms race is not a zero-sum game
and that we are all doomed in any nuclear conflagration by design or accident? Is it
difficult to fathom that a discriminatory arms control system based on haves and
have nots is not sustainable? Is it difficult to foresee that a state facing a real or
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perceived security threat might be tempted to imitate the “big boys” and try to
acquire the very same weapons the weapon states are relying on while admonishing
others not to have?
In addition, how about the legal commitment to nuclear disarmament that all the
major nuclear weapon states entered into five decades ago which was an integral
part of the NPT? How does this obligation square with recent statements by some
nuclear weapon states and others, who expressed their opposition to the Nuclear
Weapon Ban Treaty because inter alia “the policy of nuclear deterrence has been
essential to keeping the peace… for over 70 years”! How does this about face affect
the integrity of the non-proliferation regime? Could the weapon states at least show
some serious commitment to their disarmament obligations by taking certain
measures in that direction? For example: getting the CTBT into force rather than
mulling over testing new weapons? Negotiating among themselves the modalities
for their collective adherence to the Nuclear Ban Treaty (TPNW)? Resuming
negotiation of the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty stalled in the Conference on
Disarmament for nearly 25 years?
And what about the idea of adopting a multilateral approach to the nuclear fuel
cycle, uranium enrichment and plutonium separation, to have better control of the
production of weapon usable material? A few years ago, when I introduced the idea
there was excitement and a slew of proposals for assurance of nuclear fuel supply,
resulting in the establishment of an IAEA low enriched uranium bank in
Kazakhstan and a low enriched fuel reserve in Russia. Unfortunately, the principal
idea of a multilateral approach to the fuel cycle, like many other ideas relating to
nuclear arms control, has been dormant ever since.
I should also mention the crucial role of verification or safeguards in the current
and future arms control regime. The adage “trust but verify” remains a truism and a
key ingredient of any successful arms control effort. Yet a credible verification
regime requires an appropriate legal mandate, adequate financial resources, up to
date technology, including independent analytical tools and satellite monitoring,
impartial inspectors and “safeguards” against outside meddling or interference. In
most, if not all, these areas, the current international system could benefit from
certain improvements to ensure robustness and integrity.
Scientists have a critical role in all this. Can they develop technology to combat
cyber-attacks on command and control systems? Can they engineer an alternate
command and control system to delay or prevent the so-called prompt launch where
leaders of nuclear weapon states have less than ten minutes to respond to a reported
nuclear attack?
Our principal challenge is to preserve what remains of the nuclear arms control
architecture and strive to build new multilateral arrangements that bring under
control the terrifying new technologies such as hypersonic delivery systems,
nuclear-powered missiles and weapons in space. In parallel, we need to start dis-
cussion and research on a security system that does not rely on nuclear weapons.
What will it look like? What are its basic elements? How is it going to work?
The few areas I briefly touched upon show that we are not short on ideas for a
more secure and prosperous world. It is our mindset that is holding us back; the
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refusal to understand that the existing paradigm cannot last and that the obscene
inequality and increasing polarization between and within nations lead to violence
and wars. We seem to be stuck in the past, unable to recognize that the world has
fundamentally changed and that we must think and act differently, as the young
generation keeps reminding us if we want to preserve our planet and its inhabitants.
The late J. Robert Oppenheimer, one of the fathers of the atomic bomb,
remarked after the first bomb was successfully detonated that “we knew the world
would not be the same” and said that it brought to mind words from the Hindu
Bhagavad Gita “now I am become Death, the destroyer of worlds”. This was over
seven decades ago! It is about time that we extricate ourselves from this foreboding
scenario and move to a more humane one based on equity, cooperation and soli-
darity, basic human values that are central to our survival and well-being. We have
the tools and resources at our disposal. I end by rephrasing the Russell–Einstein
Manifesto of 1955 and the Normandy Manifesto of 2019: shall we put an end to the
human race or shall we renounce war and abolish nuclear and other weapons of
mass destruction? The choice is ours.
Science for Peace
Fabiola Gianotti
European Organization for Nuclear Research, Geneva, Switzerland
e-mail: fabiola.gianotti@cern.ch
I am very pleased to have the opportunity to talk about Science for Peace at
this conference, in particular by presenting two brilliant examples of successful
collaboration across borders: CERN, the European laboratory for particle physics
based in Geneva, Switzerland, and SESAME, the Synchrotron-Light for
Experimental Science and Applications in the Middle East, based in Allan, Jordan.
Let me first share with you some thoughts about what Science can do for Peace.
Science can play a key role in connecting people in today’s fractured world
because it is universal and unifying. Science is universal because it is based on
objective facts and not on opinions. The laws of nature are the same everywhere on
earth, at any time in history.
Science is unifying because the quest for knowledge and the passion for under-
standing how nature works are aspirations and values that are shared by all
humanity. Thus, scientific knowledge has no passport, gender, race or political party.
Another important role of science is related to the fact that we live in a society
characterized by the fast growth of technology and innovation. While these
developments have mostly positive consequences in terms of progress, they bring
with them the risk of exacerbating inequalities, hence contributing to political and
social unrest and widening the gap between developed and developing countries,
the rich and the poor, those who have access to education and those who don’t.
Open science (open-source software, open hardware, publications in open-access
journals, open data) and scientific education accessible to all play a crucial role in
reaching out to the less privileged sections of humanity, thus contributing to
capacity building and to reducing cultural and social gaps.
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Last but not least, it is important that scientists contribute to the debates on the
big societal and planetary challenges (e.g. the UN Sustainable Development Goals)
by bringing facts and scientific evidence to the table. They should advocate
scientific development as the foundation of progress against science-sceptical
trends. They should make governments and society aware of the consequences
of the possible misuse of scientific knowledge and technology and contribute to the
development of adequate policies (e.g. on ethical issues, non-proliferation of
weapons, etc.). And they should promote discussion at the global level and mul-
tilateral approaches. Scientific academies, in particular, can play a leading role in
this context by bringing scientists and governments and policy makers together.
Their impact is more significant when they join forces, as is the case with the
present conference jointly organised by Accademia dei Lincei and the US National
Academy of Sciences.
CERN, the largest particle physics laboratory in the world, is a brilliant example
of what science can do for peace. CERN is an intergovernmental organization based
on a treaty between Member States. Its mission is research in particle physics, the
most fundamental of all sciences as it studies the elementary constituents of matter
and the universe. Research at CERN has led over the decades to great discoveries,
the latest one being the Higgs boson in 2012, and to the award of Nobel prizes to
CERN scientists. CERN is also a driver of innovation. In fact, to accomplish its
ambitious scientific goals CERN needs to build complex instruments in the fields of
particle accelerators, particle detectors and computing infrastructure, and to develop
cutting-edge technologies in various domains, from superconducting magnets to
fast electronics, big data, cryogenics, etc. These technologies are transferred for free
to society, for the benefit of everybody’s lives. The most famous example of
CERN’s spin-off is the World Wide Web, which was developed at CERN in 1989
by Tim Berners-Lee and collaborators to facilitate the exchange of information
among the Laboratory’s scientists and was released in 1993 royalty-free for anyone
to use and improve. Other CERN technologies today find applications in fields such
as medical imaging and accelerators to treat cancer. The training of tomorrow’s
scientists and the scientific education of the general public are also part of CERN’s
mission and are achieved through a large number of initiatives that target, for
instance, high-school students and teachers. Last but not least, and most relevant to
this conference, CERN is a concrete example of peaceful collaboration across
borders, as it attracts some 18,000 scientists from all over the world (more than 110
nationalities are represented).
CERN was founded in 1954, in the aftermath of World War II, on the initiative
of visionary politicians and scientists (including Edoardo Amaldi) with the twofold
goal of bringing back scientific excellence to Europe and promoting peaceful
collaboration among European countries after the war. Hence, the concept of
“Science for Peace” is enshrined in CERN’s foundations. The CERN Convention,
which was signed in 1953 by 12 European countries under the auspices of
UNESCO, states that “The Organization shall provide for collaboration in nuclear
research of a pure scientific and fundamental character … The Organization shall
have no concern with work for military requirements and the results of its
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experimental and theoretical work shall be published or otherwise made generally
available…”. Thus, CERN’s Convention promotes scientific developments for
peaceful applications (“no concern with work for military requirements”) and open
science (“the results of its experimental and theoretical work shall be published or
otherwise made generally available”), two extremely modern concepts whose spirit
was already captured by CERN’s founding fathers.
The Convention also supports collaboration across borders (“the organization
and sponsoring of international cooperation”) and training and education (“the
dissemination of information and the provision of advanced training for research
workers”).
Since its inception, CERN has played an important role in breaking political
barriers, promoting in particular collaboration between scientists from eastern and
western countries during the period of the Cold War. The first scientific contacts
between CERN and the Soviet Union were established in the early the 1960s, and
the first cooperation agreement between them was signed in 1967. According to this
agreement, CERN would provide experimental equipment for a new accelerator
being built at the Protvino laboratory in Serpukhov (near Moscow) and, in
exchange, scientists from CERN’s Member States would participate in the scientific
programme of the new accelerator. During the 1970s, several joint CERN-Soviet
Union experiments were carried out at the Serpukhov facility and showed how
scientific collaboration can surmount political obstacles even in a very tense
international climate. Since then, several cooperation agreements have been signed
between CERN and the Soviet Union, and later the Russian Federation, the latest
one in April 2019. The relations between CERN and the countries of Eastern
Europe have grown significantly, with many of these countries now having become
the CERN Member States and some 1000 Russian scientists currently involved in
CERN’s projects.
Today CERN has 23 Member States and 8 Associate Member States (including
India and Pakistan). Membership is not limited to European countries, Israel being
one of the Member States. Big countries that are historical partners of CERN,
namely the USA, Japan and the Russian Federation, are Observers to the CERN
Council (the body that governs the organization). In addition, CERN has signed
some 50 international cooperation agreements, most of them with developing
countries. For these countries, engagement with CERN is part of their efforts towards
scientific and technological development and towards building a knowledge-based
economy, as well as a channel to strengthen their relations with other countries.
CERN’s annual budget amounts to 1.2 billion Swiss francs, and the Member States
contribute to it in proportion to their net national income. Non-Member States, such
as the USA, Japan and Russia, contribute à la carte, i.e. through one-off contributions
to specific projects. It should be emphasized that budget stability over the decades
and international cooperation have allowed extremely ambitious projects to be
realized that no single country could have afforded alone.
CERN currently operates the Large Hadron Collider (LHC), the most powerful
accelerator ever built. It is housed in a 27-km ring, which lies 100 m underground,
across the border between Switzerland and France. It deploys the most advanced
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technologies in terms of, e.g. superconducting magnets. Operation started in 2010.
Two beams of protons are accelerated in the two opposite directions of the ring up
to the highest energies allowed by the technology and are brought into collision at
four points of the ring, where four big experiments (ALICE, ATLAS, CMS and
LHCb) have been installed in four huge underground caverns. The task of the
experiments is to detect and measure the product of the proton-proton collisions
with high precision. The detectors are high-technology instruments of spectacular
size and complexity (ATLAS is about half the size of the Notre Dame cathedral in
Paris and CMS weighs twice as much as the Eiffel Tower). Two years after start-up,
on 4 July 2012, the ATLAS and CMS experiments reported the discovery of a new,
very special particle, the Higgs boson.
These great achievements would not have been possible without the contribu-
tions of scientists from all over the world.
Today, some 18,000 scientists work at CERN. About 60% of them come from
the Member States, some 2000 from the USA, 1000 from Russia and several
hundred from Japan and China. CERN also hosts scientists from developing
countries, such as Nepal, Mongolia and Madagascar. In this case, CERN’s mission
is to build capacity and help these countries to reduce the scientific and techno-
logical gap with other countries. Finally, some of the scientists involved in CERN’s
activities come from countries that are not the best of friends, e.g. Israel, Iran and
Palestine. Yet, at CERN they work together, driven by the same passion for
knowledge. About 50% of the scientists working at CERN are younger than 40,
many of them Ph.D. students and post-docs.
CERN offers many training and educational opportunities for its young popu-
lation, including regular “schools” of particle physics, accelerators, instrumentation
and computing. Since 2010, some of these schools have been held in Africa every
second year (in South Africa, Ghana, Senegal, Rwanda and Namibia so far), and are
jointly organized with research institutions across the world. Every year, the CERN
Summer Student Programme trains some 300 undergraduate students from all over
the world, including a significant number from developing countries.
The CERN-UNESCO schools on digital libraries are an example of the appli-
cation of CERN’s open science for education and training. These schools aim to
provide African librarians with the skills they need to run digital library systems,
thus improving African researchers’ access to information and increasing the global
visibility of African research. They have been held in Rwanda, Morocco, Senegal,
Ghana and Kenya so far and have been attended by 150 librarians from many
African countries. The library system is based on INVENIO, an open-source digital
platform developed at CERN.
Another brilliant example of science for peace is SESAME, the first facility for
fundamental and applied research in the Middle East. It is based in Allan, Jordan.
The Member States are Cyprus, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Pakistan, the Palestinian
Authority and Turkey. Some of these countries would not sit around the same table
for political discussions, yet at SESAME their scientists work together using the
same research facilities and sit around the same table to discuss science. SESAME
is an intergovernmental organization based on the CERN model of governance and
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scientific cooperation. CERN has also provided some of the accelerator compo-
nents. Operation started in 2017, and the first scientific paper has been published
recently.
Places like CERN, SESAME and other international scientific organizations
cannot directly solve geo-political conflicts. However, they can break down barriers
and help young generations to grow up in a respectful and tolerant environment
where diversity, inclusiveness and collaboration are promoted as great values. They
are shining examples of what humanity can achieve when we put aside our dif-
ferences and disputes and focus on the common good. I believe that science can
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Her Excellency Ambassador Belloni
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Director General Emeritus ElBaradei
Director General Gianotti
Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,
I have the honour to deliver this Tribute to His Excellency Ambassador Yukiya
Amano, who was Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) between December 2009 and July 2019.
Ambassador Amano brought both professional expertise and personal values and
commitment to his work, which resulted in a vision for the Agency. He had
extensive experience in disarmament and non-proliferation diplomacy, as well as
nuclear energy issues. At the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador
Amano was Director General for the Disarmament, Non-Proliferation and Science
Department from 2002 until 2005. He previously served as a governmental expert
on the United Nations Panel on Missiles and on the United Nations Expert Group
on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education. Ambassador Amano contributed
to the 1995, 2000 and 2005 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty Review Conferences,
and he chaired the 2007 Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Nuclear
Non-proliferation Treaty Review Conference.1
He was Japan’s Resident Representative to the IAEA from 2005 until his
election as Director General in July 2009.
1Cf. IAEA—Yukiya Amano’s biography.
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Ambassador Amano served as Chair of the IAEA Board of Governors from
September 2005 to September 2006, and in that period, he received on behalf of the
Agency the Nobel Peace Prize, shared with our keynote speaker, the distinguished
IAEA Director General Emeritus Mohammed ElBaradei, with this motivation: “for
their efforts to prevent nuclear energy from being used for military purposes and to
ensure that nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is used in the safest possible way”.
Ambassador Amano changed the motto of the IAEA to Atoms for Peace and
Development to better reflect the contribution of the Agency in assisting countries
in the peaceful use of nuclear technology for their development.
After the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident, he led the interna-
tional effort to provide assistance to Japan and actively encouraged the Member
States to learn the essential lessons from the accident. Ambassador Amano was an
active proponent of the strengthening of nuclear safety standards throughout the
world.2
In nuclear security, his efforts contributed greatly to the entry into force of the
Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.
During his term of office, the International Conference on Nuclear Security became
recognized as the leading forum for Ministers and other high-level representatives
of IAEA Member States to consider this topic.3
In July 2015, Ambassador Amano signed a roadmap with the Islamic Republic
of Iran for the clarification of possible military dimensions to its nuclear pro-
gramme. At the same time, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the group of countries
known as the P5—plus the European Union—agreed on the Joint Comprehensive
Plan of Action, the JCPoA.
I also wish to recall the participation of Ambassador Amano and His Excellency
Ali Akbar Salehi, Vice-President of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Head of the
Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, at the 2017 Edoardo Amaldi Conference on
60 Years IAEA and EURATOM. On this very important issue, Amano said at that
time.
[…] Even complex and challenging issues can be tackled effectively if all parties
are committed to dialogue—not dialogue for its own sake, but dialogue aimed at
achieving results. […] and quoting more […] the IAEA was able to make a vital
contribution, and maintain the confidence of all sides, by sticking to its technical
mandate and not straying into politics. […]
In that conference, Ambassador Amano gave examples of the IAEA’s work in
helping developing countries to use nuclear science and technology in areas such as
food production, electricity generation, the management of water supplies, pro-
tecting the oceans and responding to the effects of climate change and the human
health and, in particular, cancer control by radiotherapy, nuclear medicine and
imaging technology.
Then, my personal tribute. Let me express my deep gratitude because I had the
honour to be appointed by Ambassador Amano as Member of the IAEA Standing
2Cf. Memorial Ceremony for Director General Yukiya Amano, Vienna, 21 August 2019.
3Ibidem.
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Advisory Group on Technical Assistance and Cooperation with the purpose of
advising the Director General on IAEA’s technical cooperation activities in terms
of their relevance, delivery and impact.
Throughout his tenure as Director General, Ambassador Amano, served the
IAEA as well as its Member States with unwavering determination and commit-
ment. His leadership of the international response in the aftermath of the Fukushima
Daiichi nuclear accident, the modernization of the IAEA’s nuclear applications
laboratories in Seibersdorf and the increased international confidence in the cred-
ibility and impartiality of IAEA nuclear safeguards achieved during his tenure.4
Then, in September 2019, the IAEA General Conference unanimously adopted a
resolution to name a new facility in Seibersdorf “The Yukiya Amano Laboratories”.
Ambassador Amano leaves behind a strong legacy in every one of the IAEA’s
mission areas, be it non-proliferation, nuclear energy, nuclear safety, nuclear
security or technical cooperation.
On behalf of the Honourary Committee, I offer my condolences to Ambassador
Amano’s extended family and the IAEA staff.
Please, stand for a moment of silence and may his soul rest in peace. Thank you.
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e-mail: giorgio.parisi@lincei.it
I have the great pleasure of opening the XXI Edoardo Amaldi Conference. I am
grateful to the organizers of this conference, the Accademia dei Lincei, the US
National Academy of Sciences. I am particularly happy to have here the President
of the NAS Marcia McNutt. Her presence is a sign of the importance that our two
Academies attach to their collaboration: I am sure that these relationships will
increase in future.
We live in difficult and dangerous times: peace is at risk and the situation is
worsening in recent years. This conference addresses points that are crucial for our
future: it aims to understand how to set up international cooperation with the aim of
enhancing Nuclear Safety, Security, Safeguards and Non-Proliferation. It is not an
easy job, everyone wants Nuclear Safety and Security (at least for his own country):
the non-proliferation treaty indicates very clearly in which direction we should
move. Unfortunately, the implementation of this treaty has been very slow: in the
treaty is written in a clear way that the nuclear states have the obligation to pursue
in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament.
However, a general and complete nuclear disarmament is distant as ever and the
governments of nuclear states do not have it on their agenda.
Which could be an exit strategy from this stalemate? The role of scientists may
be crucial because they can be the link among people of different countries.
Scientists are well accustomed to international cooperation, we all work together
without paying attention to distinctions of race, nationality and so on: when we
discuss science only technical argument do matter.
This scientific attitude of discussing a problem trying to use only logical argu-
ment may be a great advantage when we aim to reach an agreement during more
difficult discussions where often arguments that seems rational have their deep roots
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in irrational feelings. Backchannel diplomacy may be successful in cases where
Track One diplomacy has serious difficulties to progress: it helps the various actors
to get a better understanding of the other actors.
Conferences like the present one are precious; I am pleased to acknowledge the
contribution and the help of all the people that worked so hard for its successful
realization:
– The Committee on International Security and Arms Control of the National
Academy of Sciences and the Working Group on International Security arma-
ment control that worked together to prepare this conference.
– The two chairs Luciano Maiani and Raymond Jeanloz, the organizing com-
mittee of the conference Marvin Adams, Francesco Calogero, Steve Fetter,
Micah Lowenthal, Alberto Quadrio Curzio, Carlo Schaerf and Edoardo
Vesentini and the wonderful Scientific Secretary Wolfango Plastino.
– The speakers and the other participants to the conference whose the presence
was crucial for its success: indeed, all the participants play an important role in
spreading around the ideas discussed in the conference that hopefully should
reach the governments of the various countries.
– Finally, the staff of the Accademia dei Lincei: the logistic organization was a
rather complex task because there have been two days before a quite large event,
the opening of the exhibition Leonardo a Roma.
I gratefully acknowledge the support from the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs,
from the National Research Council (CNR), from the National Institute of Nuclear
Physics (INFN) from the Enciclopedia Treccani and from the public Radio Television
Society (RAI).
Opening Address of the US National Academy of Sciences
Marcia McNutt
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I would like to begin by saying “Thank you” to President Parisi for hosting us in
this magnificent palazzo. It’s an honour to be here with you and your colleagues
and to be able to join you in welcoming this distinguished group to the Twenty-first
Edoardo Amaldi Conference, organized in a successful partnership between our two
Academies.
The US National Academy of Sciences has a historic connection to the Lincei
Academy. I hope that you will visit us in Washington, DC, and if you do, you will
see a homage to the Lincei Academy. Our historic building was completed in 1924
when we were a young Academy—only 61 years old. In the Great Hall where all the
assemblies of the Academy membership were held, artists created murals and dec-
orations to inspire our scientists. In the arches above the galleries are renditions
of the insignia of four of the world's oldest academies of sciences. The crowned lynx
of the Accademia dei Lincei is in the east arch, reminding us of the scientific home
Galileo Galilei, his accomplishments, and the importance of speaking truth to power.
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There are problems and opportunities today that we as scientists need to address.
We need to share what we know, to work together across political boundaries, to
develop new technologies and apply novel strategies to help humanity preserve our
very existence and, hopefully, improve the richness of the human experience.
Climate change threatens people and ecosystems around the globe. Rapidly
emerging bioscience offers enormous promise to eradicate diseases, but also
potential risks of accidental and intentional harm. We convene today to talk about
nuclear issues at a time of transitions when much is still unknown. We will talk
about nuclear weapons and how to preserve security. About nuclear energy and
how to promote safety and prosperity. And about nuclear science and how we
together, joined by our quest for knowledge and our pursuit of the common interests
of all, can do our part to make an increasingly divisive and dangerous world more
connected and safe. Free, open and reciprocally beneficial collaborations among
scientists around the world, based on transparent and mutually respectful interac-
tions are essential to science and to science advice on these and other topics.
The National Academy of Sciences’ Committee on International Security and
Arms Control, CISAC, was formed nearly 40 years ago and engages counterparts in
Russia, China and India in bilateral dialogues on all of these issues and more: space
security, biosecurity, cyber-security and the implications of artificial intelligence in
military systems. Composed of natural scientists, retired military leaders and policy
and area experts, CISAC utilizes the common language of science and importantly
the common understanding of evidence-based reasoning and how to establish facts.
You have seen in the programme the history of the Amaldi Conferences and their
connection to CISAC. We are proud to co-organize this conference and pleased to
engage this broader group.
You will hear many talks over the next two days. None of us expects that this
will be one harmonious song; there are real disagreements on these issues and we
want to discuss them, not avoid them. Our organizations were formed on the
premise that, if we begin with facts and apply scientific knowledge and reason, we
can reach a better understanding of these disagreements and, in some cases, find
solutions. At this conference, we will work to understand each other and to make
progress towards solutions. I look forward to the discussions.
Opening Address of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International
Cooperation
Elisabetta Belloni
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Rome, Italy
e-mail: elisabetta.belloni@esteri.it
Presidents, Chairpersons, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,
It is an honour for me to deliver this opening address to the twenty-first edition
of the “Amaldi Conference” dedicated to International Cooperation for Enhancing
Nuclear Safety, Security, Safeguards and Non-proliferation. The conference,
organized by the Accademia dei Lincei together with the US National Academy of
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Sciences, relies on the support of different national institutions, including the Italian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation.
I would like to associate myself in paying tribute to the legacy of Director
General Amano. Thanks to his professionalism, unwavering commitment and
skilful leadership, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has further
advanced along its pattern of “Atoms for Peace and Development” and is carrying
out an impressive work to ensure security and safety of nuclear activities around the
globe and to help countries achieve the goals of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development. I am confident that the next Director General, under selection during
these weeks by the members of the IAEA, will continue to lead effectively the
Agency in a challenging environment.
I would also like to recall the memory of Edoardo Amaldi, whose studies on
nuclear physics have greatly contributed to the design of particle accelerators. He
was particularly engaged with our National Institute of Nuclear Physics and the
European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN). He stood among the most
recognized nuclear scientists worldwide and joined the Pugwash Conferences on
Science and World Affairs. I am particularly grateful to the Accademia dei Lincei
for its commitment to the memory of such an important physicist and former
President of the Academy itself.
The non-proliferation and disarmament community is currently engaged in the
preparation of the next year Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT). In this regard, let me emphasize the importance Italy attaches to the NPT: it
remains the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime and the essential
foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament, as well as the basis for further
development of nuclear applications for peaceful purposes. In our views, these three
mutually reinforcing pillars are still perfectly valid today.
It is with this approach that Italy is actively participating in the review cycle and
is systematically emphasizing the substantial benefits, which the Treaty has so far
ensured. In almost fifty years since its entry into force, the NPT has hugely con-
tributed to strengthen the credibility of the non-proliferation norm. As a result of its
legal obligations (Article III), almost the entire international community has safe-
guards arrangements with the Agency, which allow inspections to nuclear instal-
lations. Along the years the NPT has been remarkably successful in containing the
number of states possessing nuclear weapons. And we have to jointly work to
guarantee that despite all the challenges it remains successful.
In terms of nuclear disarmament, we are convinced that the best approach
remains enshrined in the framework of Article VI of the NPT, which provides the
only realistic legal framework to attain a world without nuclear weapons in a way
that promotes international stability and based on the principle of undiminished
security for all.
Our approach relies on the idea that the goal of a nuclear-weapons-free world
can be gradually reached, implying the involvement of all relevant actors and
through a series of concrete and progressive steps. In this regard, Italy has always
been a staunch supporter of the entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT) and has always strongly promoted the start of negotiations of a
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treaty prohibiting the further production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or
other explosive devices.
Italy shares the widespread concerns about the catastrophic consequences of
nuclear weapons’ use and we are aware of the continuing nuclear risks for
humanity. In this context, I believe that the International Community has to
recommit to the concept of cooperative security, which over the decades, through
effective strategic arms control agreements, has enhanced transparency, contributed
to build confidence and substantially reduced stockpiles. We attach therefore the
highest importance to the New START Treaty and would welcome early and active
dialogue on its future post-2021 and on other arms control arrangements.
The reflection on the NPT brings me to address the severe stress, which the
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPoA) on the Iranian nuclear programme
is currently experiencing. I would like to emphasize in this context that the
JCPoA is a key element of the global non-proliferation architecture, whose
implementation is of paramount importance. The Director General for Political
Affairs and Security, Ambassador Cardi, will further elaborate on this issue, as
well as on the serious North Korean proliferation crisis, in his address during the
first Panel.
Italy will continue supporting the whole range of the IAEA’s activities both
financially, as the seventh contributor to the regular budget, and politically, also in
its present capacity as a current member of the Agency’s Board of Governors.
Italy highly values the vital role of the IAEA in strengthening capacities
worldwide for the safe, secure and peaceful use of nuclear science and technology,
in line with the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.
Nuclear science and technology can be applied in a number of sectors, far
beyond nuclear power, and in critical domains, such as medical therapy against
tumours. In this respect, Italy is particularly committed to making the added value
of nuclear science and technology available for the entire world.
We substantially contribute to the technical cooperation fund of the Agency,
which helps countries across the globe to benefit from atomic technology for their
own prosperity, and we host in Trieste the Abdus Salam International Centre for
Theoretical Physics (ICTP), which is a driving force behind global efforts to
advance scientific expertise in the developing world.
I am particularly pleased that each year a number of foreign researchers are
hosted in national laboratories and medical structures in the framework of fellow-
ships financed under the Agency’s technical cooperation fund and managed in
cooperation with the ICTP.
My country is also at the forefront of advanced research in nuclear science and
technology, starting from the development of particle accelerators at the National
Institute for Nuclear Physics and at the Elettra Sincrotrone Centre in Trieste. Let me
also remind you about the Italian engagement for and within the European
Organization for Nuclear Research. In this respect, I am particularly pleased that
Director General Fabiola Gianotti is together with us today.
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The Italian scientific community is particularly involved in state-of-the-art
nuclear applications for nuclear medicine (e.g. the laboratories of the National
Institute for Nuclear Physics) and for nuclear fusion (e.g. the involvement of the
National Agency for New Technologies, Energy and Sustainable Economic
Development in the ITER international project).
Let me finally conclude that Italy remains fully committed to the achievement of
a better nuclear security environment and will continue to support all international
efforts aiming at this outcome.
For the safety of its nuclear installations, Italy will continue to implement its
national policy for decommissioning and safe management of spent fuel and
radioactive waste in strict cooperation with the International Atomic Energy
Agency. Just a couple of weeks ago Sogin—our national company for decom-
missioning—has been recognized by the IAEA as collaborating centre with the aim
of sharing its expertise in international training programmes.
In terms of national regulation, I would like to recall that since more than one
year the National Inspectorate for Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection (ISIN)
has been working as a new national regulatory authority, strengthened in its powers,
independence, financial and human resources.
Presidents,
Chairpersons,
Let me thank you and your staff for the organization of this conference. The
exceptional level of keynote speakers and panellists is a clear evidence of your
success in preparing a debate, which I am confident will be fruitful, intense and
thought-provoking.
Thank you for your attention.
Opening Address of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs
Izumi Nakamitsu
United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, New York, United Nations
e-mail: izumi.nakamitsu@un.org
Distinguished participants, Ladies and gentlemen,
It is a pleasure to address you as part of the Twenty-first Edoardo Amaldi
Conference. I would like to commend the Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei for your
commitment to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and thank you for
organizing this event.
Since the first General Assembly resolution in 1946, the United Nations has
made the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction one of its highest priorities.
Yet today, that objective is under threat. The progress achieved in nuclear disar-
mament and non-proliferation, especially in the last thirty years, is being unwound.
A qualitative arms race is underway as states that possess nuclear weapons mod-
ernize their arsenals. Key multilateral bodies are stalemated as differences over how
to pursue disarmament grow wider.
xxvi Opening Addresses
The arms control framework that helped bring about the end of the Cold War is
being eroded. The demise of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty has, as
Secretary-General Guterres cautioned, removed a vital brake on nuclear war.
Should the so-called New START Treaty between the USA and the Russian
Federation not be extended before its expiration in 2021 there will be no limit on
the world’s two largest nuclear arsenals.
These realities underscore starkly that a “business as usual” approach will not
work. This is precisely why the Secretary-General launched a new vision for global
disarmament in May last year in the form of his agenda for disarmament, “Securing
Our Common Future”.
The purpose of this agenda is to generate new momentum and partnerships that
seek to tackle disarmament in a comprehensive manner and through the involve-
ment of all stakeholders. It represents a call for concrete, practical actions, har-
nessing the capacities of the United Nations to support Member States in their
endeavours to create a safer and more secure world across four distinct but mutually
reinforcing pillars.
Let me highlight a few key aspects related to the first of these pillars,
Disarmament to Save Humanity. The focus of this pillar is clear: to eliminate
weapons of mass destruction and, in particular, nuclear weapons.
It appeals to all States to affirm that it is in the interest of national, collective and
human security, as well as the survival of humanity, that nuclear weapons are never
used again under any circumstances.
The total elimination of nuclear weapons can only be obtained through rein-
vigorated dialogue and serious negotiations between Member States to return to a
common vision leading towards a world free of nuclear weapons.
As the Secretary-General advised the Conference on Disarmament earlier this
year, what is needed is a new vision for disarmament, arms control and non-
proliferation. One that secures the gains we have made and also tackles the chal-
lenges of the twenty-first century.
The upcoming 2020 Review Conference of the Treaty on the non-proliferation
of nuclear weapons, marking the fiftieth anniversary of its entry into force, provides
an important platform to move forward on these goals. I trust that States parties will
make the most of this opportunity to consider how to ensure the future of the
disarmament and non-proliferation regime.
As we look ahead, it is my hope that forums such as this one can help to
invigorate dialogue and exchange, to overcome obstacles and to identify shared
pathways and partnerships.
I look forward to working with you towards securing our common future and I
wish you the best for your conference.
Thank you.
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Opening Address of the European Commission for Foreign Affairs
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Cari Amici, dear Friends,
Let me thank the Accademia dei Lincei for inviting me to this year’s Amaldi
Conference, and apologies for not being with you in person.
You opened the conference with a tribute to Amano, and I would like to thank
you for this.
As you know, Amano and I worked very closely together, in these years, in
particular on the implementation of the nuclear deal with Iran.
Thanks to the deal, the International Atomic Energy Agency has been tasked to
monitor and verify Iran's compliance with its nuclear-related commitments—which
is an incredibly sensitive and delicate task.
Amano carried out this task with professionalism and impartiality. The political
pressure was immense, but he always focused exclusively on establishing the facts
—leaving politics aside.
He set an example of personal integrity. But he also demonstrated how crucial it
is for the world to rely on a multilateral institution such as the International Atomic
Energy Agency—an independent, impartial and credible global institution.
Multilateral global governance is the best and only way to guarantee our col-
lective security—and this should be self-evident when it comes to nuclear weapons.
Our non-proliferation architecture aims first and foremost at making our world a
safer place. Dismantling such architecture would make the world a more dangerous
place. It is a risk that none of us can afford.
So our first duty is to preserve the rules that we have built together and to work
together for their full implementation.
I have mentioned the Iran nuclear deal, and the work we are doing to preserve it.
I am just back from New York, where I gathered the Foreign Ministers of China,
France, Germany, Russia, the UK and Iran, for a ministerial Joint Commission
meeting. Together we confirmed that our goal is the full and effective implemen-
tation of the deal, by all sides, and preserving the agreement in these difficult times.
If all existing agreements were fully implemented, our world would already be a
much safer place. I also think of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, or
the entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
In the coming months and years the future of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and
of the New START Treaty, will be discussed too. This is all essential for our
collective security.
So, the most urgent task is to avoid that the world moves backwards and prevent
the worst from happening. But we must also prepare the ground for better times to
come.
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The way forward is multilateralism. From North Korea to the Middle East, only
a multilateral framework can help achieve sustainable solutions, which can stand
the test of time.
This is the European way. This has been our compass in these five years of work.
Multilateral solutions for non-proliferation and disarmament.
Multilateralism for peace and security.
In a changing world, this is still the best way forward. The only way towards a
more peaceful and secure future.
Thank you.
Opening Address of the Committee on International Security and Arms
Control of the US National Academy of Sciences
Raymond Jeanloz
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e-mail: jeanloz@berkeley.edu
It is a great pleasure to join my distinguished colleagues in welcoming you to the
Twenty-first Amaldi Conference on International Cooperation for Enhancing
Nuclear Safety, Security, Safeguards and Non-Proliferation.
I am especially pleased that the US National Academy of Sciences Committee
on International Security and Arms Control has had the opportunity to collaborate
with the Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei in organizing this important meeting. Our
venue—within a Member State of the European Union and NATO, and with close
proximity to the Holy See—offers new opportunities for dialogue between states. It
is truly inspiring to see such leading experts in science and technology, as well as in
policy and moral domains, come together to address some of the world’s most
daunting problems.
These are problems in which science and technology have played a central role,
and through which we hope that science and technology can help to identify fun-
damental solutions. Indeed, we continue to see the rapid development of technologies
that promise great advances for human well being, but that also bring enormous
challenges to the security and sustainability of modern societies. From climate change
and environmental challenges, to the uncertain risks of bio-technology and threats in
cyber and space domains, we see the potential for chaos and catastrophe associated
with our most sophisticated human activities.
This is no less the case with the topic of the present conference: the nuclear
threat. All the more so, as the nuclear domain includes the most physically powerful
technologies developed to date by our species.
When I refer to science and technology providing solutions, I mean more than
the invention of new technologies to help control those that already exist. Perhaps
more significantly, I also mean applying the approaches used in science and
technology, approaches that depend on communication; on collaboration; and on
objective analysis leading to replicable results. In short, it is our intent for the
scientific community to help civil society make the right decisions in containing and
controlling technology, so that it best serves our mutual and collective benefit.
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As an example of such approaches, I briefly describe the work of the Committee
on International Security and Arms Control. Within the US Academy, the
Committee works to address the most daunting problems in international security,
including control of nuclear, biological, cyber and space technologies; and on
countering terrorism and the malicious proliferation of technologies. As with the
rest of our Academy, we focus on independent analysis based on reliable evidence,
whether or not the results are comfortable to us or to our government.
One of our main activities is to use the global network of communication and
collaboration among scientific researchers to establish new channels of communi-
cation between nations. In particular, we initiate discussions on security topics that
are too difficult for direct communication between governments. The topics may be
scientifically demanding, or politically sensitive for one side or the other, but the
objective is to start with a technical focus in order to create conditions for com-
munication—and ultimately dialogue—between nations.
The nature of this approach requires that we work quietly, with the least public
attention possible, as discussions are initiated, and mutual trust can be established.
I should clarify that although we are independent, our activities are scrutinized by
our Academy and discussed with our government in order to ensure that our work
is appropriate, sound and helpful. One measure of our success is then the extent
to which our discussions are taken over into direct government-to-government
communications.
We have longstanding experience in developing such channels of communica-
tion, including decades’ worth of quiet dialogues with several partners.
Nevertheless, it is sometimes necessary to discuss more publicly the critical matters
that face humanity in international security. Recent developments around the world,
including modernization of nuclear arsenals; the evolution, if not erosion, of arms
control regimes; the increased recognition of enormous humanitarian and envi-
ronmental consequences of nuclear war; and many more reasons impel us all to
bring relevant scientific knowledge to the world at large, and this is the point of the
present conference.
I therefore want to end my remarks so that we can proceed with our important
agenda. There is much work to be done; and it is time for us to move forward with
our discussions.
Opening Address of the International Security and Arms Control Working
Group of the Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei
Luciano Maiani
Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, Rome, Italy
e-mail: luciano.maiani@cern.ch
It is a great honour and pleasure to open the XXI Amaldi Conference on
International Cooperation for Enhancing Nuclear Safety, Security, Safeguards, and
Non-Proliferation, organised jointly by the Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei and the
US National Academy of Sciences, with the support of Ministero degli Affari
Esteri, Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche and Istituto nazionale di Fisica Nucleare.
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We gratefully acknowledge the patronage of the Conference by the President
of the Italian Republic.
A few dates—The Edoardo Amaldi Conferences have been established at the end
of the Eighties from the efforts of distinguished scientist, with a vast participation
of the Scientific Community, to provide accurate and unbiased information to their
Governments on the themes of Disarmament and Arm Control.
1980. The US National Academy of Sciences establishes CISAC (Committee on
International Security and Armament Control), to maintain bilateral contacts with
an analogous group at the Soviet Academy of Science. Among CISAC components
Wolfgang Panofsky, eminent physicist, founder and first director of the Stanford
Linear Accelerator Center. Panofsky Co-Chaired CISAC from 1985 to 1993,
together with E. P. Velikov. The CISAC meeting on International Security and
Armament Control was soon extended beyond the limitation of a direct link
between the USA and the USSR. About ten scientists from European countries
participated. The possibility of establishing in Europe a group of scientists with a
role analogous to that of CISAC was discussed.
1987. Edoardo Amaldi sets up SICA (a working group on International Security
and Arms Control), at Accademia dei Lincei. A first informal SICA meeting was
held in Rome at Lincei on 23–25 June 1988: Workshop on International Security
and Disarmament: The Role of the Scientific Academies. While preparing the third
Meeting, Edoardo Amaldi unexpectedly dies. He was then President of Accademia
Nazionale dei Lincei.Participants of the 1990 meeting decided to dedicate future
meetings to the memory of Edoardo Amaldi, hence the name Edoardo Amaldi
Conferences.
1991–2011. Edoardo Amaldi Conferences have been regularly held at Lincei
and elsewhere in Europe.
In 2015 and 2017. With the support of Ministero degli Affari Esteri, the present
format of the Edoardo Amaldi Conferences was adopted, with important partici-
pation from new countries in the Middle East and Asia (China, Egypt, India, Isreal,
Iran, Japan, Pakistan).
Back to our origin—2019 SICA (Accademia dei Lincei) and CISAC (US
National Academy of Sciences) have Co-organised the 21st edition.
From the next year, the Lecture on Security and Disarmament, held in 2016
and 2018 under the name of Edoardo Amaldi Lecture, will transform into
the Amaldi-Panofsky Lectures and will be organised by the US NAS in
Washington, DC.
Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World—The Scientific Community has
actively participated in the effort towards a Nuclear Weapon-free World, since the
very aftermath of Iroshima and Nagasaki.
Non-Governmental Organizations, with the Pugwash Conference Organization,
the International Physicians for the Prevention of a Nuclear War (IPPN) and others
have greatly contributed to raise in the public opinion the awareness that employing
nuclear weapons is absurd under any possible circumstance.
Multilateral organizations, the United Nations, the International Atomic Energy
Agency, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization and others have
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provided impartial, objective, authoritative reporting of the behaviour of individual
states otherwise impossible to provide to the international public opinion.
These are the pillars under which considerable progress on Security and Arm
Control has taken place over the last decades, starting from the Non-Proliferation
Treaty of 1970.
The efforts have been recognized by four Nobel Peace Prizes: in 1985 (given to
the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War), 1995 (to Joseph
Rotblat and to the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs), 2005 (to
Mohamed Elbaradei and to the International Atomic Energy Agency) and in 2017
(to the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons—ICAN).
The XXI Amaldi Conference—The past five years have seen a dramatic esca-
lation in the danger of nuclear conflicts and many positive steps towards disar-
mament and arms control are in danger. Resuming the dialogue among different
blocks, ideologies and cultures is badly needed.
The Twenty-first Edoardo Amaldi Conference aims to provide a forum where
eminent scientists, diplomats and policy makers will be able to compare national
perspectives and international collaborations, while discussing how “Science
beyond Boundaries” will enhance nuclear non-proliferation policies.
We wish you all a fruitful and interesting participation.
Before concluding, I would like to express our sincere thanks to:
– Marcia Mc Nutt and Giorgio Parisi, Presidents of US National Academy of
Sciences and of Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, for their continuous
encouragement;
– Ministero Affari Esteri, CNR, INFN for support;
– The Scientific Board: Raymond Jeanloz, Co-chair, Wolfango Plastino, Scientific
Secretary, Marvin Adams, Francesco Calogero, Steve Fetter, Micah Lowenthal,
Alberto Quadrio Curzio, Carlo Schaerf and Edoardo Vesentini, Members, for
their valuable support;
– RAI TV for efficiently covering our event.
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As Chairman of the panel, “New and evolving voices in arms control and disarma-
ment”, I take the opportunity to start with an evaluation as president emeritus of
Lincei and member of the board of Amaldi Conferences.
In fact, this initiative has many aspects of method that fulfill the aims of a National
Academy like Lincei. I refer mainly to the role of sciences for policies1 in fields that
are relevant for human development. In the case of Amaldi Conferences, sciences
are connected both to policies and to politics in the worldwide scenario under the
umbrella of mutual understanding that this initiative has built up since 1988.
The panel ofmy chairmanship impliesmany of these aspects that can be classified,
at least, in the two broad categories of institutional and economic issueswhile heavily
focusing on the core topic of international security.
Security and Complexity—The concept of security, in its very general meaning,
points to the preservation of a condition of safeness, both for states and individuals
but in a more precise meaning must be considered in the context of a global growing
condition of complexity and economic interdependence.
The concept of complexity in contemporary world reveals to be of great interest
when it is associated with the issue of nuclear disarmament, which implies now an
interplay of institutional and political, economic and social factors.
One way to show this complexity of interplays is to start with the problem of
climate change which is in these days one of the most known and discussed. To
many it might appear far from that on nuclear disarmament and this is exactly the
reason on which we base our reasoning to demonstrate the connections.
To date, the debate around climate change is framed in terms of adaptation. If
adaptive actions to climate change are to be taken, there could be a point beyond
1See alsoAccademiaNazionale dei Lincei, “G7 Science AcademiesMeeting 2017”, Bardi Edizioni,
Rome 2017.
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which adaptation could be more cost sensitive than nuclear deterrent. This is the
case of the would-be water scarcity in the Himalayan region, related to the melting
of the Himalaya’s glaciers, that constitute the major source of fresh water for, at least,
India, Pakistan and thewestern regions of China. These three countries are all nuclear
powers and, in theworst-case scenario, their nuclear deterrent could turn into themost
viable option to exert political and military pressure over their neighbors in order
to secure their fresh water supplies. This example, extensively cited in international
fora to address the theme of climate change, helps us in understanding many of the
facts and findings exposed by the contributors to this panel.
Bilateralism and Multilateralism—The institutional and economic aspects of
nuclear disarmament are strictly intertwined to the extent that the institutional frame-
work of disarmament initiatives must always take in consideration the economic
landscape in which such disarmament should take place.
Looking to the past we must say that most of the existing nuclear arms control
instruments reflect the cold-war concerns towards nuclear arms reduction and, in
general, the U.S.–Russia competition for nuclear supremacy. Although a reduction
in both the U.S. and Russia’s nuclear arsenal is highly desirable, today most of
the challenges arise from regional instability and nuclear proliferation by countries
tempted by regional hegemonic ‘adventures’.
Looking to the present and to the future the scenario changes. While maintaining
a stronghold on existing bilateral disarmament initiatives, like the START, the INF
and the Russian-U.S. arms control treaties, new emphasis should be put on existing
global and multilateral nuclear disarmament initiatives, like the EU’s and UN’s. A
particular stress is to be put on this point as multilateralism is the most powerful
tool to achieve peace and development and is as well the issue-area in which Europe
plays an important role. I would say that this role is fundamental, given the rising
worldwide tendency towards neo-protectionism and neo-confrontation.2
The EU non-proliferation and disarmament consortium, as we all know, embod-
ies the European Union’s commitment to nuclear disarmament. The consortium is
overtly devoted to make its contribution to nuclear disarmament worldwide, also at
the legal level through a resolution of the European Parliament (res. 2016/2936).
United Europe has been built on peace, that is also one of its fundamental values
as it is clearly stated in the preamble of the Treaty of Rome (1957):
[…] Intending to confirm the solidarity which binds Europe and the overseas countries and
desiring to ensure the development of their prosperity, in accordance with the principles of
the Charter of the United Nations,
Resolved by thus pooling their resources to preserve and strengthen peace and liberty, and
calling upon the other peoples of Europe who share their ideal to join in their efforts,
Determined to promote the development of the highest possible level of knowledge for their
peoples through a wide access to education and through its continuous updating […]
2On these topics, see also: Alberto Quadrio Curzio, “Europa e profili di sviluppo”,
Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, Relazione Conclusiva dell’Anno Accademico 2018-2019, Roma
20 Giugno 2019: https://www.lincei.it/sites/default/files/A_QuadrioCurzio_Europa_e_profili_di_
sviluppo2019_06_20.pdf; and Alberto Quadrio Curzio, “Europa: il Futuro”, Federazione Nazionale
dei Cavalieri del Lavoro, Napoli 28 Settembre 2019.
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Extremely clear on these principles is article 11 of the Italian Constitution, which
states:
Italy rejects war as an instrument of aggression against the freedom of other peoples and as
a means for the settlement of international disputes. Italy agrees, on conditions of equality
with other States, to the limitations of sovereignty that may be necessary to a world order
ensuring peace and justice among the Nations. Italy promotes and encourages international
organisations furthering such ends.
The United Nation multilateral initiative, as we all know, is constituted by the new
agenda ‘Securing Our Common Future‘, launched by the Secretary General António
Guterres, in May. In December, the UN General Assembly First Committee adopted
a resolution calling for the UN Secretary General to convene a conference in 2019
on creating a weapons of mass destruction free zone in the Middle East and every
year thereafter until a zone is achieved.3
Nuclear disarmament: the inadequate transparency—Moreover, when address-
ing the problem of nuclear disarmament, two key issues deserve great attention:
transparency and cost.
As for January 2019, the estimation for the total amount of nuclear weapons
stockpiles around theworldwas of 13,865, distributed among 9 countries. TheUnited
States and Russia hold the 90% of the world total with respectively 6185 (USA)
and 6500 (RUS), followed by France (300), China (290), the UK (200), Pakistan
(150–160), India (130–140), Israel (80–90) and North Korea (20–30).
All these estimations are based on analytically based researches of independent
bodies, like SIPRI,4 according to the information disclosed by certain States. To this
respect, attitudes vary significantly. Among the most transparent States, there are
the United States and the UK, followed by France. These three States have disclosed
reliable information about the status of their nuclear arsenals and the plannedmilitary
spending in nuclear weapons (be it maintenance or renewal). Other States, like China,
India and Pakistan, make no secret of their nuclear status, but disclose no information
about the status of their arsenals or their planned military spending in that area.
Finally, a longstanding domestic political tradition put Israel on the list of the total
non-disclosure policy.
The Russian Federation follows a particular policy of public non-disclosure.
The Russian government prefers instead to share the information with the U.S.
government, in the framework of the New Start treaty negotiations.
Given this picture of the international reality, what can be said is that even if
nuclear stockpiles followed a declining path across the last decades, the issue of
nuclear disarmament keeps being obstructed by the lack of transparency by some
of the existing nuclear powers. The main point is that, even if the total number of
nuclear warheads declines, nuclear capabilities do not. The lack of transparency in
military spending for nuclear programmes make it difficult to assess whether or not
3Res. A/C.1/73/L.1 (https://undocs.org/A/C.1/73/L.1). Israel, Micronesia and the United States
voted against the resolution and 71 countries abstained.
4SIPRI Yearbook 2019. Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, pp.10–11 https://
www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/yb19_summary_eng_1.pdf.
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governments invest money to increase the efficiency of smaller arsenals. This is a
great challenge for nuclear disarmament and international peace.
This opens the issues of controls and sanctions, which will be dealt in the
contribution of Tibor Tóth—Executive Secretary Emeritus CTBTO.
Nuclear desarmament and military spending—In 2018, the world total military
spending has been estimated to be $1.8 trillion in 2018, accounting for 2.1% of
world gross domestic product (GDP) or $239 per person. For the first time in history,
the 2018 represented the highest point of global military spending. According to
SIPRI 2019 yearbook data,5 the five biggest spenders in 2018 were the USA, China,
Saudi Arabia, India and France, which together accounted for 60% of global military
spending. The USA increased its military spending for the first time in seven years to
reach $649 billion in 2018. Spending by theUSAaccounted for 36%ofworldmilitary
spending and was 2.6 times more than the next highest spender, China. The rise in
U.S. military spending can be attributed to two factors: a 2.4% increase in the salaries
of military personnel; and the implementation of large and costly conventional and
nuclear arms acquisition programmes. China allocated an estimated $250 billion to
its military in 2018. This represented a 5.0% increase compared with 2017 and an
83% increase since 2009. China’smilitary spending is roughly linked to the country’s
economic growth,which slowed in 2018 to the lowest level in 28 years. Slower growth
in military spending can therefore be expected in the coming years.
Somefinal remarks: Peace and Sustainable development goals—Todate, disarme-
ment is included only implicitly and not explicitly in the Sustainable Development
Goals (SDGs). The disarmament issue could be desumed from SDGs 16.1 and 16.4.
According to the SDG 16.1, the aim must be that of “Significantly reduce all forms
of violence and related death rates everywhere”, while the SDG 16.4 says that “By
2030, significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen the recovery and
return of stolen assets and combat all forms of organized crime”. Another source
from which one can desume a committment to disarmament can be found in the
SDGs 3 (Good health and well-being), 4 (Quality education) and 8 (Decent Work
and economic growth).
Besides the explicit reference of SDGs 16.1 and 16.4 to violence, arms trafficking
andfinancial related issues, the linkingpoint of SDGs3, 4 and8 to disarmament is rep-
resented by the different use of financial resources, from nuclear arms development
towards social, sanitary and educational purposes.
To have an idea of the volume of the financial resources devoted to nuclear pro-
grammes development and of the possible different uses that public authorities could
do of these resources, I will give you two examples.
The first one concerns the costs of the British ‘Trident’ nuclear programme. Every
year, it costs to british taxpayers around £ 2bn and the british government has planned
a total expense in nuclear programme’s related activities a total amount of £ 100bn.At
the same time, there are many studies pointing to the underfinancing of the National
Health System (NHS), which is quantified in a gap of £ 2bn per year.
5SIPRI Yearbook 2019. Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, pp. 6–7 https://www.
sipri.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/yb19_summary_eng_1.pdf.
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Just to have an idea, the necessary investment to meet the requirements of SDG
9/6—Basic infrastructure: roads, rail and ports; power stations; water and sanitation;
SDG 2—food security: agriculture and rural development; SDG 12/13—climate
change mitigation and adaptation; SDG 3–5: health and education, should be com-
prised between 4 and 7 trillion U.S. dollars per year globally (World Investment
Report 2014, UNCTAD).
Obviously the goal of disarmament, at least at the nuclear level, is both ambitious
and difficult to realize. As it happens in every field of human activity, uncertainty and
lack of complete informations could discourage international actors to take desarma-
ment initiatives. To this respect, as Robin Grimes—Rs And Mod, United Kingdom,
in this session tells us, interests and needs are to be taken in consideration also in the
institutional design process of desarmement initiatives.
I like to conclude mentioning the speech of Amb. Cardi who express the official
position of the Italian Institution. He is very clear on the possibility of factoring in the
element of multilateralism. In a condition of uncertainty, incomplete information and
cost-benefit approach to nuclear disarmament, the multilateral institutional design
is the only viable option in taking new initiatives and boosting existing ones in the
field of international nuclear security.
Acknowledgements The author thanks Dr. Giovanni Barbieri Ph.D. for his suggestions and
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Chapter 2
Message to the Participants of the XXI
Edoardo Amaldi Conference
Paul Richard Gallagher
Your Excellencies, distinguished Panelists, dear Ladies and Gentlemen,
It is a pleasure to address you with a brief message at the XXI Edoardo Amaldi
Conference on International Cooperation for Enhancing Nuclear Safety, Security,
Safeguards and Non-Proliferation.
Today’s meeting is very pertinent, given the difficulties that we are unfortu-
nately witnessing in the field of arms control and, in particular, nuclear weapons
disarmament and non-proliferation.
As mentioned recently by His Eminence Card. Pietro Parolin, the Holy See’s
Secretary of State, at the General Assembly High-Level Plenary Meeting to com-
memorate and promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear
Weapons (New York, 26 September 2019), “the lapse of the Intermediate—Range
Nuclear Forces Treaty, the failure to achieve entry into force of the Comprehensive
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the inability of the Conference on Disarmament even to
begin negotiations on a ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons,
the so-called “modernization” of nuclear weapons and delivery systems, and the
instabilities at play in the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Program of
Action […] areworrying signs of an erosion ofmultilateralism and of the ruled-based
order […] One might be tempted to lose hope in face of the setbacks, the impasse
or the very slow progress in the disarmament agenda, in particular in the area of
nuclear disarmament. However, perseverance and determination should characterize
our common efforts to move toward the elimination of nuclear weapons. We must
make every effort to avoid dismantling the international architecture of arms control,
especially in the field of weapons of mass destruction” .
The Holy See is totally committed in this effort. This is demonstrated by the
fact that it is Party to the main multilateral Treaties concerning nuclear weapons:
P. R. Gallagher (B)
Holy See’s Secretariat of State, Vatican City, Holy See
e-mail: rapportistati@sds.va
© The Author(s) 2020
L. Maiani et al. (eds.), International Cooperation for Enhancing Nuclear Safety,
Security, Safeguards and Non-proliferation, Springer Proceedings in Physics 243,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42913-3_2
9
10 P. R. Gallagher
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Comprehen-
sive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear
Weapons. Each is a component of the international regime of nuclear disarmament
and non-proliferation, which also includes the IAEA Safeguards Agreements and
related Additional Protocols, the Agreements for nuclear-weapons-free zones, as
well as various other bilateral agreements. All of them play a complementary role
in the difficult path to achieve the long-term and complex goal of a nuclear weapons
free world, desired by the whole international community.
The common goal of a nuclear free world was underlined by Pope Francis at a
symposium held at the Vatican in November 2017, where he emphasized that nuclear
weapons exist “in the service of a mentality of fear that affects not only the parties in
conflict but the entire human race. International relations cannot be held captive to
military force, mutual intimidation, and the parading of stockpiles of arms. Weapons
of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, create nothing but a false sense of
security. They cannot constitute the basis for peaceful coexistence between members
of the human family, which must rather be inspired by an ethics of solidarity”.
Your Excellencies,
At the recent XI Conference to facilitate the entry into force of the Comprehensive
Nuclear-Test-BanTreaty (NewYork, 25 September 2019), Card Parolin said that “the
norms embodied in the UN Charter, international humanitarian law, disarmament
and arms control instruments, and other elements of international law represent an
indispensable commitment to cooperative security and a juridical embodiment of
this global ethic of responsibility that is now sorely needed”.
The Holy See has indeed often reaffirmed in international forums on disarmament
the importance of concretely promoting the culture of life and peace, founded on the
dignity of the human being and on the primacy of law, through a multilateralism
based on dialogue and the responsible, honest cooperation of all members of the
community of nations. These are indispensable elements for the construction of real
and lasting trust, a fundamental element for guaranteeing international security and
peace.
Wemust work tirelessly to restore any possibility of dialogue and to fight the trust-
deficits, which unfortunately characterize the current environment around nuclear
disarmament and non-proliferation, especially since strengthening dialogue and
rebuilding trust to be one of the major aims of this thought-provoking Conference.
With this in mind, I would like to recall what was said by Pope Francis in His
Message to theUnitedNationsConference toNegotiate aLegallyBinding Instrument
to Prohibit NuclearWeapons, Leading Towards Their Total Elimination on 27March
2017: “Growing interdependence and globalization mean that any response to the
threat of nuclear weapons should be collective and concerted, based on mutual trust.
This trust can be built only through dialogue that is truly directed to the common
good and not to the protection of veiled or particular interests; such dialogue, as far
as possible, should include all: nuclear states, countries which do not possess nuclear
weapons, the military and private sectors, religious communities, civil societies, and
international organizations. And in this endeavour we must avoid those forms of
mutual recrimination and polarization which hinder dialogue rather than encourage
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it. Humanity has the ability to work together in building up our common home; we
have the freedom, intelligence and capacity to lead and direct technology, to place
limits on our power, and to put all this at the service of another type of progress: one
that is more human, social and integral”.
Thank you.
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Chapter 3
The Risks of Nuclear Proliferation:
Addressing the Challenge
Sebastiano Cardi
Chairperson, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,
I am very pleased to intervene at this panel of the “Amaldi Conference” dedicated
to “New and evolving voices in arms control and disarmament” and chaired by the
President emeritus of the Accademia dei Lincei, Prof. Alberto Quadrio Curzio. I am
particularly glad to be here today with an eminent scientific expert from the Ministry
of Defense of the United Kingdom, Prof. Robin Grimes, and with the Executive
Secretary Emeritus of the CTBTO, Ambassador Tibor Tóth.
This year, the “Amaldi Conference” falls within the preparatory process towards
the 2020 Review Conference of the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). As in previous
interventions, I would like to emphasize the central role of the Treaty in underpinning
the global nuclear non proliferation regime. The NPT three pillars structure is well
balanced and mutually reinforcing. Let me also underline that (i) nuclear disarma-
ment, (ii) non-proliferation and (iii) peaceful uses of nuclear energy are definitely of
equal importance.
In view of the 2020 Conference, Italy believes that the Action Plan agreed in 2010
has to be implemented in a full, balanced and comprehensive manner. What can still
be done in the framework of the Action Plan and what additional measures may be
undertaken will have to be part of the reflection of the Review Conference.
The proliferation of nuclear weapons represents today a major threat to interna-
tional security. The existence of programmes to develop such weapons, the action of
criminal proliferation networks, the difficulty of securing sensitive materials and the
risk that non-state actors and terrorist groups might get access to them remain major
challenges to cope with.
In this respect, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) system of safe-
guards—multilateral, impartial, professional and responsible as it is—represents a
fundamental guarantee for our common security. In all relevant international fora,
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Italy promotes the universalization of the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agree-
ments together with an Additional Protocol as the international verification standard.
Italy systematically calls on all States who have not yet done so to sign and bring
into force the Additional Protocol and, where relevant, adopt the modified Small
Quantities Protocol.
Let me indeed recall that the Model Additional Protocol significantly increases
IAEA’s ability to verify the peaceful use of all nuclear material in States with
comprehensive safeguards agreements.
This draws me to evaluate with you the current status of the Joint Comprehensive
Plan of Action, under which Iran has committed intern alia to provisionally apply the
Additional Protocol in relation to the verification of its nuclear-related obligations.
The JCPOA is a key element of the global non-proliferation architecture and an
achievement of multilateral diplomacy endorsed by UNSCR 2231. I am therefore
deeply concerned by the severe difficulties, to which it is nowadays exposed. Its
implementation remains crucial for regional and international security. Iran should
return to full compliance without delay.
Let me also stress that Italy is ready to support all initiatives aimed at restoring the
JCPoA’s integrity and de-escalating the present tensions in the region. In this regard,
I am personally involved in a potentially helpful exercise of dialogue in relation to
the situation in Yemen, whereby France, Germany, Italy and United Kingdom seat
together with Iran to address possible solutions for the conflict.
Let me also recall the long-standing support by Italy to the establishment of a zone
free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems
in the Middle East. We continue to believe that the zone should be established on the
basis of arrangements freely arrived at among all the States of the concerned region.
We are ready to engage with all relevant players to achieve that.
In terms of challenges to the global non proliferation regime, North Korea’s
nuclear and ballistic missile programmes remain an issue of serious concern. We
positively consider the dialogue launched by the US Administration with the leader-
ship of North Korea. However, we strongly believe that the current sanction regime
should remain in place as long as Pyongyang does not undertake concrete steps
towards a complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization. Among these steps,
we of course envisage the return to the NPT, the implementation of the IAEA Com-
prehensive Safeguards Agreements together with an Additional Protocol, and the
signature and ratification of the CTBT.
The global non proliferation regime is under pressure also in relation to the threat
posed by the proliferation of weapons ofmass destruction and their means of delivery
to—and through—non-state actors.
This is why Italy strongly supports the full and universal implementation of
UNSCR 1540 (2004) and its follow-on Resolutions, as well as the role of the 1540
Committee in facilitating technical assistance for appropriate domestic controls over
WMD related materials in order to prevent their illicit trafficking.
Italy is also considerably engaged in relevant international non-proliferation part-
nerships, notably the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and its Mediterranean
Initiative. We hosted a table top exercise in Rome in 2016 and organized a livex
3 The Risks of Nuclear Proliferation: Addressing the Challenge 15
naval exercise at the port of Catania in 2018. Both exercises gathered many high
level officials from PSI partners to share expertise, best practices and resources to
build robust capacities among partners for combating illegal trafficking of dual use
items, dismantling smuggling networks and conducting interdiction operations under
an established and functioning cooperative framework in accordance with interna-
tional law. In the light of this strong commitment under the PSI framework, Italy has
accepted to take over the Presidency of the PSI Operational Expert Group for 2020
(this is the coordination core group of the Initiative).
Italy remains committed to the achievement of a better international nuclear secu-
rity environment. Ensuring the highest levels of nuclear security is a shared interest
of the international community. We strongly support the central role of the IAEA
in the global nuclear security framework and we encourage all States to fulfil their
nuclear security responsibilities.
Italy has ratified the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of
Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and the International Convention for the Suppression of
Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT). We actively participate in the activities of the
Nuclear Security Contact Group (NSCG), in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear
Terrorism (GICNT) and in other relevant international and European initiatives.
As a further demonstration of our commitment to promote a nuclear security cul-
ture and capacity building worldwide, Italy has been funding over the last years the
International School on Nuclear Security, jointly run by the IAEA and the Interna-
tional Centre for Theoretical Physics (ICTP) in Trieste. The School is highly valued
by developing and emerging countries, for its contribution to the development of
a cadre of professionals in the national framework governing nuclear safety and
security.
Against this backdrop, we look forward to the next International Conference on
Nuclear Security (ICONS), which will take place in February 2020, as an important
opportunity to build on experiences and achievements and devise future directions,
approaches and priorities for nuclear security.
Let me finally recall the need to recognize the changing nature of the existing
threat, react, adapt and step up our efforts for reinforcing the global non-proliferation
regime. Risks may indeed arise from a variety of sources: states aspiring to possess
nuclear weapons; non-state actors in search of “dirty bombs”; poor national legis-
lation in place to prevent illicit trafficking of materials and dismantle proliferation
networks, as well as from mismanagement and misuse of rapid development of
science and technology.
I would like therefore to conclude this intervention by highlighting the importance
of further analysis and research in thefield of non-proliferation. In this respect, the tra-
ditional bi-annual gathering of the “Amaldi Conference” is an excellent opportunity
of debate and analysis among international high-level experts and officials.
Let me also recall the EU Consortium of non proliferation and disarmament think
tanks, which is very well placed for such endeavour of research. I am particularly
pleased that as of 2018 the Rome-based International Affairs Institute is part of
the Consortium and is the leading think tank for the international non-proliferation
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conference, which many of you annually attend (this year is foreseen for December
in Brussels).
Thank you for your attention.
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Chapter 4
Preferred Courses of Action for Security
as Nuclear Arms Control Changes
in the 2020s
Tibor Tóth
Before we embark upon projecting preferred courses of action for security into the
2020s as it is prescribed by the title of this contribution it might be timely to undertake
a travel back into the recent past and recall how each of us had perceived ten years
ago the prospects of strengthening international security for the 2010s.
For me it was a period of optimistic expectations. As the Executive Secretary at
that time of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization’s Preparatory
Commission, I anticipated a series of concrete steps strengthening international secu-
rity in the years and decade to come. My expectations and the expectations of many
other practitioners of nuclear arms control were fueled by the upsurge of interest in
nuclear arms control and disarmament as witnessed among others by the 2007 pro-
posals of the ‘Four Horsemen of the Nuclear Apocalypse’, the 2009 Prague speech
of president Obama and an emerging nuclear abolition movement.
A few of the measures projected through these and other initiatives have been
delivered like the New Start Treaty or the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear
Weapons. Many others have not. As a particular disappointment not just for me, but
for many others as well, was that no significant breakthrough happened on the entry
into force of theCTBT.Notwithstanding thewell-founded expectations a decade ago,
the 2010s have not gone down into history as a period of bringing about the necessary
number of cooperative security measures embodied in arms control, disarmament
and other soft diplomacy tools versus the flare up of competitive security, that is
military competition and coercive measures fueled by geopolitical drivers.
The disappointing track record of the decade behind us begs for the question why
so few cooperative security measures were put in place? Were those packages of
cooperative security promoted merely as part of expectation management? Or was
the aggregate sum of the projected measures overly ambitious as president Obama
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himself implied in his Prague speech? Or was it just the wrong time for the right
measures?
We have to address those questions now instead of a belated ‘what went wrong’
soul-searching again in ten years time. Or what is worst, we should not embark again
upon the ritual of pre-NPT review conference goal setting without understanding
why it was not feasible to deliver during the 2010s those cooperative measures so
many had considered not just essential, but feasible.
Obviously, in the years to come we will not give up on mitigating international
security challenges, as they represent one of the wickedest of the ‘wicked prob-
lems’ eclipsed in their severity only by climate change and global pandemics. At
the same time while doing that we should build our mitigation efforts on measuring
and modelling of why previous mitigation efforts went wrong and how to deploy
future ones successfully. Grounding mitigation in measuring and modelling of both
the challenge and the intervention would enable us to look beyond the contradic-
tory trade-offs between cooperative security requirements and competitive security
Realpolitik. Combining the three Ms might help to understand better the ‘when’
question: why cooperative security measures are feasible at certain points in time,
but they fail at others?
In order to do all that we need a new conceptual framework as well. In a 2016
article1 I sought to apply the conceptual models used to describe market trends to
international security. In doing so, I illustrated the historically prevailing state of
play in the quantitative and qualitative nuclear arms race as trend indexes in the ever-
changing mix of competitive and cooperative means of pursuing security between
states. Market-trends observation and terminology was applied to make the security
trend comparisons more easily intelligible.2
Along the lines of that article a proposed new conceptual framework within which
we undertake measuring, modelling and mitigation would require departures from
prevailing cooperative security assumptions:
• Wego beyond theNPT review conference-centric assessment of cooperative secu-
rity requirements. Going even further, we step out of the boundaries of reiterating
the prevailing lists of proposed cooperative security measures.
• We assume (though we do not condone), as a present system-of-systems reality,
that the mix of cooperative and competitive security measures is not defined by
cooperative security, but—the other way around—driven by competitive security.
• We postulate that competitive security itself seems to follow a cyclical pattern
of booms and busts. In each post-bust cycle, security is increasingly left to ‘self-
regulating’ market forces of more and more unconstrained competition.
1Conflict, cooperation, and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty: financial markets as a
metaphor for cycles in global security [1].
2Terms like cycles of boom and bust; bubbles inflated and burst; market adjustment, crash, panic,
crisis, recession and depression; bull and bear markets; secular (couple of decades) and primary
(couple of years) timeframe.
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• As a result of overinvestment in competitive security accompanied by counter-
cyclical regulatory tools removed throughunilateral of coordinated ‘deregulation’,
eventually each cycle ends up with a security market “correction” or “crash”.
• It is when the competitive bubble bursts and mainly in the aftermath of the ensu-
ing security “panic” or “recession” that regulatory, cooperative security tools
are belatedly embraced. Both the Limited Test-Ban Treaty (LTBT) of 1963 and
the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) of 1996 were put in place
as global-security regulations primarily as a result of the bursting of a cycli-
cal competitive-security bubble with near-fatal global consequences during the
Cuban missile crisis in 1962 and in the INF crisis of the late 1970s and first half of
the 1980s, respectively. In both instances, post-crash a multitude of multilateral
and bilateral disarmament, arms-control and non-proliferation agreements were
acknowledged as crucial regulatory tools in the wake of ‘never again’ collective
soul-searching.
• We assume however, that after a while security balance is sought again through
the ‘invisible hand’ of deterrence and competition forces. As soon as the new
competitive boom picks up again cooperative-security arrangements are eroded,
overshadowed and squeezed out by a new recurring cycle of competitive security.
• And last, but not least, we postulate the potential emergence of a ‘super bubble’:
the present competitive security bull market that emerged from the mid-1990s is a
long-term (secular) one and it coincides from the late 1990s with recurring crises
in the financial, economic and social spheres.
The above conceptual framework is admittedly unconventional to prescribe pre-
ferred courses of action for security into the 2020s. It assumes that we can’t define
the security requirements of the decade in the narrow context of how nuclear arms
control changes. Furthermore it suggests that even the unorthodox postulate of coop-
erative security being defined and driven by the boom and bust cycle dynamics of
competitive security, is not sufficient to put our arms around the security requirements
of the 2020s.
While addressing mitigation, security policy decision-makers and practitioners
will have tomonitor not just the cyclical dynamics of a two-decades long competitive
security bull market and the need for regulatory counter-cyclical measures before the
bubble bursts. They have to measure, model and mitigate an emerging super bubble:
the spill-over and reinforcing dynamics of the prevailing crises in the financial,
economic and social spheres intermingling with the critical build-up of a security
bubble. Even in the darkest days of the Cuban missile crisis or the INF-crisis we had
not collectively faced such a super bubble. It was in the 1890s and the 1920s such a
cyclical convergence emerged in modern history. In both cases the super bubble did
burst with unprecedented consequences.
In a world with still nearly twenty thousand warheads, two hundred thousand war-
heads worth of plutonium and uranium in military and civilian stocks, two hundred
thousand tons of spent fuel scattered around hundreds of nuclear power plants all
of us, be it decision-makers, practitioners or observers will have to embrace a new
approach to security in the 2020s, both in concepts and in practice.
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Chapter 5
Interests and Changing Needs from Arms
Control, Disarmament,
and Non-proliferation for International
Security
Robin Grimes
Perhaps, before I start my formal comments, I should mention one of the activities I
am currently engaged on, particularly relevant to the topic before us.
I chair within the JCPOA framework both the Arak Working Groups and the
Arak Technical Experts Groups. Thus, my job, in collaboration with colleagues
from China, Russia, France, Germany and the EU Commission, is to help guide the
Arak project forward. This is a heavy water moderated and heavy water cooled test
reactor. The aim is to keep this reactor away from proliferative uses throughout its
design, build and operation. I want to emphasise my personal commitment as well
as that of the UK.
So, let me start the formal presentation with some general thoughts concerning the
International Rules-Based System and Arms Control, including the role of science.
Without respect for and confidence in, some formof agreed international systemof
rules and behaviourwewill not achieve international security.Change in the approach
to the international-rule-based system therefore raises significant concerns.
Nevertheless, renewed emphasis on the international rules-based system is cru-
cial as we need to create an environment reinforced by confidence. This can be sup-
ported by rules, transparency and verification, underpinned by evidence and assured
processes.
Of course, every party engaged in an arms control process must be confident this
activity will not allow a strategic competitor an advantage, or that another party is
cheating.
It is critical that all states recognise and respect each other’s need for security.
Undermining another country’s sense of security will only lead to instability. An
Arms Control endeavour must be win-win or cheating will be incentivised. The
same is true for disarmament.
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Establishing the common interest, and the possibility of reciprocation are crucial
to restoring arms control and discouraging cheating.
To make progress we need: political will; conducive international conditions; and
sufficient trust between parties. We therefore need to co-operate!
The broader relations between parties are crucial considerations. If relations
remain bad, vulnerabilities could become a major source of danger and potential
war.
The Economist quotes Lawrence Freedman as having argued that “Arms Control
tends to follow politics—not lead it.” The challenge therefore—if you agree with
the premise—is how we develop the political will and political confidence for arms
control. Of course, part of that is to have the tools available to carry out the job at
hand.
In any case, strategic stability is also our focus and objective rather than arms
control alone. But then again, strategic stability is achieved through a combination
of arms control, deterrence, non-proliferation and arms reduction measures. So to
my mind the argument is somewhat circular.
We also need to consider whether Arms Control in the future should remain single
domain, accounting only for nuclear weapons, or whether we need a cross-domain
framework that takes into account weapons systems that impact strategic calcula-
tions—including new technologies deployed in space and cyber, but also missile
defence systems. Looking only slightly further ahead, AI will have a considerable
impact across all these.
In general technology developments proceed at pace and we too often play catch-
up to understand their impact on strategic stability, let alone how to respond within
an arms control context.
But the only way we can achieve confidence is through verification, including dis-
armament verification. There is an international need for increasing co-operation in
Verification—whether for disarmament or arms control or any future treaty on fissile
materials for nuclearweapons.Themost promising area of co-operation is in disarma-
ment verification. This demands co-operation on technology development, especially
the application of new science and technology and joint deployment practices.
Let me now turn to the specific issue of Verification—Developing and agreeing
effective measures for verifying nuclear disarmament will be vital for enabling the
fulfilment of the goals of Article VI of the NPT. Nuclear Weapon States and Non-
Nuclear Weapon States alike will need to have confidence that nuclear-armed states
have dismantled all their warheads, and that this has been carried out in a way that
makes us safer and does not inadvertently increase the risk of nuclear proliferation.
Beyond the dismantlement of individual warheads, we also need to understand
what monitoring and verification procedures may be required across a state’s nuclear
and defence sites to provide sufficient confidence that nuclear disarmament has taken
place irreversibly.
These present significant technological as well as political challenges. And I think
human behavioural science has an under-appreciated part of play in helping us think
more clearly and broadly about the effectiveness of activities and in measuring their
impact. It complements the basic science and engineering.
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Throughout the development of these verification measures, the UK places great
importance on involving Non-Nuclear Weapon States and maximising transparency,
while upholding our non-proliferation and security commitments.
The UK has continued to play a leading role internationally in the development of
nuclear disarmament verification. The UK-Norway Initiative (UKNI), which began
in 2007, was the first ever such technical partnership between a Nuclear Weapon
State and a Non-Nuclear Weapon State. In 2015, building on UKNI’s work, the UK
established the Quad Nuclear Verification Partnership with Norway, Sweden and the
United States.
In 2017, the Quad undertook the first ever multilateral disarmament verification
exercise atRAFHonington.KnownasLETTERPRESS, the exercisewas held atRAF
Honington’s former nuclear weapons storage facilities, adding additional realism to
the verification activities.
LETTERPRESS provided the opportunity to practice techniques and procedures
in a simulated real-world scenario and explored challenges associated with moni-
toring and verification of declarations, as might be required in future treaties. The
exercisewas held in strict conformitywith the non-proliferation obligations of all par-
ticipants. The Quad have produced a report for the 2019NPT Preparatory Committee
summarising our work to date and lessons learned.
I think you can see one way in which we begin to explore and learn more about
the interplay of technology and behaviour.
The UK has played an active role in the International Partnership for Nuclear
Disarmament Verification (IPNDV) since its foundation in 2015. The IPNDV is an
initiative that brings together a wide range of countries to identify and solve the
challenges associated with nuclear disarmament verification.
As our collaborations on verification have developed, a common theme has been
the extent to which Non-Nuclear Weapon States have been able to play a near-
complete role in the process, while upholding their non-proliferation obligations.
This has been possible by viewing the challenge in terms of the verification of nuclear
materials and explosives.
The UK is also in the second decade of an active bilateral partnership with the
United States in monitoring and verification research. Our joint technical coopera-
tion programme allows us to apply policy, technology and programme expertise to
develop and evaluate targeted approaches for transparent reductions and monitoring
of: nuclear warheads, fissile material and associated facilities, for potential disarma-
ment and non-proliferation initiatives. Technical experts conduct activities and share
information to explore and address essential and difficult monitoring and verification
challenges, working to integrate potential approaches for arms control monitoring
and transparency.
The UK believes sharing the results of verification initiatives such as the Quad
and IPNDV are important for demonstrating transparency, as well as building
understanding and capacity for nuclear disarmament verification worldwide.
In parallel to developing verification we need to ensure and assure the non-
proliferation of nuclear know-how and materials. This is another key area where
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international co-operation is required—and an area where the UK has been working
to enhance measures.
A key part of this narrative is Non-Proliferation—A fundamental corner-stone
of global peace and security is our ability to maintain the effective functioning of
the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, centred on the enforcement of nuclear
safeguards by the IAEA. Without these checks on proliferation, peaceful use of
nuclear technology would not be possible.
All countries utilising peaceful nuclear technologies have a duty to finalise safe-
guards agreements with the IAEA andmeet their obligations. TheUK is no exception
and continues to meet its obligations as a Nuclear Weapons State and responsible
user of nuclear energy.
TheUKVoluntaryOffer SafeguardsAgreementwith the IAEAandEuratom came
into force in 1978. This allows for the application of safeguards on all sources or
special fissionablematerial in facilities or parts of them, subject only to exclusions for
reasons of national security. In order to ensure we continue to meet our obligations
once Euratom arrangements no longer apply in the UK, we have agreed a new VOA
and Additional Protocol with the IAEA, and our new safeguards arrangements are
ready.
The UK supports the IAEA’s continued efforts to strengthen the international
safeguards system across the world, which is an integral part of the global non-
proliferation regime within the framework of the NPT. One such element of our
support to the IAEA is the UK Safeguards Support Programme (UKSP) which has
provided practical assistance to support the strengthening of IAEA safeguards since
1981.
Currently our priorities are to provide training of IAEA inspectors, assistance
to enhance the IAEA’s safeguards IT infrastructure and participation in the Net-
work of Analytical Laboratories (NWAL). Through NWAL, the UK supports non-
proliferation by analysing environmental and bulk samples at the request of the
IAEA.
I believe the academic community has a greater role to play here, especially in
sharing emerging science across its community, thereby progressing international
credibility. Nuclear forensics is an area for which this approach is being effective. At
theUniversity ofBristol this summerwe initiated a series of international conferences
on nuclear forensics, supported by the IAEA. This meeting reviewed the engineering
and science behind new and existing techniques. We will hear more about science
diplomacy later in the conference but I want just to emphasise the increasing role
that academies can play, as evidenced by the conference.
The last topic I will cover is the implementation of Safeguards—The UK believes
that a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement plus an Additional Protocol is the
universal verification standard as required by State Parties by the NPT.
The Additional Protocol is an important enhancement to safeguards implemen-
tation and the non-proliferation regime. It is a necessary change to ensure that safe-
guards are fit for the challenges of the twenty first century. Only the Additional Pro-
tocol can provide credible assurance of an absence of undeclared nuclear material
and activities within a state.
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The UK uses all opportunities to call upon all states that have not yet done so to
bring an Additional Protocol into force as soon as possible.
The UK has also supported the evolution of safeguards implementation including
through the State Level Concept (SLC). The UK judges that safeguards implementa-
tion by the IAEAmust continue evolving to address newdemands and newchallenges
incorporating the experience gained from past safeguards implementation and taking
advantage of new techniques and technologies.
And the UK has reiterated these points on many occasions, including in the UK’s
official statements I have personally presented the IAEA General Conference.
The UK supports the IAEA’s efforts to improve the efficiency of safeguards. This
is vital because the quantities of materials, and number of facilities under safeguards,
continues to grow.
Let me finish with these remarks—International co-operation is, of course, key to
all of our approaches and endeavours—we need asmany nations as possible on-board
to make progress, both technologically and politically.
As peaceful nuclear technologies develop, and their use increases, particularly
among developing economies, the effective, reliable and sustainable application of
safeguards will grow ever more important. This is vital in view of the emergence
of small and advanced modular reactors, mobile reactors and, nuclear co-generation
as well as the increasing use of radioactive materials in medical, agricultural and
scientific research applications.
Maintaining access to the many social, economic and scientific benefits of these
technologies requires commitment to the supporting multi-lateral architecture, cen-
tred on the NPT and the IAEA, and compliance with obligations and responsibilities
by the international community.
In today’s uncertain international security environment, we potentially face new
strategic technologies such as hypersonic and space-based weapons systems, cyber
threats, and all augmented by the application of AI. It is clear there has never been
a more important time to work together:
• to rebuild arms control in a manner that creates security and stability for all,
• to create the conditions for disarmament and,
• to implement and strengthen the treaties and measures required for non-
proliferation.
Thank you for your attention.
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Sophisticated deterrence theories have been proposed to justify the acquisition of
nuclear weapons by countries; but they are demonstrably flawed and likely to lead to
a catastrophic outcome; which has been avoided so far only thanks to the insubordi-
nation of individuals who did not follow the instructions mandated by such theories.
The relevant military and political decision makers should try to escape from this
dangerous situation. This is not easy; but the alternative is doom.
Escape before doom might become possible after the danger of the current situa-
tion of humankind due to the presence of nuclearweapons ismorewidely understood.
But it is more likely that a sufficiently potent motive for drastic changes shall emerge
only after a major nuclear-weapon catastrophe caused by a diligent implementation
of the sequence of the actions carefully programmed to make nuclear deterrence
work. All of us—and primarily all those of us having some specific competence
or professional involvement in the development and operational management of
nuclear weapons (their technologies, their operational rules, and the related domes-
tic and international politics)—especially all those who do believe their activities
related to nuclear weaponry help to promote the survival of their fellow citizens
and of humankind—all ought to ponder these facts and cooperate in order to move
humankind away from the brink.
Si vis pacem, para bellum. “If you want peace, prepare for war”. This advice was
probably rather sensible in many of the occasions in which it was uttered and fol-
lowed throughout human history; but these were circumstances in which the primary
goal was to avoid war if at all possible, but otherwise to win the war. Now every
reasonable person understands that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never
be fought” (President Ronald Reagan, 1984 State of the Union Address). Hence,
any “reasonable” version of nuclear deterrence must have as its primary goal the
prevention of nuclear war: indeed, of any deliberate use of nuclear weapons.
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Attempts have been made to translate nuclear deterrence into a precise military
doctrine eventually codified into a set of operational rules governing the eventual
use in bello of nuclear weapons. This task has become extremely difficult after the
development of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs). This is not the place to
enter into a sophisticated analysis of the subtleties that have therefore been invented
by the theoreticians who have made their living by investigating—in various coun-
tries—the operational details of nuclear deterrence deliverable by ICBMs. Being
myself a theoretical and mathematical physicist (rather than an experimental physi-
cist), I should respect these intellectual exercises that have occupied the minds of
quite clever individuals. But as a natural scientist I must also emphasize the necessity
to confront theory with reality.
The theory of nuclear deterrence implies decisions about the development, man-
ufacture and deployment of defensive and offensive nuclear weapons and, most
importantly, the operational rules of their command and control systems. At least in
one known case—and most probably in several other cases, as hinted at by people in
the know (for instance by responsible individuals who served asMinisters of Defense
in key nuclear-weapon countries; indeed, some of these cases are widely known)—
a catastrophic nuclear exchange was only avoided because an individual—Colonel
Stanislav Efgrafovich Petrov—took upon himself the responsibility to disobey orders
and not to launch the nuclear-armed missiles under his command, in spite of the evi-
dence that a nuclear attack was incoming. Indeed, the operational rules implied by
deterrence theory required that those missiles be launched before being destroyed by
the incoming missile attack; thereby providing just that nuclear response the threat
of which was supposed to deter the nuclear attack that—in that specific case—was,
by all available evidence, in progress.
So, the world was saved from a sudden nuclear catastrophe. Due to the good sense
of a single individual.
An individual who, incidentally, behaved in the most “reasonable” manner: by
deciding not to launch the missiles under his operational command he opted for
the—supposedly “impossible”—chance that the warning of the incoming nuclear
missile attack was just due to a mistake, and as a fateful consequence of his decision
he and many others did survive (of course he himself might then be shot for not
having followed his instructions…); while in the alternative case (no mistake of the
warning system, the incoming attack was indeed incoming) he would in any case
be incinerated (with his colleagues, and many others). So, his decision was indeed a
quite reasonable decision: especially in the context of that cold logic that is supposed
to subtend nuclear deterrence theory and the consequent rules governing the oper-
ational employment of nuclear weapons (with no place for ethical or humanitarian
considerations).
In fact, he was not subsequently shot; nor were shot—as far as I know—those
who had designed a deterrence mechanism that was designed so as to produce an
unnecessary catastrophe, thereby demonstrating the criminal idiocy of its planners.
When fools are in charge of critically important planning concerning the employ-
ment of weapons of mass destruction, we must worry; but we can have little hope of
redress after we witness that theories which are both foolish and dangerous continue
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to provide the dominant paradigm of the thinking about the operational command
and control of nuclear weaponry. Or when totally childish statements are uttered by
key decision makers bragging about having a bigger organ, with reference to the size
of the nuclear arsenal of which that decision maker is (in principle) ultimately in
control.
My conclusion is that we must all try and fulfill the responsibility to point out
that a world with large numbers of high-yield nuclear weapons the purpose of which
is—without being used; just by their presence—to deter the use of nuclear weapons
by potential enemies; such a world has now been shown to be based on stupid rules:
survival has been experimentally demonstrated to require that those rules not be
followed! The rules meant to implement nuclear deterrence being clearly foolish,
the “enemy” has every reason to expect that they in fact shall not be implemented:
hence there is no logic in the claim that deterrence over time worked, since the world
was spared the actual use of nuclear weapons in bello for over 70 years. In fact,
the world has not witnessed a catastrophic employment of nuclear weapons—after
Hiroshima and Nagasaki—not thanks to nuclear deterrence, but in spite of nuclear
deterrence: only because the rules meant to implement nuclear deterrence were not
followed. And note that this clearly indicates that the eventual planner of a nuclear
attack may well expect that there shall be no nuclear retaliation; or at least that this
is not likely to happen, being a quite irrational act.
Yet themyth of the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence continues to be instrumental
to sustain the development and deployment of nuclear weaponry; and the belief of
its relevance is perhaps the main cause impeding progress towards the elimination
of nuclear weaponry: the eventual actual employment of which constitutes the major
threat to the survival of our civilization, perhaps of homo sapiens.
Moreover, it now begins to be—quite logically!—suggested that, in order to guar-
antee that the threat of catastrophic retaliation on which deterrence theory is based is
a certainty, its implementation should be turned over to intelligent computers, so as
to eliminate the unreliable intervention of humans and thereby make it quite certain
that nuclear deterrence work! Opening eventually the way to interventions of more
intelligent hackers.
Our current scientific understanding of cosmology and of the emergence of intel-
ligent life on our planet is not sufficient to make reliable estimates of the probability
that other intelligent communities exist in the universe; so there is no cogent scientific
reason to be surprised by the fact that so far we got no signals indicating their exis-
tence.Yet a reasonable conjecture is that thismay be due to the fact that all sufficiently
intelligent civilizationswhich emerged in our universe, eventually discovered enough
about microphysics to become able tomanufacture nuclear weaponry; and then even-
tually these weapons were accumulate and used; and this “inevitable” development
caused the disappearance of that civilization. So, this seems our ultimate fate.
Indeed, the task to eliminate nuclear weapons—before they eliminate us —is by
no means easy in the current world context. Important progress in this direction
had been made, perhaps culminating—a decade ago—in the statement by President
Obama in Prague (April 9th, 2009): […] So today, I state clearly and with conviction
America’s commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear
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weapons. This goal will not be reached quickly—perhaps not in my lifetime. It will
take patience and persistence. But now we, too, must ignore the voices who tell us
that the world cannot change. We have to insist, “Yes, we can.” […].
But in the last decade there has been regress, motivating the pessimistic conjecture
that significant progress shall occur only after a major nuclear-weapon catastrophe.
Yet all of us—and primarily all those of us having some specific competence or
professional involvement in the development and operationalmanagement of nuclear
weapons (their technologies, their operational rules, and the related domestic and
international politics)—all those who sincerely believe that their activities related
to nuclear weaponry help to promote the survival of their fellow citizens and of
humankind—we all ought to recognize and advertise the demonstrated, dangerous
folly of nuclear deterrence theory and of the military doctrines and operational rules
implied by it; trying moreover to cooperate in order to move humankind back from
the brink of nuclear annihilation.
A final warning. If you suspect that the point of view expressed above about the
current operational aspects of nuclear deterrence is excessively alarmistic, you are
advised to read the short paper (dated September 10th, 2019; available from the
website of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) entitled “A Common-
sense Policy for Avoiding a Disastrous Nuclear Decision”, authored by James A.
Winnefeld, who served as the commander of NORAD (North American Aerospace
Defense Command) and who retired in 2015 as the ninth Vice Chairman of the USA
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Its 3 sections—entitled “The current command-and control sys-
tem is under stress”, “How the current systemmight fail”, and “How a decide-under-
attack option would work”—are a terrifying description of the current operational
situation and of the strategic thinking underlying the actual employment of nuclear
weaponry, as described by someone who has been until rather recently in charge of
it in one of the two nuclear-weapon superpowers. Indeed, the diagnosis of the risks
of the current situation is, coming from such a competent source, quite compelling.
While the proposed improvement—“reasonable” as it is in the framework of the
deterrence ideology—demonstrates a remarkable frame of mind (an occupational
disease?): four alternative scenarios are envisaged, two of which are viewed as, in
some sense, “successful”, including the one resulting in a full nuclear annihilation
having the dubious merit to be symmetrical hence more universal (and, by the way,
demonstrating a catastrophic failure of deterrence).
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Chapter 7
Nuclear Weapons, International Security,
and Non-proliferation in the 2020s
C. S. Eliot Kang
Thank you for havingme here in Rome to address nuclear weapons, nonproliferation,
and the broader security environment. I would like to focus my remarks on our new
initiative to launch a structured international dialogue on Creating an Environment
for Nuclear Disarmament, or CEND. This is a topic of great interest to my boss,
Assistant Secretary Chris Ford, who is unable to be here today. He sends his regrets.
Before I outline the CEND initiative, I would like to put it into context. This
initiative emerged from the review process for the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty,
or NPT. March 5 will mark the 50th anniversary of the NPT’s entry into force,
and the tenth NPT Review Conference will take place next April to May. These
milestones are an opportunity to recall how the NPT has made the world safer and
more prosperous. It is difficult to imagine how the world might have evolved without
the NPT, how many states might now possess nuclear weapons, and how much
more fraught it might be to pursue the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, science,
and technology. This anniversary is also an opportunity for states to reaffirm their
commitments to the Treaty, and to rededicate themselves to preserve and strengthen
the nuclear nonproliferation regime for future generations.
NPT Review Conferences take place every five years. They are often quite con-
tentious and feature sharp divisions among various groups of states, in particular over
nuclear disarmament. You could be forgiven if you had the mistaken impression of
a treaty in crisis. But you would be mistaken to focus on these divisions and ignore
howmuch the NPT actually represents the common interests and aspirations of all of
its Parties. All NPT Parties—nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states
alike—are made more secure by an effective nonproliferation regime that prevents
the further spread of nuclear weapons. The assurances provided by that regime facil-
itate peaceful nuclear cooperation and help create a security environment conducive
to progress on nuclear disarmament. Nonproliferation, disarmament, and peaceful
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uses of nuclear energy are not competing interests but shared benefits for all NPT
Parties.
The past 50 years have seen significant progress on nuclear disarmament. The
United States has reduced its total stockpile of nuclear warheads by approximately
88% from its Cold War peak, from 31,255 nuclear weapons in 1967 to 3822 as of
2017. Many categories of nuclear weapons have been removed from our stockpile
altogether. However, the dramatic reductions in nuclear arsenals that took place
when Cold War tensions eased have largely run their course, and security conditions
have become much less favorable. The long list of challenges includes long-running
regional tensions in SouthAsia, theMiddle East, and elsewhere. Some nuclear-armed
states are modernizing and expanding their nuclear capabilities at the same time they
are becoming increasingly assertive in challenging the existing international order.
TheCEND initiative grew out of an effort to think creatively but realistically about
how to move forward on nuclear disarmament in light of these challenges. It seeks
to establish a dialogue on how all states can work together to create an environment
conducive to further progress on nuclear disarmament. The CEND Working Group
(CEWG)met inWashington, DC, July 2–3. Its primary goals were: first, to identify a
list of challenges that would need to be overcome or questions that would need to be
answered in order to create an environment more conducive to progress on nuclear
disarmament; second, to establish and define an initial mandate for subgroups to
examine those factors and questions; and third, to determine subgroup composition
including co-chairs.
Non-governmental expert facilitators from the Carnegie Endowment for Interna-
tional Peace, King’s College London, and the Clingendael Institute guided breakout
sessions focusing on three themes. The first themewas reducing perceived incentives
for states to retain, acquire, or increase their holdings of nuclearweapons. Participants
decided to broaden the topic to address the converse: increasing incentives to reduce
and eliminate nuclear weapons. The second theme was multilateral and other types
of institutions and processes to bolster nonproliferation efforts and build confidence
in, and further advance, nuclear disarmament. The third theme was interim measures
to address risks associated with nuclear weapons and to reduce the likelihood of war
among nuclear-armed states.
Over the course of the two-day conference, the NGO facilitators worked with
each of the breakout sessions to identify areas of convergence for further work by
subgroups. These areas of convergence were based on the observations of the facili-
tators and not necessarily the consensus views of the participating governments. To
enable an open dialogue, it was necessary to limit the number of countries partici-
pating in the initial CEWG meeting, but in order for this effort to be taken seriously,
we brought together an ideologically and geographically diverse group of countries
to form the core group of CEWG participants. We achieved this, with participants
hailing from 42 countries across the globe and representing governments that are
both likeminded with our positions, as well as those with whom we have significant
differences. All five NPT nuclear-weapon states—the P5—took part in this meeting,
including my fellow panelist Vladimir Leontiyev.
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While the CEND initiative was motivated by a desire so stimulate a more realistic
approach to disarmament in NPT-based deliberations, it has implications beyond the
NPT. In addition to the P5—the NPT nuclear-weapon states—India, Pakistan and
Israel, which are not NPT Parties, were active participants in the first meeting. For
too long, the international disarmament discourse has focused almost exclusively on
the P5. This ignores the obvious fact that even if the P5 eliminated all their weapons,
the result would not be a nuclear weapon-free world. If we are to take the issue
of nuclear disarmament seriously, then we need to involve states outside the NPT
as well, for these states are located in regions where some of the most intractable
obstacles to disarmament lie.
Every country has a stake in the dialogue around nuclear disarmament. CEND’s
success depends upon the active engagement of countries participating directly in
the CEWG and helpful input from those not directly participating. We continue to
encourage consultations by CEWG participants with other states in their respective
regions. In particular, we have consulted with NATO Allies in Brussels before and
after the first CEWG meeting.
Within theCEWG, deliberations took place under theChathamHouse rule. Partic-
ipants are free to discuss views expressed during the meeting, but should not attribute
them to a particular speaker or country. And the views expressed do not necessarily
coincide with those of the United States. With that in mind, I would like to simply
list some of the areas of convergence within each of the topical subgroups.
The first subgroup addressed “reducing perceived incentives for states to retain,
acquire, or increase their holdings of nuclear weapons and increasing incentives to
reduce and eliminate nuclear weapons”. It identified the following potential areas
for further work:
• Articulate threat perceptions of states in regional (or global) competitions involv-
ing nuclear weapons more clearly and deeply so they can be better understood
and addressed,
• Buttress existing arms control, nonproliferation and security mechanisms and
compliance with them,
• Assess differing perceptions of the purpose of declaratory policy, including for
deterrence and reassuring those most alarmed about the prospect of nuclear war,
• Improve capabilities and protocols to verify nuclear disarmament and
• Address the tensions between nuclear deterrence and concerns over the humani-
tarian consequences of nuclear war.
The second subgroup addressed “multilateral and other types of institutions and
processes to bolster nonproliferation efforts and build confidence in, and further
advance, nuclear disarmament”. The following areas of convergence for further work
emerged:
• Strengthen and maintain existing institutions through preserving what we have,
maintaining the disarmament architecture, and avoiding politicization of existing
institutions and agreements,
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• Strengthen and reaffirm commitment to the NPT by monitoring progress with
existing commitments and acknowledging the NPT is the “cornerstone” of the
global nonproliferation and disarmament architecture, and
• Develop a list of practical measures with a view to improving the security
environment through focusing on nonproliferation measures, building trust and
confidence, and identifying what is practical now.
The third subgroup considered “interimmeasures to address risks associated with
nuclear weapons and to reduce the likelihood of war among nuclear-armed states,
and found the following areas of convergence:
• Reduce the likelihood of nuclear weapon use through conflict management and
prevention,
• Build trust through transparency and confidence building measures in the area of
risk reduction, and
• Improve communication and dialogue among states possessing nuclear weapons
and between states possessing and not possessing nuclear weapons.
We are now turning to next steps, including convening a second CEWGmeeting,
which will take place November 20–22 at Wilton Park in the UK, by invitation
only. All three subgroups will meet. This will allow for greater cross-pollination
between subgroup discussions and should also allow participating countries to cover
all three subgroups with one or two representatives. Subgroup co-chairs will play an
important role in making this and subsequent meetings successful. The Netherlands
is co-chairing the “reducing incentives” subgroup, with the other co-chair still to be
confirmed. South Korea and the United States will co-chair the “nonproliferation
institutions” subgroup. And Germany and Finland will co-chair the “risk reduction”
subgroup.
We are also working to enlist NGO support as part of a consortium approach.
NGOs would provide needed resources to the CEWG process, including by assisting
the co-chairs and by facilitating discussions, but the substantive discussions will
continue to take place only among government delegations.
Before I close, allow me to say a few final words about the goals of the CEND
initiative in the NPT context. By the 2020 NPT Review Conference, subgroups will
have met in person at least once more, with associated intercessional work being
conducted between meetings. We do not plan for the CEWG to have completed a
“phase” of its work before the RevCon, as that is an unrealistic timeline for the
CEWG to have developed finished deliverables for the serious and difficult work it is
tasked with. However, by the RevCon, CEWG subgroups will have clearly outlined
their plans of work. At the RevCon, the CEWG subgroup co-chairs will be able
to present a clear plan for progress that will continue past the 2020 RevCon. We
envision holding a side event to lay out these plans.
In closing, I want to emphasize two key points. First, the US government fully
supports this initiative. But second, we have no intention to micromanage its pro-
ceedings or prejudge its outcomes. We received uniformly positive feedback from
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our first meeting, thanking us for the deep, substantive interactions of our first meet-
ings, which allowed participants to get past their standard talking points and develop
a real understanding of each other’s perspectives.We aim to build on that foundation.
Ultimately, it is up to the participants to determine the direction that these dialogues
take.
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing,
adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate
credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s Creative
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not
included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by
statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from
the copyright holder.
Chapter 8
Russia’s Vision for Arms Control,
Disarmament, and Non-proliferation
Vladimir Leontiev
Russia’s vision of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation issues remains
in fact very conventional. It is pragmatic and realistic and has no ambition to look
“innovative”, “forward-looking” or “future-oriented”.We do not feel “constrained by
traditional formats and diplomatic protocol”, as our American colleagues sometimes
are. On the contrary, we strongly believe that in many cases using proven formats and
keeping to well-established diplomatic routine is the best way to address and resolve
outstanding international issues of today and tomorrow. From our point of view, this
“traditionalist”—or maybe “no-nonsense”—approach may be helpful for preventing
turning serious and solution-oriented professional discussions aimed at achieving
substantive results into road-shows with uncertain purpose, random participation
and no clear mandate.
We also do not see advancing arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation as a
self-sufficient goal. For us, it is first of all one of themeans to assure Russia’s national
security—in this case, by using political and diplomatic tools. The Foreign Policy
Concept of 2016 specially emphasizes this particular function of Russian diplomacy
and gives it an undisputable “number 1”. So, we have a strong conviction that national
security is—and should be—the main driving force behind this process. By the way,
this concept is also reflected in the NPT review disarmament-related formulas “in
a way that promotes international stability, peace and undiminished and increased
security” and “based on the principle of increased and undiminished security for all”.
As amatter of fact, it would be completely unreasonable to expect any automation
or self-sustained dynamics in areas, where progress depends on and is determined
by evolving security environment. And evolutions that we currently see are anything
but encouraging.
Smart and honest diplomacy can achieve many things. Sometimes it can succeed
even without “touching neither a cannon nor a ruble”, as Russian poet and diplomat
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Fedor Tiytchev has put it in December 1870. Though this formula dates from the
XIX century, it still remains relevant and is fully applicable today, when military
build-ups and deployments are often considered to be an efficientmethod of resolving
outstanding issues, and when ideas like “peace through strength” and “strong powers
competition” are becoming alarmingly popular in certain parts of the World. This
is disturbing, because all previous attempts to achieve peace through strength have
notoriously failed, and competition is hardly an appropriate basis for building stable
and cooperative relationships.
In the field of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation Russia is strongly
committed to traditional legally-binding instruments, that is to say international
treaties and agreements. From our point of view, they have clear advantage over
“Rules based order” and over unilateral measures, informal understandings or even
political commitments, though sometimes these may also be useful.
First of all, legally-binding instruments result from negotiations during which
parties directly express their concerns and formulate their wishes. This allows to
address real issues without too much bias—at least in theory, for we have recently
witnessed some quite different examples—and to reach a realistic balance between
what is desired and what is achievable. This also provides opportunity to develop
appropriate verification machinery and to agree on scope and modalities of eventual
outreach. This aspect becomes particularly important today given—for example—
growing aspirations of non-nuclear weapon States to monitor and verify the process
of nuclear disarmament, that is to say reductions and limitations of nuclear weapons
carried out by NWSs.
Verification is really one of the strongest points of legally-binding arrangements
that no external oversight may substitute. Those familiar with our nuclear arms
reduction treaties with the USA know that they are largely about verification. These
treaties, surely, contain benchmark figures and dates as well as things like databases
and glossaries of terms and definitions, but almost all the rest of their volume is
dedicated to verification and transparency. By the way, problems that we currently
have with New START Treaty implementation by the United States relate exactly to
this particular area.
Unilateral measures do not even come close to these standards. For instance, a
country may declare it has unilaterally reduced its nuclear missiles to a number of
“X’. The first question is—how do we know it is true? And how the accuracy of such
data may be checked? As a matter of fact, there is nothing to support such claims
except “you have my word”. Sounds great and sincere, but doubt may still exist, and
there is no practical way to dissipate it.
On the contrary, treaties like New START allow to track any particular missile
or any particular launcher throughout its entire life-cycle and to have an accurate
count of deployed nuclear warheads or other treaty-limited assets, even if sides may
disagree on their actual numbers, as they do now. They may also contain mutually
agreed guidelines and rules for eliminations or eventual conversions, so that one may
be sure about the result of procedures applied. This is at least how it is supposed to
work.
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Legally-binding international instruments are also more difficult to cancel, even
though treaties typically contain an “escape close” allowing each party to withdraw
if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the treaty have
jeopardized its supreme interests. Fortunately, in the area of arms control using this
clause is rather rare. Two major examples are the US withdrawals from ABM and
INF treaties that we deeply regret. Such steps may bring freedom for realizing certain
military programs and create an illusion of securing an advantage, but they inevitably
produce very harmful consequences for international security and stability. At the
USMC they say, that if something is done twice, it becomes a tradition. This gives me
real concerns about the New START—the last nuclear arms control treaty involving
the USA that remains and that is getting nowadays strong criticism in Washington
DC. Tradition is already there, so there are reasons to expect this Treaty might be
next on the list. I do hope our American colleagues do not intend to cross this box
as well and will allow the Treaty to live at least to its regular term in February 2021.
But frankly, I am not sure.
All these concerns exist and are well-founded. Nevertheless, presence of legally-
binding framework can make situation in the area of arms control, disarmament and
non-proliferation more stable and more predictable. And this is something it badly
needs today, when acute problems arise and when we face systematic attempts by
certainStates to disrupt fundamental arms control agreements and regimes and to con-
vert the entire international arms control architecture to fit their particular interests.
Aspirations for military domination and search for tools that would allow stronger
pressure on political opponents or “competitors”—to use a more “trendy” expres-
sion—result in scrapping mechanisms that have been contributing to maintaining
international security and stability for decades.
The most recent example was scrapping the INF Treaty. It is clear for us that the
real purpose of the pathetic set-up related to this Treatywas to create an opportunity to
get rid of its restrictions and to clear ground for building additional military capacity
intended first of all to exert pressure on China that the US believes to be its major
military opponent and economic competitor. At a certain point INF Treaty became
an obstacle, so this obstacle was removed.
Similar reasonsmay explain persistent ambiguity concerning prospects of theNew
START Treaty. Russia has come out for its extension. We think that under present
circumstances this would be a reasonable solution, for it is clear that remaining time
is already too short for negotiating a follow-up agreement, and that otherwise in just
sixteenmonthswewill remainwithout anymeans at all to ensuremutual transparency
and predictability between our two countries in the area of strategic nuclear weapons.
Extensionwouldmaintain the existing regimeof regular data exchanges, notifications
and inspections that Russia and USA carry out at their respective military facilities.
It would also buy time for addressing the issue of new weapons and technologies
and eventual arms control measures that might be applicable to them. This is an
important subject that we are ready to discuss with our American colleagues in the
framework of our bilateral strategic dialogue.
But before extension is considered, there is an urgent need to settle the issue of
illegitimate withdrawal by the USA from the accountability under the Treaty of a
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significant number of its strategic assets that the American side has either unilaterally
declared “converted” or simply renamed using language that is not in the Treaty. It is
as if calling a “ballistic missile” a “self-propelled flying bomb” would exempt from
the Treaty all Russian and American ICBMs and SLBMs as well as their launchers.
It is an interesting idea, but quite evidently it would deprive the New START—or
any other similar treaty—of any practical sense.
The New START Treaty provides for eventual conversion of certain categories of
SOAs, rendering them incapable of employing nuclear armaments, but it stipulates
this should be done so that the other Party can confirm the results of the conversion.
Then they stop to count against agreed central limits. Our American colleagues have
ignored this rule and today they exceed Treaty limits by more than one hundred
accountable units—SLBM launchers and HBs. If this capacity is recounted into
actual nuclear warheads, it will give the USA a more than comfortable advantage of
1200. Way too much for a Treaty that allows each side to have no more than 1550.
We insist the American side should implement the Treaty the way it was negotiated,
signed and ratified, but colleagues do not recognize that they have a problem and
insist on their right to read this bilateral agreement in their very special way that we
believe is completely wrong. We will continue working with the US on this issue.
The NPT is also under pressure. This cornerstone Treaty is strongly affected by
growing estrangement between nuclear- and non-nuclear weapon states supporting
different approaches to nuclear disarmament. To make things worse, situation is
aggravated by revisions of previous arms control commitments and dismantlement
of landmark agreements taking place against the background of attempts by certain
States to turn the Treaty into a political tool serving their purposes. Sometimes these
purposes have little or no relation to nuclear non-proliferation. For instance, during
the current NPT review cycle on several occasions discussions were initiated on
chemical weapon attacks, while the issue of chemical weapons is absolutely strange
to this Treaty.
Onemorenegative factor affecting theNPT is the perpetuationofNATO’s “nuclear
sharing” arrangements that go against the Treaty’s Article I andArticle II. There is no
doubt this issue of “nuclear contamination”, as it is called at the NPT RevCons, will
be raised once again at the coming Conference in May. Besides Russia’s concerns,
it is one of the favorites for NAM countries that certainly will not miss such an
occasion. And they will be right to do it.
Neither should we forget other long-standing controversial topics on the NPT
agenda, such as overinflated nuclear disarmament expectations that gave birth to the
Treaty on prohibition of nuclear weapons (TPNW), lack of progress on the Middle
East NWFZ, unresolved regional issues (Iran, DPRK) etc.
All this will surelymake the 2020 RevCon anything but a piece of cake, but Russia
is fully committed to its success. We will work hard to achieve positive outcome.
Our strong belief is that everything should be done to assure unfailing viability and
efficiency of the NPT. This goal is our top non-proliferation priority, and so it will
remain.
Another matter of big concern is CTBT. The US decision not to ratify it has cre-
ated a very awkward situation. On one hand, the Treaty is signed by 184 countries
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and ratified by 168. Data from International Monitory System is being acquired,
transmitted and analyzed, though efficient full-scale functioning of the Treaty’s ver-
ification machinery requires its entry into force. On the other hand prospects for this
Treaty to enter into force look pretty dim now. Nevertheless, Russia supports the list
of measures intended to facilitate its entry into force that was adopted in New York
on September 25th, and we will actively participate in their implementation.
Naturally, we have noticed recent American accusations that Russia is non-
compliant with this Treaty. First of all, a State that has refused to ratify CTBT and
to assume respective legal obligations has no formal or even moral right to speculate
about such issues. But given the US record we suspect that there is something more
here than regular Russia-bashing and that our American colleagues may be prepar-
ing appropriate environment for eventually recalling their signature and resuming
nuclear tests. This would be another hard blow for international security and nuclear
non-proliferation.
One of Russia’s strategic stability and arms control everlasting headaches is the
US missile defense shield. Since Washington pulled out of the 1972 ABM Treaty
some twenty years ago missile defense assets and technologies are free from any
political and legal constraints and are being developed in the most destabilizing way
undermining international security and entailing emergence of new generation of
weapons specially intended to overrun them. And it is not only about Russia. NATO
is also striving to create a capacity that would allow it to penetrate what is called
“AI/AD domes” that is, to engage and destroy on Russian territory targets protected
by AA and MD. So, this problem works both ways meaning it requires common
attention.
New reasons for trouble appear as plans are announced to deploy missile defense
interceptors in space and to carry out missile defense by preemptively hitting adver-
sary missiles on the ground “left to launch”. People who promote such ideas should
remember that this particular logic of “preemptive disarming first strikes” has gen-
erated the multiplication of “counterforce” nuclear scenarios that were fueling the
arms race for decades and that have repeatedly brought the World to the brink of
overall nuclear war.
Returning to such scenariosmay look like amedical case, for one of the symptoms
of mental disorder is repeating the same action again and again expecting to get a
different result. There will be no different result. The only way to alleviate the threat
of preemptive strikes is to build up the number of assets, make themmore survivable
and launch them as soon as possible with the first hints of being under attack. I think
that one of the biggest strategic concerns of our American colleagues is to avoid what
they call “unwanted escalation”. Nevertheless, it seems that in this case it is exactly
the ‘unwanted escalation” that is looming. Especially given the fact that if the New
START is not extended, there will be no numerical restrictions preventing eventual
build-ups.
“Power competition” does not really go well with maintaining strategic stability
and promoting arms control, for “competition” is inevitably based on race for supe-
riority “in the air, on land and sea”—or in space. We think that such attitudes are
behind the staunch opposition to russo-chinese draft proposal of a treaty prohibiting
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placement of weapons in space and to our initiative of making unilateral commit-
ments not to be the first to place weapons in space, that are intended to prevent space
becoming a new field of the arms race and to avoid it being “dominated” by anybody.
Especially when it is the question of military domination.
Russia is strongly opposed to diverting international arms control and non-
proliferation regimes from their initial legitimate purpose and turning them into
political tools serving the interests of individual States or groups of States. Sad
results of such an abuse may be seen at the OPCW that some member-states wanted
to integrate into their campaign against Syrian President Assad and his government.
Another goal was to blackmail Russia and to undermine our efforts aimed at political
settlement of the conflict. To do it, the OPCW technical secretariat—administrative
body by definition—was invested with “attribution” functions empowering it to des-
ignate perpetrators of eventual chemical attacks. This was done in a very irregular
way circumventing the rules set by the CWC. There is no doubt this mechanism will
work “as instructed” by its major stakeholders and produce conclusions that they
expect.
Russia will continue to oppose this plot. We call on all the OPCWmember-states
not to undermine this Organization that until recently was one of the most successful
and efficient mechanisms in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation.
ForRussia, the central role in strengthening the global architecture of arms control,
disarmament and non-proliferation should belong to the UN and its multilateral
disarmament machinery. Unfortunately, here we also witness disturbing trends that
risk reducing to zero the efficiency of what is called “the UN disarmament triad”.
The GA voting results for relevant resolutions show that consensual decisions are
getting more and more difficult to achieve and that there is no common program of
action in this area. Even issues that formerly seemed to be undoubtedly unifying
may suddenly become objects of bitter controversy. Attempts to sideline substantive
dialogue, to politicize debates and to turn the UN into a tool for building pressure on
opponents became especially manifest during the 2018 session of the UNGA First
Committee.
Speaking of the UN I can not avoid mentioning scandalizing and totally ille-
gitimate US refusals to issue visas to members of Russian delegations and Russian
experts coming to the UN events being held in NY. Such US policy is an open incom-
pliance with its commitments under the 1947 Agreement on the UN headquarters.
This year it has resulted in disrupting the regular session of the UN Disarmament
Commission by preventing the head of the Russian delegation from attending it.
Thus American authorities have shown their real priorities as they have collapsed
discussions on the issue of transparency and confidence-building measures in outer
space activities that were originally initiated by the US side.
Current situation in the UN disarmament machinery reflects general deterioration
of international situation that is aggravated by lack of dialogue on strengthening the
existing arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation regimes and on developing
mutually acceptable new mechanisms in this area. In this context, the issue of a
legally-binding Protocol to the BTWC is a tattle-tailing example of how things may
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get blocked by those whowant to avoid restrictions and constraints—or, maybe, have
something to hide.
Speaking of BTWC, Russia will continue to support initiatives aimed at strength-
ening its regime and making the Convention more efficient. We have made a number
of proposals in this sense and call on all other members to support them. But the
issue of the Protocol is still pending.
Under current circumstances it is very important to keep the remaining com-
munication channels open. We are glad that after a long—maybe, too long—break
strategic dialogue has resumed with the USA. It is a venue that allows us to speak
openly on our respective security concerns and on eventual ways to fix them. We are
looking forward for the next meeting that we hope will take place before the end of
this year. Bilateral high-level discussions with some other countries also take place.
For Euro Atlantic region an important role in this area belongs to OSCE Forum for
Security Co-operation, “structured dialogue” on European security challenges and
threats and theOpenSkiesConsultativeCommission. TheNATO-RussiaCouncil that
was supposed to be “weather-proof” has failed a real-life test. Its NATOmembers did
not realize that dialogue is only possible on the basis of equality and mutual respect.
So, now NRC is practically out of business, and there are strong doubts about its
future.
Within the OSCE framework Russia’s priorities are reducing military confronta-
tion, including mutual restraint in military activities along our borders with NATO
countries, resumption of military-to-military contacts, risk reduction, strengthening
stability and de-escalation. As for “structured dialogue”, it first of all provides us an
opportunity to address issues related to “deconflicting”.
Surely, international security and arms control agenda in Europe may be much
more ambitious. I am not speaking about the “European missile crisis Rev 2.0” that
may be coming ourway. There are lots of things here that can be done on a cooperative
basis. We have already kissed some of these “sleeping beauties”, but they either did
not wake up, or went to sleep again. Maybe, second chance will be worth trying, but
for this it will be necessary to return to the basics and assume that all countries here
are equal. They all have their security concerns and legitimate security rights. Russia
is not an exception. One should also remember that arms control is always a deal, so
it would be totally unrealistic to expect us to give away our national security interests
for nothing. And, most of all, it is important to realize that nothing positive will ever
be achieved through policies of “deterring Russia”, that nowadays look more and
more like “containment” that was the central element of the Cold war, and that, I
hope, we have definitively left behind.
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Chapter 9
Perspectives on Nuclear Safety, Security,
Safeguards and Non-proliferation
Li Hua
Global nonproliferation and nuclear security and safety situation remains facing
challenges—The global situation on nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear security,
and nuclear safety presently remains facing considerable uncertainties. The Korean
Peninsula nuclear issue, although achieved some progress over the year 2018, still
in the jeopardy of increasing tension escalations in the wake of the Hanoi Summit
ending up without further agreements. The recent tests of the DPRK’s short-range
missiles have provided more uncertainties for the future of the Korean Peninsula
situation. Meanwhile, the Iran nuclear issue is confronting severe challenges. The
Trump administration’s withdrawal from JCPOA, as well as its revival of sanctions
against Iran, has inevitably triggered an increasingly intense confrontation between
Iran and the United States, fueling regional tensions and conflicts risks. Nuclear pro-
liferation risks have been increasing featuring as some country has accumulated a
large amount of sensitive nuclear materials in the operation process of nuclear power
industries which could serve for proliferation purposes. Some emerging technolo-
gies are contributing to the proliferation risks growth by facilitating wide-spreading
nuclear weapon design knowledge and lowering nuclear devices design and produc-
tion thresholds. More broadly, the global development of nuclear power industries
would inevitably be coupled with the risks of proliferation due to the dual-use nature
that nuclear technologies possess.
Chinese approach to address challenges of nuclear proliferation, safety and
security—China is facing an extremely complicated situation both in domestic and
abroad. The Korean Peninsula nuclear issue is in the vicinity of Chinese territory,
which could deliver a considerable impact on Chinese national security. There has
been a considerable amount of sensitive materials in China’s neighboring counties,
leaving China facing potential proliferation threats. Chinese nuclear power industries
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have been undergoing rapid developments with about 11 nuclear power plants under-
construction simultaneously, ranking the global top. The facilities would be possi-
bly become the targets of nuclear terrorism, resulting in emerging nuclear security
challenges.
Addressing the complicated threats and challenges of nuclear security, safety and
proliferation requires strategic thinking and concrete measures, The Chinese ancient
culture has provided the general guidance for managing the complicated risks of
proliferation, safety, and security, which could be dated back to the philosophy of
Confucius and Laozi about 2500 years ago. There is a Chinese character that could be
used to convey this idea, which is和, whose primary meaning is harmony. Chinese
ancient philosophists raised great ideas featuring compatibility between peoples and
between people and nature. For personal relations, this idea highlights no impose on
others; For relational between people and environment, it highlights the integration
between the two and the compliance with natural patterns.
To address the imminent domestic threats and challenges, China has adopted
a Rational, Coordinated and Balanced Nuclear Safety Strategy, which highlights
equal emphasis on development and safety, and develop the nuclear industry in a
context of guaranteed safety, equal emphasis on rights and obligations, and promote
international nuclear safety on the basis of respect for the rights and interests of all
countries, equal emphasis on independent efforts and coordination, and seekuniversal
nuclear safety with a mutually beneficial approach and equal emphasis on symptoms
and root causes.
China has attached great importance to the building of legal framework consisting
of the laws on nuclear safety, under which administrative regulations and departmen-
tal rules dovetail with the law, the provisions of laws and regulations and technical
standards complement each other. In June 2003, the Law of the People’s Republic
of China on the Prevention and Control of Radioactive Pollution was promulgated;
in September 2017, the Nuclear Safety Law of the People’s Republic of China was
issued. By June 2019, China had enacted nine administrative regulations such as the
Regulations on the Supervision and Administration of Civil Nuclear Facilities, the
Regulations on the Supervision and Administration of Civil Nuclear Safety Equip-
ment, the Regulations on Nuclear Material Control, and the Regulations on Emer-
gencyManagement of Nuclear Accidents at Nuclear Power Plants. It had issued over
30 sets of departmental rules and 100 sets of safety guidelines, and formulated over
1000 national and industry standards related to nuclear safety.
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Milestones of China’s Building of Legal Structure on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Nuclear Safety and Security 
Governance capabilities, under the legal guidance, are essential to ensure the
enforcement of the strategies as well as the legal instruments. China has con-
structed a three-pronged regulatory system consisting of headquarters, regional
offices and technical support organizations and developed a whole set of regula-
tive regimes which includes comprehensive review and license management, whole-
process surveillance and law enforcement, round-the-clock radiation environment
monitoring, improved nuclear and radiation emergency response and professional
teams.
China’s increasing embrace of global nuclear governance marks another Chinese
effort to enhance its capabilities to confront nuclear proliferation, safety, and security
challenges. China joined the Zangger Committee in 1997 and The Nuclear Supplier
Group in 2004 respectively and signedwith the IAEA the safeguard protocol in 1998.
China in 2008 decided to ratify the amendment of Convention on Physical Protection
of Nuclear Materials.
Milestones of China’s Participation in Global Governance on Nuclear non-proliferation and Nuclear Safety and Security 
Chinese nuclear scientists community has launched a variety of research pro-
grams on nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear safety, and security and has been con-
ducting dialogues and communication broadly with international colleagues in the
area.Chinese scientists in organizations such asChinaNationalNuclearCooperation,
China Institute of Atomic Energy and China Academy of Engineering Physics have
done nuclear material composition analysis through destruction analysis technolo-
gies such asX-ray fluorescence analyze andmass spectrometry, uranium enrichment,
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and plutonium isotope composition through non-destruction analysis technologies
such as gamma spectrometry. Chinese scientists employ numerical modeling and
Monte Carlo method to simulate nuclear reactors’ operation and developed sensitive
material detection and vehicle monitoring, which contributes to addressing nuclear
material smuggling challenges.
The creation of China-the United States Center on Excellence has marked one of
the great highlights in China’s cooperation and collaboration with partners world-
wide. During the Washington Nuclear Security Summit in April 2010, the former
President Hu Jintao reached an agreement with then President Obama on the joint
establishment of a Center on Excellence (COE) on Nuclear Security in China. The
COE started operation in 2015 and has become a nuclear security exchange and
training center boasting the enormous scale, the most comprehensive equipment, the
most robust technical capabilities.
Through the systemic approaches, China has maintained a good nuclear safety
record for a long time—it ranks among the highest of all countries in terms of nuclear
power safety operation indicators. In 2000, 2004, 2010 and 2016, the International
Atomic Energy Agency conducted four comprehensive reviews of China’s nuclear
and radiation safety regulation, giving full recognition to China’s good practices and
experiences. In the comprehensive ranking of similar units of the World Association
of Nuclear Operators (WANO) in recent years, operating units in China have per-
formed above the world median for more than 80 percent of the indicators, and have
reached the world’s advanced level for more than 70 percent of the indicators.
Suggestions for further enhancing global efforts of promoting nuclear-
nonproliferation, safety and security—Nuclear proliferation and security and safety
challenges are posing a shared threat to human community. Chinese President Xi
Jinping stated in UN Geneva Office in 2017 that “Nuclear weapons, the Sword
of Damocles that hangs over mankind, should be completely prohibited and thor-
oughly destroyed over time to make the world free of nuclear weapons”. It is of great
necessity that the international community should take joint measures to address
the complicated situations concerning nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear safety, and
security.
The Korean Peninsula nuclear issue remains one of the most severe items in
international security agenda, which involves complicated domains such as secu-
rity, politics as well as nuclear technologies. Furthermore, the possible denucle-
arization process would confront challenges such as declaration, dismantlement,
disablements. The Chinese government has consistently advocated solving the com-
plicated situation featuring the addressing symptoms and roots of nuclear prolifer-
ation, which means the security concerns and denuclearization demands should be
addressed simultaneously. The dialogue and negotiation in this regard would be the
most desirable approach. Moreover, given that the denuclearization process could be
time-consuming, creative thinking is necessary to ensure the future possible denu-
clearization process could proceed smoothly. Deals on capabilities frozen, facilities
disablements, weapons dismantlement could be reached respectively and separately.
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The security mechanism building would be proceeded accordingly, possibly includ-
ing confidence building measures such as exercise halt, exchange military posture
information, and legally binding instruments such as peace treaty.
Given the indispensable role of sensitive nuclear materials in nuclear prolifera-
tion, strengthening nuclear sensitive material control would contribute significantly
to reduce proliferation risks. The data from International Panel on Fissile Materials
demonstrates that the global HEU inventory remains over 1000 tons with potential
proliferation, nuclear security, and safety risks despite the significant improvements
having been achieved in the reduction of HEU globally over Nuclear Security Sum-
mits, leaving considerable rooms to desire for further global efforts. The focus of
efforts should be further orientated to reduce HEU usage with the highlight to pro-
mote the conversion of research reactors from fueling HEU to LEU. Plutonium
would be the other focus of nuclear material control efforts. Spent fuel should be
subject to international safeguards wherever possible and greater efforts remain in
need of enhancing monitoring and detecting possible clandestine reprocessing facil-
ities. Based on current researches and capabilities, Kr-85 remains the most reliable
reprocessing indicator, and ariel random sampling is of more feasibilities than other
means given that the required high-density network of fixed monitoring stations in
the vast region would be prohibitively costly due to the Kr-85 background.
More theoretically, emerging technologies are dual-edged swords that could
impact negatively on international security if proper management is absent. Global
scientists community in this regard would be obligated to take enhanced approaches
to take preemptive measures of risk management such as assessing proliferation
as well as safety and security risks, promoting national legalization as well as
participating in international cooperation.
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Cooperation is central to the success of the non-proliferation regime, but we cannot
simply assume that parties are cooperating. Monitoring helps confirm that countries
are fulfilling their positive obligations to report stocks, technologies, and operations
and their negative obligations to forego prohibited activities. Science and technol-
ogy have long played important roles in monitoring treaty obligations, and as new
technologies and analytical methods emerge and mature their roles can increase.
However, neither development nor adoption is guaranteed. Technical developments
require continued efforts by scientific and technical experts, informed by imple-
menters and supported by adequate resources. Adoption and implementation of
new technologies also require adequate resources and the shared will to enhance
capabilities.
The international community relies on the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), and particularly its Safeguards program, to confirm each country’s com-
pliance with its obligations under its comprehensive safeguards agreement and any
additional agreements (such as an Additional Protocol) that expand the range of
permitted inspections. As of 2019, 175 states have entered into comprehensive safe-
guards agreements with the IAEA, including all non-nuclear-weapon states party to
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and all states party to regional nuclear-
weapon-free-zone treaties. Under these agreements, the IAEA monitors activities to
ensure that nuclear material is not diverted to a program for nuclear explosives. The
IAEA also has voluntary agreements with the five NPT nuclear-weapon states and
with India, Pakistan, and Israel, which are not parties to the NPT. The IAEA’s most
extensive safeguards efforts are currently in Iran, largely driven by requirements
under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). After operating for many
1Rotblat et al. [1].
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years with the same technologies and approaches, the IAEA is now employing a
variety of new technologies and using other extant technologies that have become
feasible for the IAEA to use in conjunction with their traditional observations and
analyses.
The ban on nuclear explosion testing, not yet in force but observed by all except
North Korea, is a key element of the non-proliferation regime. The Preparatory Com-
mission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO)
embodies both cooperation and monitoring and supports the non-proliferation
regime. The CTBTO has a plenary body for deliberation and decision making and
the Provisional Technical Secretariat, which conducts monitoring, processing and
dissemination of data, and prepares for possible future on-site inspections. The
CTBTO’s capabilities have surpassed expectations, providing high-quality data and
analyses of seismic events around the world, complemented by radionuclide detec-
tors, and infrasound and hydroacoustic sensors.NorthKorea’s violations ofUNSecu-
rity Council resolutions and international norms through nuclear explosion testing,
as well as on-going production of fissile material and missile tests, have provided
unfortunate opportunities for the CTBTO to demonstrate its capabilities, and it has
performed well.
Detectors themselves have improved, but it is really the analysis of combinations
of signals from detectors and sensors that has substantially improved monitoring
capabilities. Artificial intelligence can help with these analyses.Multispectrum satel-
lite imagery powerfully augments analysis using ground-based detection to compare
to declarations. Technical advances for traditional monitoring can be complemented
by nontraditional monitoring, which could include what Rotblatt called societal veri-
fication1 and by what Stubbs and Drell called public technical means.2 In the former,
citizens of a treaty-bound country see it as their obligation to report publicly or to
international bodies any potential violation of their nation’s treaty obligations. The
latter involves non-government analysis of open-source information. In both cases,
technological innovation enables major improvements in the public’s ability to assist
the non-proliferation regime. But none of these advances comes without controversy.
Thegreatest recent advances in capabilities have come from integrationofmultiple
sources of data. The CTBTO operates the International Monitoring System (IMS),
data fromwhich can bemerged with data from national resources outside of the IMS.
The IAEAnowuses commercial satellite imagery extensively to analyze consistency.
Together, these and other technologiesmake the non-proliferationmonitoring regime
more capable than ever before, and there are opportunities for further improvement.
2Stubbs and Drell [2].
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Chapter 11
The IAEA for Building Future
Safeguards Capabilities
Massimo Aparo
Mission—The IAEA’s verification mission for non-nuclear weapons states is derived
from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. That mission is a simple one: to verify—
through the application of safeguards—that nuclear material within the territory,
jurisdiction, or control of a non-Nuclear Weapons State is not diverted to nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Our role is clearly defined in our statute
and in legally binding safeguards agreements with States. We operate within bound-
aries largely determined by our Board of Governors - to provide a unique service to
the international community.
Deterring the proliferation of nuclear weapons depends very much on the robust-
ness of the verification regime. Essentially, there are three elements to a robust
verification regime. First, for Member States to provide the IAEA with accurate and
consistent declarations of their nuclear material and facilities. Second, having effec-
tive safeguards measures available. And third, having the will to apply them without
fear or favour.
Verifying the non-diversion of nuclear material at declared nuclear facilities is an
important element of that regime, but is not sufficient. Any determined proliferator
is unlikely to conduct nefarious activities where inspectors regularly inspect. That
is why we also need to provide credible assurance of the absence of undeclared
nuclear material and activities. While the Agency has the “right and obligation”
under Article 2 of the CSA to ensure that safeguards will be applied… on all source
of special fissionable material in all peaceful activities”—that is “Completeness”:
the Additional Protocol provides complementary legal authority that strengthens the
Agency’s ability to detect undeclared nuclear material and activities. It is only for
States with both a CSA and AP in force that the Agency is able to conclude that
all nuclear material remains in peaceful activities in the State. And that is why the
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additional protocol is vital in strengthening the verification regime, by providing us
with additional information and broader access to sites and locations.
The work of our inspectors—backed by analysts and technical support staff in
Vienna—continues every day across the world. Sustaining that global operation
requires resources, commitment and capability. Here, I want to stress that it is our
legal obligation to implement safeguards—it is not a matter of choice. Our legal
obligations determine our workload, and our workload continues to increase while
our budget broadly remains the same.
Challenges—While the core safeguards mission does not change, the world in
which we operate does. When coupled with increasing demand on safeguards ser-
vices, this means we need to adapt in order to sustain the credibility of the safeguards
system.
Alongside the steadily rising number of nuclear facilities and locations outside
facilities that are under safeguards—currently over 1300—in recent years we have
also seen a significant growth in the number ofAdditional Protocols in force—around
40 in the past decade—to now stand at 134. As you are aware, the additional protocol
gives theAgency broader access to information about all parts of a State’s nuclear fuel
cycle, including research and development activities, as well as the manufacturing
and export of sensitive nuclear-related equipment and material.
The volume and diversity of safeguards-relevant information is growing rapidly.
More Additional protocols in force means more Additional Protocol declarations to
be checked. Open source information grows exponentially, thereby increasing the
demands on analysts to keep pace and to identify the most relevant information.
The Agency now conducts more complicated verification activities than ever in
the past, to keep pace with the nuclear fuel cycle developments of States under
safeguards. For example, today there are a lot more spent fuel transfers to medium
and long-term storage and more decommissioning of facilities than previously.
Globalization, new technology and modern communications have all made it
possible to access technologies, materials and expertise that were previously not
widely available. Technology that could be used for the development of nuclear
weapons is no longer out of reach for a growing number of States.
And advancements in information technology have heightened cyber security
threats to the protection of sensitive information that has beenprovided to the IAEA—
in confidence—by Member States.
Meeting the challenges—So, how is the IAEA and more particularly the Depart-
ment of Safeguards responding to the challenge of adapting to change in the context
of rising demand and a tightly constrained budget? Let me set out some of the ways
in which we are seeking to do so.
Let me start with State-level safeguards.
State-level safeguards approaches (SLAs) are a very important tool to improve
the effectiveness of safeguards. They also enable the Agency to better cope with a
fast changing environment because, unlike the Safeguards Criteria, they can respond
to changes in State-specific factors, such as changes to a State’s nuclear fuel cycle.
In other words, the frequency and intensity of safeguards measures can be adjusted
in line with changes to those factors. SLAs, developed based on detailed procedures
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and defined steps, also allow for a more consistent definition and prioritization of
technical objectives.
As part of the Secretariat’s ongoing dialogue with States on this matter, in July
last year, the DG issued his report on ‘Implementation of State-level safeguards
approaches for States under integrated safeguards—experience gained and lessons
learned’.
Moving forward, our immediate efforts are concentrating on ensuring that our
SLA processes are indeed consistent and applied uniformly across all operations
divisions. The Department is developing additional guidance and tools to support
the work, and reviewing and updating the SLAs that have been developed so far. We
are using a robust internal review process for this, ensuring safeguards approaches
are objective and non-discriminatory. The current focus is on updating and refining
the SLAs for States under integrated safeguards, so that our experience with these
States can be improved over time.
The number of States with a comprehensive safeguards agreement for which an
SLA has been developed has now reached 130. These 130 States hold 97% of all
nuclear material (by significant quantity) under Agency safeguards in States with a
comprehensive safeguards agreement. So you can see that we have made significant
progress on this front and we will continue to develop and implement SLAs for all
States, in accordance with the processes set out in the Supplementary Document
presented to the IAEA Board of Governors in 2014.
The Safeguards Department’s main product to the Board of Governors is our con-
clusions,which are contained in the annual Safeguards ImplementationReport. These
conclusions are the product of an internal process called State evaluation. State eval-
uation is the ongoing evaluation of all relevant information available to the Agency
about a State and is aimed at assessing the consistency of that information in the con-
text of a State’s safeguards obligations. To be effective, we need the State evaluation
process to be rigorous, with thorough analysis underpinning soundly-based and well
documented results. One of the ways in which I have strengthened State evaluation
is through the use of Peer Review Teams. These are proving extremely useful in
making sure that State Evaluation Groups consistently use the best approaches and
tools in preparing SERs and in drawing up Annual Implementations Plans.
All of this work in relation to SLAs has now been pulled together under a major
Departmental project to ensure that SLAs all meet a high standard of quality and are
implemented to the same standard.
The modernization of safeguards IT under the MOSAIC project has ensured that
the Department’s IT system supports all safeguards implementation processes well
into the future. Through MOSAIC, new and improved IT applications are allow-
ing for better planning, conducting, reporting, and quality assessment of safeguards
activities. The Department has undertaken this upgrade using in-house expertise,
but has relied heavily on extra-budgetary support from Member States. The entire
upgrade was completed in May 2018—on schedule and within budget.
Another crucial benefit of theMOSAIC project was the increased ability to defend
against cyber security threats that it delivered. Indeed, in recent times, theDepartment
of Safeguards has taken a number of important steps to improve the cyber security
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of information in its possession. These steps include moving safeguards confiden-
tial system and files into a secure environment, raising staff awareness about cyber
threats, and ensuring that we comply with international best practices in this area.
Environmental sampling and nuclear material analysis are crucial to effective
verification. As capabilities in this area advance, the IAEA’s analytical laboratories
in Seibersdorf and the 22 other laboratories that comprise the Agency’s Network of
Analytical Laboratories will remain tightly coordinated. The Agency is examining
ways of improving the timeliness of its analysis. The IAEA will also improve its
quality control programme for the Network of Labs, in particular in the area of
particle analysis.
TheAgency is constantlyworking to ensure that it deploys equipment formeasure-
ment and containment techniques that inspectors find easy to use. Such equipment
needs to be sufficiently rugged to be shipped around the world and flexible enough
to be used in a number of different environments.
The Agency has expanded and enhanced it use of unattended monitoring systems
and improved its corresponding capability to receive remote data transmission at
Headquarters in Vienna. The use of remote data transmission enables greater verifi-
cation efficiency by relieving inspectors of the task of collecting and reviewing data
at facilities. It also allows early detection of any deterioration in system performance.
The Agency also now constantly monitors commercial technologies to identify
and potentially exploit innovations that could enhance its capabilities. In November
2018, at the IAEA’s quadrennial Safeguards Symposium, for example, the Agency
looked at the possibilities offered by robotics and how different gamma imaging
cameras might be utilised. The Agency is keen to find promising technologies for
further testing and, if such tests are positive, move expeditiously to deploy them in
the field.
At the diplomatic level, Member States increasingly want to better understand
how safeguards are implemented and to receive new levels of communication and
transparency from the Secretariat. We will maintain that active dialogue with our
Member States through bilateral discussions, technical meetings and formal reports
to the Board of Governors.
Iran—Turning now to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action—JCPOA or “Iran
nuclear deal”—which has posed particular challenges for the IAEA: in terms both
of overall effort and in particular technical aspects.
Clearly, it is a gain for verification. The combination of a Comprehensive Safe-
guards Agreement, Additional Protocol and further transparency measures itemised
in the deal represents the most robust overall verification system applied in the world
today. And Iran’s nuclear-related commitments under the deal have resulted in a sig-
nificant reduction in Iran’s declared nuclear activities and major constraints on those
activities that Iran is allowed to maintain.
While the IAEA played a key role before, during and after the negotiation of
the JCPOA, it is not a party to the Agreement. Nor is it for the IAEA to determine
whether Iran is in compliance. We simply report the facts to our Board of Governors
and to the UN Security Council.
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In order to verify and monitor Iran’s implementation of its nuclear-related com-
mitments under the JCPOA our inspectors are on the ground 24/7. They now spend
around 3000 days in the field in Iran each year, twice as many as before the deal took
effect. They have taken hundreds of environmental samples and placed around 2000
tamper-proof seals on nuclear material and equipment. TheAgency has collected and
analysed hundreds of thousands of images captured by our sophisticated surveillance
cameras along with several million pieces of open-source information. Furthermore,
all of our activities are supported by state-of-the-art technology, including systems
that collect and process data. Added to which we have access to more locations
under the Additional Protocol, which enables us to learn more about Iran’s nuclear
programme overall.
Many of the things the Agency was requested to do under the JCPOA (and the
Joint Plan of Action before it)—required it to develop new, robust approaches and
ways of working—even to develop new equipment—and to do so inside a very short
timeframe. In such cases there were no “baseline” documents to consult, and no
precedent to help us.
As all of us are keenly aware, the future of the Iran deal is uncertain. Iran has
reduced a number of its commitments. Nevertheless, the Agency’s verification and
monitoring system in Iran remains intact and we will continue to report the reality
on the ground for as long as we are required to do so.
DPRK—It is over a decade since IAEA inspectors were required to leave North
Korea. Since then, the Agency has not been able to carry out any verification activi-
ties in the country. However, the Agency continues to monitor the DPRK’s nuclear
programme and evaluate all safeguards-relevant information available to it, including
open source information and satellite imagery.
In the past 10 years, the DPRK’s nuclear programme has significantly expanded.
It has started uranium enrichment, built a light water reactor and restarted all the
nuclear facilities in Yongbyon, including the 5 MW(e) reactor and reprocessing
plant. However, without access, the Agency cannot confirm the nature and purpose
of the activities I just described. Since 2009, the DPRK has announced that it has
conducted five nuclear tests, in addition to the one announced in 2006.
In 2017, the Agency created an Executive Group and Agency Team dedicated
specifically to the DPRK. This team has increased the monitoring of the DPRK’s
nuclear programme through more frequent collection of satellite imagery. It has
also enhanced the Agency’s readiness to promptly undertake any verification it may
be requested to conduct in the DPRK if a political agreement is reached among
countries concerned. Subject to the approval of our Board of Governors, we could
respond within weeks to any request to send inspectors back to the DPRK.
Conclusion—By successfully addressing the challenges that I have identified
today, we can ensure that the IAEA continues as a modern, highly productive and
lean verification organization. Inside the Safeguards Department we will continue to
improve our processes to ensure delivery of desired outcomes; maximising collab-
oration through teamwork within the Department; and ensuring an efficient distri-
bution of resources. Such enhancements are vital if the Agency is to bridge the gap
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between demand and resources, and demonstrate to Member States that it is using
their resources wisely and effectively.
The challenges to the safeguards system are more profound and varied today
than they have ever been. To succeed, the IAEA will need to be able to respond
to the unexpected, while strengthening the credibility of the safeguards conclusions
it draws. I am confident that working together with Member States and the wider
safeguards community, we can meet those challenges and make the world a safer
place for future generations.
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Chapter 12
Science and Technology for Putting
an End to Nuclear Explosions
Tammy Taylor
Dear Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen,
Thank you for inviting me to be here with you for the XXI Eduardo Amaldi
Conference in the beautiful facilities of the Accademia Nazionale Dei Lincei. The
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the CTBT, was designed to establish a
mechanism to monitor and verify the cessation of all nuclear explosions—to help
humanity put an end to the grave consequences of nuclear explosions. As theDirector
of the International Data Center Division of the CTBTOrganization (CTBTO), or the
Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS) as it is commonly referred to, I’m delighted
and honoured to engagewith this scientifically and politically elite group of experts to
elaborate on a few of the CTBTO’s most significant science and technology pursuits
in the context of putting an end to nuclear explosions.
The nuclear test ban became comprehensive more than three decades after the
adoption of the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty, which had banned nuclear weapons
tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and underwater. In the 1990s, the global
community sought to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions in all envi-
ronments, including underground for all time. The CTBT opened for signature and
ratification 23 years ago. Annex II of the treaty specifies the signature and ratification
by a mandated set of 44 nations who all possessed nuclear reactors in 1995. Eight
nations remain of the 44 mandated who must either ratify or sign and ratify the treaty
to enter into force. Currently the treaty has 184 signatories and 168 ratifications.
The CTBT is a treaty rooted in the recognition that the cessation of all nuclear
explosions is a requisite to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. In the prepa-
rations for the 2020 NPT Review Conference the international community could
chose to concentrate their efforts on issues of broad common agreement, such as the
CTBT. As the statements of support towards the CTBT showed in the May 2019
NPT PrepCom in New York, there are shared beliefs and principles about a large set
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of security and humanitarian consequences of nuclear testing and about the necessity
of preventing their use.
The CTBT is an instrument supported by a technology-led verification regime.
Scientific technologies are essential for verification of nuclear non-proliferation and
disarmament. The CTBT Verification Regime Elements established in Article IV of
the treaty are as follows:
• The International Monitoring System (IMS) of 321 stations that include seis-
mic, hydroacoustic, infrasound, radionuclide components, the International Data
Centre (IDC), and the Global Communications Infrastructure.
• Consultation and Clarification to allow State Signatories the right to seek clarifi-
cation on matters that indicate the possibility of non-compliance with the Treaty
following entry-into-force.
• On-Site Inspection to provide for the ability to conduct on-site verification activities
if a nuclear detonation is suspected by States Signatories. The on-site inspection
regime is designed to confirm on the ground whether a nuclear explosion has taken
place. The PTS can build the capacity to perform these on-site inspections and test
our preparedness, but no on-site inspection will r take place until the treaty has
entered into force.
• And finally, Confidence Building Measures intended to strengthen CTBTO capa-
bilities, prevent misinterpretations and allow for better calibration of the stations
of the IMS.
The IMSwill ultimately be made up of 337 facilities, 321 of which are monitoring
facilities and 16 radionuclide laboratories. These facilities are located around our
earth and they collect and transmit data to the IDC for processing and analysis. The
IMS is more than 91% complete at this time with 44 of 50 primary seismic stations,
108 of 120 auxiliary seismic stations, 11 of 11 hydro-acoustic stations, 51 of 60
infrasound stations and 71 of 80 particulate radionuclide stations certified. Forty of
the radionuclide stations will have noble gas detection capabilities once the IMS is
fully constructed. Since 2012, 25 noble gas systems have come online, been certified
and are sending data to the IDC. Thirteen of sixteen radionuclide labs are currently
operational and certified.
In summary, today the IMS is comprised of 297 certified facilities, including
radionuclide laboratories. There are nine installed facilities that are not yet certified
for operations, six facilities under construction, and 25 planned facilities for the
total of 337 IMS facilities. The precise location of each facility was envisioned by
the treaty negotiators between 1993 and 1996. The locations were selected based on
optimal global coverage. Scientific communities from around the world were heavily
involved in site selection optimization. Figure 12.1 is a current map of the IMS.
The charge of the PTS in the context of the data generated from the monitoring
facilities is to receive, collect, process, analyse, report on and archive the data from the
IMS, and to provide States Parties with open, equal, timely and convenient access to
all IMS data, raw or processed, and all IDCproducts. The PTS also provides technical
assistance to individual States Parties whenever this assistance is requested.
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Fig. 12.1 Map of the International Monitoring System (IMS)
To accomplish the above, the PTS established the Global Communications Infras-
tructure (GCI) to provide a massive communications system, which utilizes nine
geostationary satellites to bring data from the IMS facilities to the PTS in Vienna,
Austria. The communications network also transmits data to the National Data Cen-
tres (NDCs) operated by the States Signatories. This allows the States Signatories
to draw an independent conclusion on the nature of events picked up by the system
and ultimately determine whether it was a nuclear explosion. Approximately 14 ter-
abytes of data per year is transmitted through GCI making the CTBT second to none
when it comes to monitoring and understanding our planet. This communications
infrastructure is key to the operation and security of data from the IMS. The current
GCI satellite coverage is summarized in Fig. 12.2. The GCI is in its third 10-year
contract (GCI III). GCI III is operated by Hughes Network Services.
I just mentioned the four technologies that allow the CTBT to detect nuclear
explosions—seismic, hydroacoustic, infrasound, and radiation detection. Tens of
thousands of naturally occurring events affect our planet each day. To date the PTS
has characterized nearly 600,000 events. Figure 12.3 provides a summary of all PTS
relevant nuclear detonations between 2000 and 2018.
With that as an overview to establish some practical and political background of
common interests, let me narrow in on the operations of the IMS led by the IDC
Division of the PTS. I would like to share two specific examples of CTBT global
contributions that illuminate our science-based technology capabilities. After that, I
will summarize one example of science and technology needs required to continue
to advance our progress in nuclear event detection.
I have the honour to lead the IDC in Vienna as Director where about 100 analysts,
scientists, engineers, specialists, technicians, administrators and leaders navigate the
IMS data to monitor for nuclear explosions and report on all relevant energetic events
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Fig. 12.2 GCI III global satellite coverage
Fig. 12.3 Events totalling 577,573 located by the IDC between 2000 and 2018
to our States Signatories. The IDC staff also steward capacity building programs
designed to strengthen national and regional capacity to promote understanding of
these unique data and apply them for verification purposes, disaster management
capabilities and sustainable development.
The first global contribution highlight I offer is the PTS leadership provided fol-
lowing the Japan earthquake of 11 March 2011, which resulted in a massive tsunami
that led to the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident. The earthquake
was a magnitude 9 event and generated 9800 aftershocks. Figure 12.4 shows the
event (represented by the black star) and the 9800 aftershocks. Infrasound signals
generated in Japan were seen at station I44RU in Kamchatka. Figure 12.5 illustrates
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Fig. 12.4 Japan Earthquake 11 March 2011; magnitude 9 earthquake and 9800 aftershocks
the infrasound signatures. Importantly, radioactivity released from the Fukushima
Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant was detected worldwide by the IMS and then char-
acterized by IDC analysts. Figures 12.6 and 12.7 show the atmospheric dispersion
of a standard radioactivity release from the accident and the specific radionuclide
detections at the closest IMS station, respectively.
The PTS cooperation in the global response to the Fukushima accident was
notable. We were the only organization in the world to possess the ability to measure
radionuclides continuously at the global scale. Our results were used by States Sig-
natories as well as UN organizations to prioritize response activities and understand
potential public health consequences.
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Fig. 12.5 Infrasound signals generated in Japan on 11 March 2011 by earthquakes and tsunami as
seen at I44RU (Kamchatka)
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Fig. 12.6 An illustration of atmospheric transport modelling that portrays release of radiation from
the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident
Fig. 12.7 Nuclide detectionsmeasured over time following the Fukushima accidentmeasured from
radionuclide station RN38 located in Japan
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Fig. 12.8 DPRK test 1 conducted on 9 October, 2006 as detected by 22 IMS stations globally
Fig. 12.9 Historical seismicity in the region of DPRK test site
The second highlight that illustrates the significance of PTS capabilities is the
significant analysis of the Nuclear Testing Program carried out by the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), which has announced a total of six nuclear tests.
The first test was conducted on 9 October 2006. Twenty-two IMS stations detected
the test as illustrated in Fig. 12.8. History had provided a glimpse into the seismicity
of the region near the test site. On 16 April 2002 an earthquake was characterized in
the region. This earthquake provided strong comparison waveform data to evaluate
against the test of 9 October 2006. Figure 12.9 summarizes the proximity of the
earthquake location and the test event location.
Following the event, IDC analysts began examining the data from IMS monitor-
ing stations. Figure 12.10 provides a tutorial of the distinction between an explosion,
which generates a spherically symmetric propagation of shock waves (P waves),
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Fig. 12.10 Data characteristics for explosion versus earthquake
Fig. 12.11 Comparison of data characteristics between an explosion and an earthquake in the
region of the DPRK test site
and an earthquake, which generates both P- and shear waves owing to a substan-
tially more complex double-couple mechanism. The resultant distinction between
the seismograms is illustrated in the right half of Fig. 12.10. The seismogram for
the earthquake is illustrated in blue and shows propagation of large surface waves
as well as emergent arrivals. The seismogram for the explosion is illustrated in red
and shows a sudden, impulsive onset, but lacks the later surface wave characteristics.
Figure 12.11 illustrates the seismogram results for the 9 October 2006 nuclear test
in comparison to the 16 April 2002 presumed earthquake.
IDC software automatically processes metadata that arrives from monitoring sta-
tions. The primary purpose of the software is to help eliminate events that are clearly
of natural origin. Key screening criteria are applied. One important criterion is a
comparison between surface wave magnitude (Ms), waves that travel along the sur-
face of the earth, and body wave magnitude (mb), waves that travels down into the
earth’s core. Ms and mb are both measures of the amount of energy released and are
recorded as amplitude of wavelength, in other words, the amplitude of the waveform
signal.
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Fig. 12.12 Analysis characteristic criteria to distinguish between explosions and earthquakes
Fig. 12.13 Summary overview of all DPRK seismic events
As a result of the difference between Ms and mb, explosion signals show an
mb/Ms ratio larger than that for earthquakes. Figure 12.12 illustrates a large data set
from 2016 comparing four different sets of data categories stemming from the data
characteristics.
To conclude the highlights of significant global PTS contributions, please see
Fig. 12.13, which represents a summary of the six DPRK tests. Note that two of the
tests generated radionuclide (specifically radioxenon) detections—the first DPRK
test in 2006 and the 2013 third DPRK test. I’ll speak more about these radioxenon
detections as I begin discussing our science and technology needs example.
Before I transition to this example however, I would like to emphasize the
CTBTO’s readiness to make available our assets and expertise to contribute to DPRK
denuclearization should the opportunity present itself. The three main areas the PTS
could contribute to are:
• test site closure verification support activities,
• verification of a nuclear test moratorium
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• and signature and ratification of the CTBT by the DPRK, which is one of the
remaining 8 States required to adhere to the treaty.
Through any of these three areas, the CTBTO and its verification regime have
the clear potential to contribute to the denuclearization of the DPRK. Other massive
responsibilities such as removal of fissionable material and dismantlement of an
actual nuclear arsenal fall well outside the mandate of the CTBT and the expertise
of PTS staff capabilities.
The area of science and technology need that I would like to highlight for you
today is associated with the noble gas technology. Radiation-based technologies
provide rich research and development collaboration opportunities with scientists
around the world. The two CTBTO radiation technologies, radioactive particle and
noble gas detection, are the means by which we confirm that an event is verifiably
a nuclear one. We are constantly looking for the presence of one or more of 87
anthropogenic radionuclides. Exposed to prevailing winds, radiation is dispersed in
the atmosphere and may, after a certain period of time, be detected thousands of
kilometers away from an explosion site. The objective of the CTBTO’s radionuclide
monitoring network is to detect residual radiation even if only in minuscule amounts.
Our network of laboratories supports the radionuclides stations around the world.
Following the first DPRK test, PTS researchers carefully reviewed xenon data,
specifically 133Xe, according to meteorological predictions that forecasted where
the air mass originating from the test site would be moving around the earth. The
researchers narrowed in on the Yellowknife, Canada (CAX16) noble gas equipped
radionuclide station. This station was impacted by noble gas background concentra-
tions generated from the Chalk River Laboratories (CRL) in Canada. In October of
2006 a xenon emission became obvious that was not related to CRL. Background
xenon was at a low point during this time period and atmospheric transport mod-
elling, assuming an emission of 1PBq of 133Xe from the 9 October 2006 nuclear test
correspondedwellwith the detection observation. The first IMS radioxenon detection
from a nuclear detonation was verifiably identified by the IDC analysis.
The only other strong evidence of IMS radioxenon detection of a nuclear test came
following the 12 February 2013 DPRK third nuclear test. Stations RN38 (Takasaki,
Japan) and RN58 (Ussuriysk, Russia) showed spikes in radioxenon concentrations
more than 50 days after 12 February 2013. The nuclear test became evident as the
source of these detections by a combination of estimating the origin time of the fission
event based on the observed 131mXe/133Xe activity ratios and atmospheric transport
modelling scenarios which suggest strongly that delayed radioxenon emissions orig-
inating from the DPRK test site were captured by the noble gas systems at two IMS
stations.
In both the 2006 and 2013 xenon detection evidence, background concentrations
of radioxenon emissions at the three IMS stations were at abnormal concentrations
but still less than many other observed spikes of radioxenon. The global inventories
of xenon emissions around the world is unfortunately resulting in many detections
every day including one or two at abnormal concentrations every day. This causes
a background noise that doesn’t always make it possible or easy to characterize
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Fig. 12.14 Average background of Xe-133 Image provided by G. Le Petit, CEA, France
Fig. 12.15. “Hit rate” above detection limit Image provided by H. Miley and P. Eslinger, Pacific
Northwest National Laboratory, USA
radioxenon origins. Essentially, the radioxenon that could be released from a nuclear
test may be masked by the abundance of radioxenon present in the background.
With sufficient knowledge and sophisticated methods nuclear test signatures may
be unmasked and its source identified. Figures 12.14 and 12.15 provide a summary
of the geographically varying abundance of radioxenon in the environment as a
consequence of primarily isotope production and nuclear power plant operations.
The next big science and technology improvements for the PTS require methods
to extract possible nuclear detonation signatures as unique against the interfering
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Fig. 12.16 SnT19 goals
radioxenon background so that they are visible for verification activities. Character-
izing sources to understand source-receptor relationships, conducting source receptor
experiments, comparing isotopic ratios (i.e., comparing 135Xe/133Xe to 133m/131mXe),
and confirming when multiple samples catch the same plume will allow the science
to advance to a point where radioxenon signals possibly indicating a nuclear explo-
sion could be distinguishable in a high radioxenon background environment. As you
will see in my summary of the CTBTO Science and Technology 2019 Conference
below, scientists are already making progress towards this goal.
I believe the CTBTO continue to exist as we walk towards entry-into-force. As
we continue on our journey, we must become more efficient, effective, and sustain-
able. One way we look to the future is every two years we host a CTBTO Science
and Technology (SnT) Conference. In fact, just this past June, SnT19 was hosted in
Vienna. This extraordinary full week experience features the scientific and technical
magnitude of the CTBT verification regime and welcomes collaboration to envision
improving our science and technology base through experts working in test ban treaty
monitoring. SnT events foster partnerships and discussions with the scientific com-
munities in support of the CTBT and related national needs. SnT19 accomplish this
while highlighting the accomplishments and accepting input from young scientists
and enhancing geographic and gender representation. 1200 scientists, experts, prac-
titioners, and youth from 100 countries attended the 2019 conference. Figure 12.16
provides an overview of the SnT19 goals.
I want to share just a few highlights from the SnT conference hosted this past
June in Vienna at the Hofburg Palace.
• Numerous independent analysis of theDPRK announced nuclear test on 3 Septem-
ber 2017 demonstrated common understanding and raised confidence in IMS
monitoring capabilities.
• Scientific experts are still considering data to search for radioxenon signals in
background noise to associate radioxenon emissions with all announced nuclear
tests of the DPRK.
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• Progress is being made towards preserving and making available for research
digitized data of historic nuclear explosions.
• Measurement campaigns at historic test sites confirmed the correlation of Ar37
and Ar39.
• The application of gamma spatial imaging is relevant in the context of an on-site
inspection.
• Advancement in hydro-acoustic signal analysis and interpretation is now allowing
researchers to identify direct and several reflected paths on various bathymetric
structures and perform event location.
• Synergy between atmospheric observation and modelling with infrasound data
demonstrates the strong link between improvement in middle atmosphere weather
models and accurate infrasound analysis with signal interpretation.
• NET-VISA was successfully implemented in CTBTO operations for seismic
network processing associated with event building.
• Earthquake detections by IMS stations supported advances in earth sciences on
a global, regional and local scale with a key benefit resulting in better location
accuracy for CTBT monitoring.
• Machine learning is quickly becoming a useful tool for significant improvements
in the fast travel time calculation in various 3D earth models.
• New methods of event location based on waveform cross correlation (WCC) are
able to improve the accuracy of absolute location by two orders of magnitude.
• Waveform correlation processing methods were demonstrated on aftershock
sequences to be effective for operational monitoring systems with a sparse global
network.
It was highlighted in multiple sessions and panels that artificial intelligence and
machine learning is needed for cybersecurity advances and the management and
subsequent use of our IMS data. Cyber security threats are coming faster and are
becoming increasingly too complex for humans to respond to. By the time a threat
has been noted, response is too late. The continuous increase in computational power
and more sophisticated modeling is generating tremendous amounts of data. This in
turn is beginning to lead to the accelerated development of artificial intelligence to
deal with this data. There is already a large amount of data available to the CTBTO
for more enhanced atmospheric and oceanic transport modeling.
Several SnT19 presentations highlighted the challenge of sustaining operational
success of the IMS as focus shifts from network growth to sustainment, where the
budget can no longer buy the same performance improvements. As the IMS reaches
completion of the network, we need predictive maintenance approaches with fast
issue identification to help support more effective resource allocation.
SnT19 hosted two language panels, one in French and one in Spanish, which
highlighted the link between multilingualism and multi-lateralism, particularly in
the context of a highly technical treaty and an international organization with state
signatory stakeholders. The relevance of science and diplomacy approaches was
undeniable and cooperation outcomes were substantially beyond what we could
have accomplished in English alone.
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Fig. 12.17 Civil and scientific applications of IMS data
Thenecessity of inclusion anddevelopment of expertise through capacity-building
programs and scientific and civil applications is a continuous recommendation from
the global community. Let me stay with this theme of a SnT19 highlights in the
context of the importance of civil and scientific applications. In order to strengthen
the support for the CTBT around the world, it is important to emphasize potential
civil uses and benefits of the IMS data. As a scientist, I must draw your attention to
the enormous potential of this data in terms of better understanding our planet.
Civil applications include tsunamis, volcanoes and earthquakes. Disaster risk mit-
igation, climate change, and the study ofmarine life are some of the scientific applica-
tions of these technologies. We collaborate with scientists who follow the migration
of marine mammals with our hydro-acoustic technology, for example. At SnT 19,
scientists suggested use of our data for monitoring of air pollution and research
related to biodiversity changes. Figure 12.17 summarizes some of the applications
and/or potential applications of IMS data to civil applications.
If you or anyone in your institution is interested in our IMS data for your own
research purposes, please submit a proposal through our voluntary data exploitation
center or vDEC. The process is fully described in our homepage at ctbto.org and the
data you are approved to use for research purposes will be delivered to you months
after our States signatories receive it. Historical data can be delivered following
approval of your proposal.
I would like to close with two areas of best practice that I’ve seen demonstrated
at CTBTO that I think are practical for all of us in our modern workplace. Global
policy successes and science and technology advances are yearning for the benefits
derived from increased participation by women and youth in STEM disciplines. This
is nothing new.We have been talking about this for ages.Wemust find innovative and
attractive ways to make these advances a reality. UN organizations are emphasizing
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gender parity striving for a 50/50 womenmen staff ratio by 2030. The CTBTO senior
leadership team has achieved gender balance with three women directors alongside
three men directors. We are working diligently to advance gender balance in our
technical areas as well.
CTBTO has sought to engage the views of young women and men determined to
promote the CTBT and its verification regime. Created in 2016, the CTBTO Youth
Group, theCYG, nowhas over 700members frommore than 100 countries.With gen-
erous financial support from the European Union, CYG members have participated
in and contributed to major global and regional gatherings, including the CTBTO
youth conferences held in Moscow and Astana in 2017 and 2018 respectively. The
growing role of the CYG in advancing the ratification of the treaty shows how youth
can act to change minds in countries that have not yet ratified. We increasingly find
that young experts can reach countries and regions through their networks where
other methods of advocacy have been ineffective. I invite the younger experts in the
audience to join the CYG and discover fascinating technologies behind the CTBT
verification.
With such considerations inmind, I truly appreciate the opportunity to address you
as an expert group. I hope that together we will explore avenues towards increased
exchanges or collaboration wherever possible. For my part, I thank you for inviting
me to be here with you.
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in Scientific and Technological Support
for Monitoring in the Non-proliferation
Regime
Jill Hruby
This paper focuses largely on the challenges and opportunities for monitoring
declared and undeclared facilities for other than peaceful uses. There are five tech-
nology areas for monitoring that will be addressed: (1) wide area environmental
sampling, (2) open-source satellite imagery, (3) civil society reporting, (4) antineu-
trino detection, and (5) data fusion and automation to combine information from
multiple sources.
Although not covered in this paper, another challenging area forNon-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) monitoring and verification is nuclear weapons dismantlement. This
topic is being addressed by the public-private partnership between the U.S. Depart-
ment of State and the Nuclear Threat Initiative called the International Partnership
for Nuclear Disarmament Verification. Monitoring nuclear weapons dismantlement
is technically very challenging and there is no silver bullet, but through this effort
progress is being made.
Wide Area Environmental Sampling—Techniques for wide area environmental
sampling include collection and analysis of atmospheric gases, atmospheric partic-
ulates, aquatic materials, vegetation, sediments and soils, and/or fauna. Historically
environmental sampling has been deemed too expensive for practical use by the
IAEA.
Of the possible wide area sampling techniques, atmospheric sampling has long
been thought to be themost effective. Relevant nuclear signatures includeKrypton-85
gas as a by-product of Plutonium reprocessing, and Uranyl Fluoride (UO2F2) aerosol
from the interaction of leaked Uranium Hexafluoride (UF6) and the air during Ura-
nium enrichment. Reported challenges for atmosphericmonitoring include1: the high
1Wogman [1] and STR-341 from 1995 and re-visit in 2010.
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cost of awell populated sampling grid; the difficulty in detecting changes inKrypton-
85 above baseline even with modeling due to the significant increase in background
levels from the growing number of declared reprocessing programs, especially in
the Northern Hemisphere2; and the sparsity of Uranyl Fluoride generation when
improved filtering technologies are incorporated into enrichment plants.
However, there are some important opportunities in atmospheric environmental
sampling. One particularly promising area is the use of drones or mobile platforms
instead of a larger number of stationary sampling stations. Mobile platforms with
miniaturized sensors, real-time data processing, and increasingly sophisticated mod-
els provide an opportunity to collect data at different locations with one or a few
sampling systems, each responsible for covering numerous grid points. Addition-
ally, the data could be used to optimize sampling locations especially for undeclared
facilities or perhaps trigger additional types of sensors to be deployed. Cost savings
could come from not having a fixed set of sampling locations, processing fewer
samples, and having less labor-intensive analysis.
In addition to drones or mobile platforms, new detection and analyses techniques
have also been advancing including especially laser spectroscopy.3 Promising work
has been done to accurately detect small amounts of Uranyl Fluoride using ultrafast
laser filament-induced fluorescence spectroscopy, but not yet solving the cost issue.
Techniques like this could become less expensive but also could be selectively used
if triggered by mobile platforms, satellite imaging, or civil society reporting.
Additionally, therewaswork done in the early 2000s in theCentral Asia Republics
jointly with Sandia Labs,4 and a case made by researchers at Idaho National Lab in
20135 that suggest aquatic monitoring approaches are worthy of consideration.
The increased sophistication of low-cost small sensors that could be scattered over
wide areas with the ability to self-report also represent new opportunities. These sen-
sors would not necessarily be atmospheric samplers, but could be radiation, acoustic,
metrological, or other types of sensors that provide triggering data for othermonitors,
input to models, or corroborative information.
Open-Source Satellite Imagery—The revolution in commercial satellite imag-
ing has provided an incredible boost to nonproliferation monitoring and more
opportunities are coming at a rapid pace.
Trends in commercial satellites include larger constellations of smaller satellites
with medium to high resolution that image the earth more frequently, and some satel-
lites with very high resolution (less than 50 cm) that can stare at specific areas. As an
example, Planet Labs has a constellation of 150 satellites in orbit. Their constellation
allows line scanning of the entire earth every day with three-meter resolution, and
the ability to monitor an area twice a day at 72-cm resolution. Both capabilities have
at least 5 years of archived data for comparison.
2Schoppner et al. [2].
3Skrodzki et al. [3].
4Passell, H. D. et al., “The Navurz Project: Cooperative, transboundary monitoring, data sharing
and modeling of water resources in Central Asia” SAND2006-6673.
5Schanfein [4].
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New active sensor systems like synthetic aperture radar6 and video imaging allow
vehicle movement, among other things, to be tracked. In 2018, the British company
Earth-i released the first full-color video of earth from space taken by a commercial
satellite. The views include airplanes in motion at Dubai international airport, cars
driving in Argentina, and ships leaving port in Norway. Videos like these allow
digital surface models to be developed and are useful for urban and remote sites with
varied terrain to support inspection activities and to assist in characterizing unknown
buildings.
Other new analysis approaches like hyperspectral imaging7 can amplify the use-
fulness of satellite images. Hyperspectral imaging provides the ability to remotely
discriminate between elements. European Space Agency’s Sentinel-2 satellite now
has 12 spectral bands available. Hyperspectral imaging may be particularly useful to
identify conversion facilities as well as monitor reprocessing facilities.
New data fusion techniques that combine information from multiple satellites
having different sensor suites8 is also undergoing revolution. For example, the
commercial company Palantir provides sophisticated data fusion services.
Overall, it seems that open source satellite imagery will continue to become more
available and less expensive with the ability to get higher resolution images multi-
ple times a day. Video images are also expected to become widely available as is
hyperspectral data. Perhaps the largest issue for the nonproliferation community will
keeping up with what is available and using it effectively. Caution is needed in using
imagery by itself and can lead to conclusions that are not always accurate without
additional information or knowledge.
Civil Society Reporting—The phrase civil society reporting is used here to mean
engaging volunteers in monitoring, and specifically radiation monitoring in the cases
discussed. In general, civil society reporting has been considered for emergency
response or incident reporting, however, the use for NPT monitoring could prove
promising. As one of the longest and most avid supporters of civil society reporting,
Rose Gottemoeller has said “Not for every measure or every treaty would it be
appropriate to have citizen volunteers involved. But I think, nevertheless, that in
certain settings it could be quite useful to draw them in. And, in certain settings,
indeed, dispersed sensing mechanisms on a number of mobile platforms could make
a difference to how we understand deployment patterns in the future.”9
There are three specific areas of interest to monitoring in the NPT regime, none
ready for formal application, but illustrative of possibilities: one is people volunteer-
ing to use radiation detectors to record and report doses, two is people using their cell
phones as detectors with an affiliated app to record and report radiation doses, and
third is social media as a mechanism for reporting and/or obtaining relevant infor-
mation. Radiation monitoring by volunteers combined with other information could
6“Emerging Satellites for Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Verification,” Vienna Center for
Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, January 2016.




be useful to indicate, for example, a change in normal patterns perhaps indicating
the emergence of an undeclared facility or new transportation routes.
A real application of civil society reporting of radiation is Safecast.10 Safecast was
created after the Fukushima incident to report data that otherwise wasn’t available,
and now has the world’s largest open data set of radiation. A mobile, GPS enabled,
logging radiation sensor called bGeigie Nano (the “b” standing for bento box) can
be built using on-line instructions, and mounted to the outside of a car, bicycle, train,
drone or other mobile platform with data captured on a memory card. Most of the
collectors for Safecast are Japanese citizens, but data is being collected worldwide.
Recently Safecast began collecting air quality data as well. The willingness of vol-
unteers to collect and post data is an indication of what is possible, and the volunteer
nature avoids certain legal issues.
As an alternative to a specialized sensor being built and carried by volunteers,
a group of researchers at Idaho National Lab developed the concept of using the
CMOS sensor in cell phone cameras to record gamma radiation.11 In this approach,
the camera lens is covered so that no visible radiation is detected allowing only high
energy gamma or X-rays radiation to hit the sensor. If radiation is detected, an app
records and transmits the information. Research to fully understand the accuracy
and stability of these types of systems is still occurring12 and, at the very least,
demonstrates the potential of a built-in radiation sensor on a smartphone.
More recently, a research team at North Carolina State University13 used com-
mercial surface mount resistors and thermoluminescence to measure natural back-
ground radiation levels indicating the potential application beyond elevated emer-
gency response levels. The dose estimates from the resistors can be measured in a
lab in hours compared to weeks needed for biodosimetry. Their intended application
was separating the worried well from people exposed to radiation after an event,
however being able to measure background radiation levels is powerful.
Finally, social media including Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, Flickr, or other plat-
forms represent ubiquitous sources with vast amounts of information distributed
quickly. Social media is extensively utilized in emergency events and already Face-
book has created a tool called Crisis Response14 to respond to a consumer pull. Social
media also naturally results in a cueing mechanism for others to collect and post data
in regions of interest.
Social media for treaty monitoring is a more nuanced issue, and social media for
verification evenmore so. It is conceivable that social media could be used as another
open source data feed for wide are monitoring, especially in combination with other
data for corroboration. The idea of using social media in treaties could be included
in monitoring and verification provisions.15
10blog.safecast.org, accessed October 9, 2019.
11Cogliati et al. [8].
12Van Hoey et al. [9].
13Hayes and O’Mara [10].
14https://www.facebook.com/about/crisisresponse/, accessed October 9, 2019.
15Lorenz and Feldman [11] and Bufford [12].
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Anti-Neutrino Detection—In addition to the technologies already discussed, anti-
neutrino detection is an important monitoring approach especially for reactors of
key importance. Antineutrino detectors offer a potential solution for continuous,
real-time verification of nuclear reactor operation without having to be in the reactor
core. The flux of antineutrinos that leaves a reactor carries information about the
reactor power and the fissile material inventory, both important for safeguards.
While neutrino detection was discovered in the 1950s, the experiments to under-
stand neutrino oscillation in liquid scintillators that occurred in the 1990s demon-
strated much of the physics required for reactor monitoring. Since about 2000, devel-
opment of detectors that would operate within a few tens of meters from the reactor
core has been on-going.
In 2008, IAEA held a workshop on antineutrino detection for safeguards applica-
tions that concluded antineutrino detectors have unique abilities to non-intrusively
monitor reactor operational status, power, and fissile content in real time, from out-
side containment.16 The optimized neutrino detector for reactor monitoring and safe-
guards would be relatively compact in size and preferably movable. Today, the most
likely scenario for antineutrino based cooperative monitoring would be the deploy-
ment of a cubic meter scale detector relatively near the reactor. Longer range moni-
toring is also attractive but requires technical advances. On-going work on neutrino
detection includes segmented photomultiplier detectors17 and high-fidelity computer
simulations.18
Data Fusion and Automation—In order to use data from many different types of
sensors, data management and fusion are key. Layers of complexity emerge as sensor
data is combined with imagery and social media and as verification is required.
As an example of data fusion and analysis challenges and opportunities, a project
is being funded by theUnited States National Nuclear Security Administration called
MINOS—Multi-Informatics for Nuclear Operations Scenarios.19 In this project, data
is being collected on nuclear operations at Oak Ridge National Laboratory where
ground truth is available. Different detectors and sensors including radiation, acous-
tic, seismic, biota, and imagery are being collected and data management and data
analytics are then used to draw conclusions about the information to compare with
ground truth information. The goal of the work is to see if a highly automated system
can answer the question of whether special nuclear material is being diverted from
a reactor and is motivated by the large number of declared reactors coming on-line.
The project involves ten Department of Energy Laboratories. The data management
strategy is to ingest persistent field data; archive, share, and curate the data; and
allow analysis to be performed by different groups with flexibility and scalability.
The data will include export controlled and Official Use Only information to further
16Final Report: Focused Workshop on Antineutrino Detection for Safeguards Application, 28-
30 October 2008, IAEA Headquarters, Vienna, Austria, https://www.lefigaro.fr/assets/pdf/AIEA-
neutrino.pdf.
17Ashenfelter et al. [13].
18Stewart et al. [14].
19Gaylord [15] and Rajadhyaksha et al. [16].
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challenge the datamanagement system. The data ingestion system aims to be entirely
automated using domain agnostic user interfaces and multi-petabyte data holdings.
The work is just entering the third year of a 7-year planned program.
Summary—The challenge of cost-effectively and comprehensively monitoring in
the non-proliferation regime is both large and growing with the number of declared
sites, increased background levels, and complex geopolitics. However, simultane-
ously there is an explosion in ubiquitous sensors, drones and mobile platforms,
social media, commercially available satellite imagery, sophisticated and sensitive
measurement techniques, new data fusion and data sharing approaches, and inter-
ested public citizens that could help with the monitoring challenge. A few examples
of opportunities and on-going research have been provided that will be critical for
future monitoring. If global support is available to mature these approaches and gen-
erate the next generation ideas, then monitoring and verification in the increasingly
complex environment can remain.
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Luciano Maiani and Raymond Jeanloz
In addition to featuring prominent and insightful keynote speakers and convening
outstanding panels of experts, the organizing committee of the XXI Edoardo Amaldi
Conference wished to ensure that those attending the conference participated in the
conference, serving as more than an audience. To accomplish this aim, we built in
time for discussion in each session, but we also held a forum at the end of each day.
The forum speakers would address broad topics that crossed some of the topics of the
day’s presentations and discussions, and timewould be allowed for other participants
to ask questions or remark upon thewhole day. This afforded an opportunity to reflect
upon ideas, contrasts, and recurring themes.
The Conference was fortunate to have Ambassador Rafael Grossi as the speaker
in the first forum. In addition to representing Argentina to the UN organizations
in Vienna, Ambassador Grossi was President Designate of the 2020 Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference. According to the UN, with 191 par-
ties to the treaty “more countries have ratified the NPT than any other arms limitation
and disarmament agreement.” https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/.
TheNPT is in someway related to nearly every issue addressed in theAmaldiCon-
ference, whether peaceful uses, safeguards, or disarmament, the NPT is an important
element of the international order.
AmbassadorGrossi has taken a distinctive approach in the lead up to the 2020NPT
ReviewConference (sometimes called the 2020NPTRevCon),which he described in
his remarks. At the time of the conference, Ambassador Grossi was also a candidate
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to be DG of the IAEA (and later was selected). For this reason, he was unable to
attend the conference physically, but he participated by video link. He delivered his
talk and stayed connected for the discussion afterward. The text of his talk captured
here is actually a transcript.
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and Next Steps for the Parties
to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty
Approaching the 2020 Review
Conference
Rafael Grossi
Editor’s Note: The Conference occurred shortly before votes for the next Director
General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and Ambassador Grossi, who
was President Designate of the 2020 NPT Review Conference, was also a candidate
to be DG of the IAEA (and later was selected). For this reason, he was unable to
attend the Conference physically, but he participated by video link. He delivered his
talk and stayed connected for the discussion afterward. This is a transcript of his
talk.
I would like to thank the organizers of the Amaldi Conference, one of the most
prestigious gatherings we have around this set of international policy issues. So, it is
really an honour and privilege to share the podium with those who spoke before. I
will lead with my own personal presentation on the NPT Review conference itself,
and then have an exchange with you and listen to your ideas and your comments.
By way of introduction, this time the Review Conference comes at a very special
moment. It is the 10th Review Conference, which means that it is marking the 50th
anniversary after the entry into force of this treaty, the largest idea known in inter-
national law which is in itself quite a feat, a remarkable issue. It is also a conference
that is coming 25 years after the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, which
decided on extending this instrument forever. And it comes at a time where there are
lots of events ongoing in the world where multilateral approach to arms control, dis-
armament, and proliferation have been discussed, and where there are certain trends
considered by some as worrisome.
The Review Conference is a great opportunity to reassess how the treaty is being
implemented and to have a larger view to other connected questions, matters that
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have been added on in a certain sense to the NPT in its pure form without being part
of the treaty provisions. There are many other things that are interconnected and are
being looked at in this sense. One of the reasons why the conference this time around
is being seen as particularly challenging is also because of the fact that 5 years ago
we gathered in New York and the Review Conference ended up without a consensus
around a final document.Whichmeans that when we gather in NewYork next year, it
will have been 10 years without an agreed view, common view from states parties to
the NPT of how the instrument has been implemented and is working. And of course
in the course of these past 10 years a number of things have happened affecting or
influencing not only the disarmament part of the instrument, but also other sections
or other issue areas which are covered as you know in the articles of the treaty that
have to do with non-proliferation or the peaceful uses of the atom. So, as we can
see, it is a moment where people will be focusing on what happens in New York,
people will be judging perhaps the importance, the validity, and the future stability
of the multilateral non-proliferation regime on the basis of our deliberations in New
York. So, it is a big responsibility upon every single state party to this important
instrument.
Of course, one discounts that the political issues, the political problems may have
and do have a logic of their own. One cannot predict what will happen when it comes
to regional situations in terms of non-proliferation or what will be the state of affairs
when it comes to bilateral relations and bilateral understanding between for example
the Russian Federation and the United States, which have an impact on disarmament
issues. All of these are matters that go beyond the will of one like me, who is going
to preside over this effort. What one can do is to professionally try to prepare in
an adequate manner, trying to identify these challenges, these opportunities, and
design the next steps that could be applied in order perhaps not to guarantee success,
because this is something one can never do, but increase substantially the possibility
of a successful outcome when we meet next year. This, I think, is a very possible
scenario.
One of the novelties this time around is that we need to prepare better and at
an earlier stage and perhaps do it in a slightly different way, given the state of
affairs in the world, given all these uncertainties that exist, given also the degree
of questioning and challenging of multilateral approaches to disarmament and also
to non-proliferation. Traditionally, before a few months in advance of the Review
Conference, there were a number of consultations in Vienna, in Geneva, and in New
York with political groups and parties to understand what major difficulties there will
be and what challenges would present themselves. This time you may have noticed
that early on, from the beginning of the preparatory cycle, starting with the Dutch
presidency back in 2017, continuing with the Polish in the year after that, and finally
with the Malaysian chairmanship, we have seen an increased focus and in some
cases in the two first chairmanships, efforts of outreach to have an earlier discussion,
debate, exchange of ideas on what has been going on.
Once the curtain came down after the third PREPCON last April in New York,
I said my work began and it has actually been the case. How did I do it? What did
I propose? Well, I felt that it was necessary for the first time to have a dedicated,
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intensified process of wide consultations led by the president designate. Of course,
this does not exclude other efforts that are traditional under other forums, like your
conference—track two, track one—but in this case a process led by the President
Designate, which would allow me to have a direct conversation with different coun-
tries in their specific regions. I did this by way of a process for which resources were
needed. One needs to reach out, one needs to bring countries to focal places where
you are going to have the discussions and for that I proposed to the European Union a
concept and a programme of consultations. The EU gave generously and decided to
extend their support. So, I am very grateful to the European partners for the support
they gave me to start organizing these meetings. These meetings that I have been
conducting so far take the form of regional consultations which have, although not
exclusive, have also some focus on the area of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, sci-
ence, and applications. We have done this because we felt that apart from the very
interesting, strategic level of considerations and discussions on issues pertaining to
Article 6, disarmament or regional aspects of non-proliferation like the Middle East
or things of this sort, there had been in the past some imbalance. Imbalance in the
sense that sufficient attention was not being paid to all these areas of peaceful uses,
which are actually the areas of greatest and most immediate interest and benefit for
the large majority of state parties to the NPT. These are, of course, made possible
by scientists because you have this knowledge. So, in our estimation, we thought it
was important to do two things: first, to have these regionally oriented conferences,
but also to have a dialogue that would bring to the table practitioners, technologist,
nuclear regulators, technical support organizations. Those who are really in the daily
exercise of work around peaceful uses of nuclear energy and who in my opinion
had been largely absent from these conversations in the past. There was nothing
wrong with that, but it was limited in a way to the diplomatic corps in the cities in
the multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation hubs, like Vienna, New York, or
Geneva.
We have started this process, we have already had a regional meeting in Addis
Ababa. We went to Africa to start, and there we had a very encouraging beginning
withmore than 40 countries in attendance. The attendance of theAfricanCommission
on Nuclear Energy (AFCONE), the African Union Commission, and we also had
the EU represented there. The member states found this kind of approach that we
are proposing to be of enormous interest. We are going to have a number of follow
up meetings to this coming up: one in Bangkok for Asia, in Mexico for the Latin
American and Caribbean region, and the success of this first attempt has been such
that more regions and sub-regions have reached out to me requesting more of these
consultations, more of these meetings. So much so that I have had to reach out to
individual donor countries to fund meetings because the generosity of the EU had
already been tapped, and we needed to continue these meetings. One of them will
take place in Abuja, Nigeria with a focus on the ECOWAS region, but that is not
the only one. There will be one in Pretoria in South Africa. There is going to be
one more in Brazil for my part of the world. There is going to be one in Indonesia
for Asia. There is a lot of interest in these presidentially led, intensive pre RevCon
consultations.
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Process is not substance, but process enables substance to be treated in a way
that is constructive and conducive to success as opposed to one which is more
confrontational.
In these first consultations, a number of interesting friends are starting to manifest
themselves. I amdescribing to you in very general termswhat I am seeing as strengths
and one thing I see, which is admittedly a general affirmation, but still one that is
indispensable and it is necessary before we take the plunge in New York for the
Review Conference and this sort of newly found re-commitment to the NPT. I see a
lot of convinced countries, north and south, east andwest, that see in this norm a norm
that is valid, that is present and most of all that is a norm that is a future projection.
I say this because I am sure you have been debating this and perhaps we can have
an exchange after my presentation. There is a legitimate discussion about the NPT,
its validity, the appearance of other norms and considerations of this type and sort.
In terms of our preparation for the RevCon, we are working with many countries
on an important high-level part of the Review Conference, which is not going to be
structured in the sense of having a special document or a special statement, but it
is a dedicated effort. We are already working collectively and individually with key
countries to encourage their leaders at the Foreign Minister level or ideally at the
Head of State level to be present in New York. We would like them to come and to
say that we all see in the NPT a normative structure that has meaning and that has
value for the future. This finding of mine is something that is giving me a lot of hope
and that countries recognize that it will be in no one’s interest to see the Review
Conference fail.
No one’s strategic interests would be served by having a Conference which ends
up in disarray or in the absence of agreement. We can discuss about agreement, the
form, shape and modality of agreement, but one thing is for sure and this I stress,
that as I see it is the will, the collective will of all, to come out of the exercise in the
belief and the conviction that the NPT has come out strengthened and not debilitated
or weakened after the effort. I have also to indicate that I have seen engagement from
the constituencies, as I was saying, frommany countries who were not so mobilized,
as I said in ministries of energy, science and technology and a community which is
bigger and larger than before.
Before I conclude, I would like also to refer to something that is not necessarily
part of the formal part of the Review Conference, but rather as part of what I would
like to see: That is the presence and relevance of the NPT in a societal manner,
outside of the UN building. For the first time, at the Review Conference we are going
to have three important events. I do not call them side events because first of all
they will not be on the side of the conference, in the sense that we will have to go
outside the UN building to have them, but they are very relevant. The first will be a
meeting with youth groups from all over the world that are preoccupied and dealing
with non-proliferation, disarmament, or international security. It is going to be called
“The NPT at 50: The Next Generation.” So we are in contact with a good number of
networks of young practitioners or young scholars, groups all around the world, on
every continent, that have been active and are going to bemeeting.We are having this
as a very decentralized process. After my original invitation, some of these groups
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are already meeting and discussing and they will provide us with some elements that
I am going to be able to relay to the wider membership for their consideration. So,
youth is the first.
The second has to do with gender. I think these days any multilateral approach
must be looking at the gender issue as important, not only by way of an increased
participation ofwomen, but also by including gender-based perspective to it. I can say
this event is going to be called “NPT at 50: Better Together,” and I am working with
Women in Nuclear Global and other important groups that exist in many countries
to bring also this input from groups that are concerned with the added value that the
gender perspective can bring to this issue.
The third and last event I am bringing for the discussion at the NPT Review
Conference will be a meeting with global nuclear industries. We will have also a
meeting with the major industrial concerns around the world, including not only the
traditional nuclear vendors that you may have in mind as I say these words, and
I can guarantee you that all of them are participating and are very keen on being
there, but also firms around the world that are working with nuclear science and
applications. We are going to be establishing or highlighting if you want the link
between the NPT and all the industrial or even commercial activities that take place
all around the world and are sustained by the treaty. So, I will perhaps stop here since
my intention at least with my initial remarks has been to tell you how I, as President
Designate of the 2020 NPT Review Conference, have undertaken this effort, from
which perspective, how am I looking at it and the things I am doing so far, as I said in
the beginning, perhaps not to ensure success because that is impossible for me, but
to increase the scope of the dialogue and thereby to also instil the sense of optimism
in state parties, to believe that yes agreement is possible, that yes agreement will not
necessarilymean that wewill solve all the problems that we have in non-proliferation
and disarmament, but will continue to strengthen the NPT as one of the tools that
we have to deal with those in a successful way. So, I will stop here and will be more
than glad to exchange with you further ideas or listen to your questions or comments.
Thank you very much for your attention.
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing,
adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate
credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s Creative
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not
included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by








In April 1961 the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists published the following cartoon1:
At that time in the club therewere threeNuclearWeapons Stateswith the indicated
number of weapons (USA 22229, URSS 2492, UK 155) and it was estimated that
in few decades there would be about twenty since in the Arab World and South
America there would be more than one state going nuclear and there would also be
proliferation in other parts of Asia.
Today there are nine Nuclear Weapons States: USA (1945) 4000, Russia (1949)
4300, UK (1952) 215, France (1960) 300, China (1964) 270, Israel (1967–73) 80,
India (1974) 130, Pakistan (1998) 140, and North Korea (2006) 8. The numbers in
parentheses indicate the year of their first nuclear explosion and the other numbers
indicate the best estimate of the weapons available to each country in 2017.
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The USA developed nuclear weapons fearing that Nazi Germany, where fission
had been discovered in 1938, could get themfirst. Fear continuously reinforced by the
insistent Nazi propaganda on the imminent deployment of a secret new superweapon
that would turn in its favor the outcome of the war. In the end the bombs where used
to terminate the war in the Pacific with the expectation, otherwise, of a tremendous
human cost for the conquest of the Japanese islands.
The USSR developed them as a response to their successful American military
use in a time of increasing rivalry between the two aspiring superpowers.
The UK decided to build its own nuclear arsenal after it was excluded from
the American project, to which it had initially collaborated, as a demonstration of
autonomous capacity, to have an independent deterrent and to boost its international
prestige at the time of the dissolution of its Empire.
France followed to maintain big power status after the humiliations during the
war, the loss of its Empire and as a possible national defense against Russia and
deterrence against an economically resurgent Germany.
The Chinese nuclear deterrence was motivated by difficulties in Chinese-Russian
relations and continuing American non-recognition of the Communist Regime.
The other countries did it because they felt threatened by a hostile country or
military alliance which could destroy their country or impose a regime change.
The fact that the first five Nuclear Weapons States were the only one to hold
a permanent seat with veto power in the UN Security Council contributed to the
opinion that the possession of nuclear weapons provided a special prestige and a
status useful in the international power games among nations.
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapon, NPT, was negotiated
between 1965 and 1968 when France and China had already tested nuclear weapons,
only experts had heard of Israeli nuclear developments and the Indian nuclear
weapons program was in its infancy. It entered into force in March 1970.
Israel probably acquired its first nuclear devices in the years between the two
major Arab-Israeli wars: The Six-Day War of 1967, and the Kippur War of 1973.
The motivations where its geostrategic inferiority in territory, population, natural
resources and military personnel versus the hostile encircling Arab World and the
rising prestige, military build-up and threatening politics of President Gamal Abd
el-Nasser of Egypt. Israel has consistently refused to admit or deny the existence of
its nuclear deterrent but most experts believe that they possess around 100 weapons.
Moreover, it is now widely believed that the double flash detected on September 22,
1979 by theVela satellite in the SouthAtlanticwas a test nuclear explosion conducted
jointly by South Africa and Israel.
At the beginning the motivation of the Indian bomb was more the rivalry with
China than the problems with Pakistan. In 1962 China had inflicted India a humil-
iating defeat during their short war on the Himalayan border and in 1964 exploded
a nuclear device. The first nuclear weapon was exploded by India in 1974 and was
called by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi a “peaceful nuclear explosion.” India, like
China, has declared to adhere to a “no first use policy.”
The development of the Pakistani nuclear bomb is a clear consequence of its
continuous conflict with India over Kashmir, the four conventional wars that they
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fought, its smaller dimensions and economic and conventional military inferiority
with respect to India and the difficulty of defending its territory in the event of an
Indian conventional ground attach on their common border. Lahore, one of Pakistan
most important cities is about 20 km away from the Indian-Pakistani border and
there are no natural barriers between them. In these conditions it is widely believed
that Pakistan might turn to nuclear weapons in an early stage of a full-scale armed
conflict with India.
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, DPRK, was the result of the division
of the Korean Peninsula between the Russian and the USA zones of control at the
end of WW II. The successive attempt of the North to annex the South produced
the bloody Korean War (1950–53) which ended in an armistice that never became a
peace and the two Korean states developed in completely different ways.2
After 1974 theSouth started to developmuch faster than theNorthwhich stagnated
and after the demise of the Soviet Block suffered also a serious famine. Today the
GDP Per Capita of the North is less than one tenth of that of South Korea. In these
conditions the regime is afraid of being toppled by popular unrest supported by
external forces and considers nuclear weapons a deterrent against this possibility.
As its critics correctly point out the NPT is a discriminatory treaty that divides
the nations of the world into haves and have-nots. Five nations (USA, Russia, UK,




should not. In exchange they should be supported in the development of peaceful
nuclear energy under strict international guarantees. Today four nations have not
signed the treaty and not respected its provisions: Israel, India, Pakistan and the
DPRK. 190 countries have signed the treaty: all other countries except South Sudan
recently independent. This incomplete but substantial success of the treaty is due to
the realization by many nations that the military use of even a fraction of the existing
nuclear stockpiles will imply the destruction of human civilization, the immediate
death of an appreciable part of mankind and an unpredictable fate for the survivors.
In the opening remarks of his acceptance Lecture for the Nobel Prize in Economic
Sciences, on December 8, 2005, Thomas C. Schelling said: “The most spectacular
event of the past half century is one that did not occur. We have enjoyed sixty years
without nuclear weapons exploded in anger.What a stunning achievement—or, if not
achievement, what stunning good fortune. In 1960 theBritish novelist C. P. Snow said
on the front page of the New York Times that unless the nuclear powers drastically
reduced their nuclear armaments thermonuclear warfare within the decade was a
“mathematical certainty.” Nobody appeared to think Snow’s statement extravagant.
We now have that mathematical certainty compounded more than four times, and no
nuclear war. Can we make it through another half dozen decades?”
After the traumatic events of Hiroshima and Nagasaki a taboo emerged against
the use of nuclear weapons in war. President Truman resisted the pressure of Gen.
Douglas MacArthur to use nuclear weapons in Korea and accepted a final ceasefire
that confirmed the “status quo ante”. The USA suffered also a humiliating defeat in
Vietnam but did not resort to the use of nuclear weapons. Similarly, the Soviet Union
accepted a defeat in Afghanistan but did not use nuclear weapons. Obviously in both
cases it is not clear if the use of nuclear weapons might have changed the outcome
of the war.
However, mankind lives with the risk that a minor local conflict might get out of
control and escalate to an all-out nuclear war or that a nuclear exchange might be
initiated by amechanical failure or a human errormore likely in a time of international
tension. As Thomas Schelling points out this is a very real risk and there is now a
copious literature on eventswhen theworld arrived very close to a nuclear catastrophe
which was avoided by sheer luck or the exceptional wisdom of individuals who
disregarded prescribed rules of engagements and saved mankind.
The NPT has been accepted by the 190 discriminated countries on the realiza-
tion that the risk of accidental nuclear war increases with the number of nuclear
weapons states and the total number of weapons on earth. Each national nuclear
arsenal contributes to increase the probability of a war by accident due to the insecu-
rity of its Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence system (C3I) while
the probability that its weaponsmight explode, be stolen or lost due tomishandling or
poor safety increases with the number of weapons under its command. Each nuclear
weapon state contributes to the risk of war by accident in proportion to the size of its
arsenal and depending on the robustness of its technological and military organiza-
tion, the reliability of its political system and the tensions in its international relations.
All these parameters vary with time and are very difficult to estimate especially in
times of political transitions or rapid technological developments.
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After the demise of the Soviet Union, the dissolution of the Russian Empire and
the following economic crises, there were serious concerns in the West about the
safety of its nuclear stockpiles, weapons and fissile materials, and the dispersion of
its scientific and technological nuclear-military knowhow.
With the reduced economic interest of nuclear energy and the limited number
of new nuclear reactors on order, the main concession of the nuclear weapon states
to the have-nots has been the commitment to gradually reduce their nuclear arsenal
as envisioned under Art VI of the Treaty. In 1970, at the time the Treaty entered
into force the USA had 26,008 nuclear warheads and Russia 11,736. In 2017 they
had 4000 and 4300 respectively.3 The arsenals of the other nuclear weapons states,
recognized or non-recognized, for several decades have contained 100–300 weapons
each with slow changes in time.
In view of the 2020 quinquennial review conference of the NPT which are the
main problems on the table?
Recent years have seen a systematic dismantlement of the Arms Control Regime
that provided in the past some form of stability to international relations in the
strategic domain. After President G. W. Bush withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in
2002, more recently on May 2018 President Trump announced the US withdrawal
from the JCPOA and on February 2019 the US suspension of its obligations under
the INF Treaty. While the USA justified these actions as violations on the Iranian
and Russian side respectively the truth is probably more complicated.
The JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan Of Action) envisaged a strong limitation
of Iranian nuclear developments especially in the field of Uranium enrichment under
strict IAEA control in exchange for the lift of the international economic sanctions
thatwere imposed on Iran for its perceived effort to build nuclearweapons in violation
of the NPT Treaty. While the IAEA inspectors have found no evidence that Iran has
violated its part of the JCPOA agreement, the USA Government and its regional
allies have been disturbed by three factors:
• the Iranian developments in the field of ballistic missiles that in the future could
carry nuclear weapons on distant targets;
• the emerging documentation that in the past, before JCPOA, Iran was actively
pushing the studies for the realization of nuclear weapons despite its ratification
of the NPT and IAEA inspections;
• the active and successful participation of Iran, mostly through proxies, to the
conflicts ravaging the Middle east in particular in Yemen and Syria against the
interests of the USA and its regional allies.
Considering the difficult economic situation for the Iranian people probably the
USA has found more promising to reinforce the economic sanctions with the hope
of producing serious difficulties to the Iranian regime and be able to negotiate in the
future from a stronger position and/or with a friendlier government.
It seems that the attempts of the other signatories of the JCPOA to maintain their
obligations to Iran under the agreement and limit the impact of USA sanctions on
3http://thebulletin.org/nuclear-notebook-multimedia.
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Iran are inconclusive and Iran has resumed a limited and reversible increase in its
Uranium enrichment activities.
However, most experts agree that today the highest probability of a nuclear war
escalating from a conventional conflict is in the traditional hostility between India
and Pakistan over Kashmir.
Since independence India and Pakistan have fought four wars: First Kashmir War
in 1947, second Kashmir War in 1965, Bangladesh Liberation War in 1971, limited
Kargil War in1999.
Since Pakistan acquired nuclear weapons in 1998 the absence of Indian-Pakistani
wars after 1999 is considered by the supporters of nuclear deterrence as one of the
effective examples of its application. However, the situation has not been calm with
terrorist attacks in Kashmir and sometimes in India by elements probably secretly or
indirectly supported by the Pakistani Military Secret Services and Indian sporadic
retaliations and repression in Kashmir. Probably the situation did not escalate due to
the fact that the side more influenced byMoslem religious nationalism was Pakistan,
the weaker of the two nations, while the stronger India was trying to maintain a
reasonable peace with its Muslim minority. Today the situation has changed danger-
ously in India. Its government has obtained a great electoral victory with a platform
based on religious Hindu nationalism and looks determined to solve the Kashmir
conundrum with a show of force. As we have already mentioned India is conven-
tionally much stronger than Pakistan and an Indian ground attack on their common
border could hardly be resisted by the Pakistani Army which might be tempted early
on in the conflict to rely on its nuclear weapons. The result for India and Pakistan
of an all-out nuclear war between them would be catastrophic but the consequences
could be terrible also for the countries in the region and the rest of the world. This
under the optimistic hypothesis that other nuclear armed nations will not intervene
and the conflict will not escalate to a nuclear world war.
Today the main surviving components of the Arms Control Regime are the NPT,
which will undergo its quinquennial review conference in 2020 and the New START
that will expire in 2021.
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Chapter 17
The Iranian National Perspective
on Nuclear Non-proliferation
Kazem Gharib Abadi
Threats caused by NuclearWeapons—Nuclear weapons are the greatest global threat
to international peace and security, since existing arsenals of nuclear weapons alone
are more than sufficient to destroy all life on earth. It is concerning that 15,000 such
weapons remain with 2200 of them on high alert status or subject to first use nuclear
doctrines.1 In order to ensure security, that is a global concern, global solutions and
global participation is required.
Role of Nuclear Weapons in Security Doctrines—The global nuclear non-
proliferation regime is facing some serious challenges, since some NWS, in par-
ticular the US, have not only increased their reliance on nuclear weapons, but also
expanded their role in theirmilitary concepts and doctrines. TheUnited States nuclear
weapons are not only for deterrence, but also pose a serious threat possible to be
used not only against Nuclear Weapon States (NWS), but also against Non-Nuclear
Weapon States (NNWS).2 The recently announced US nuclear policy (2018 Nuclear
Posture Review) is in violation of Article I and also in full contravention with the
core provisions of the NPT.
Nuclear Disarmament—The world is at a point where commitment to disar-
mament must go beyond negotiations in good faith. Among NNWS, considerable
distrust flows from the fact that the treaty prevents them from acquiring nuclear
weapons, while the NWS have moved so slowly towards disarmament, which can be
assessed as a failure of the treaty in providing a plan for disarmament.3 It is also to
be mentioned that NWS have not fulfilled their obligations under Article VI of the
1Working Paper submitted by Iran to the second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2020
Review Conference of the NPT, NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.27, 11 April 2018.
2Ibid.
3Statement by Ms. Izumi Nakamitsu (High Representative of the UN for Disarmament Affairs) to
the 2019 Moscow Non-Proliferation Conference, 20 October 2017.
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treaty. Not only negotiations have not been pursued and agreements have not been
reached, but also actions towards nuclear disarmament are being taken too slow.
Inherent link between Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament—Disarma-
ment andNon-Proliferation are two sides of the same coin andmutually reinforcing.4
This alongwith a commitment to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, form the bargain
enshrined in the core of the NPT. As reflected in the Final Document of 2000 NPT
Review Conference: “the objective of non-proliferation derives its legitimacy from
the larger objective disarmament.”5
Israeli Nuclear Arsenal—Establishment of aNuclearWeapon Free Zone (NWFZ)
in theMiddle East is a long lost desire of countries in the region, where the unbridled
reckless nuclear weapon program of Israel threatens the region and beyond. Despite
the fact that Israel is not a party to any of the disarmament and arms control treaties,
it never declared its intention to accede to the NPT and continues its nuclear weapons
program without placing them under the IAEA Safeguards. There is no clear per-
spective on the establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East due to opposition of
the US and some other States.
Iran and Non-Proliferation—The Islamic Republic of Iran was the first country
that proposed theMiddle EastNuclearWeapon Free Zone in 1974.As amember to all
Weapons ofMass Destruction Treaties (WMD), Iran implements the Comprehensive
Safeguards Agreement (CSA) and also Additional Protocol on a voluntary and pro-
visional basis under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The JCPOA
is also an important document in nuclear activities, to which Iran concluded along-
side with other parties. Based on the Fatwa by the Supreme Leader the production,
deployment and use of nuclear weapons, similar to the other WMD are prohibited.
On the other hand, nuclear weapons have no stance in Iran’s security doctrine, as
it was proved during the time where Iran was victim of chemical weapons, without
producing and using them.
JCPOA (Nuclear Deal)—The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action is a detailed,
159-page agreement with five annexes reached by Iran and the P5+ 1 (China France,
Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) on July 14, 2015.6
The nuclear deal was endorsed by UN Security Council Resolution 2231, adopted
on July 20, 2015.7 January 16, 2016, is the JCPOA Implementation Day, since the
IAEA certified that Iran has taken the key steps to restrict its nuclear program.8
The JCPOA seeks comprehensive lifting of all UN Security Council sanctions as
well as multilateral and national sanctions related to Iran’s nuclear program, includ-
ing steps on access in areas of trade, technology, finance and energy. Thus, its full
4Beenish Pervaiz, Challenges and Solutions for Non Proliferation, 22 November 2012.
5Final Document of 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT, NPT/CONF.2000/28, New
York, 2000.
6Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, Vienna, 14 July 2015, Annex A to the UNSC Resolution
2231.
7Resolution 2231 of the Security Council, S/RES/2231, 20 July 2015.
8Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council
Resolutions in the I.R. of Iran, GOV/2015/65, 18 November 2015.
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implementation will ensure the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear pro-
gram. As a multi-party agreement, based on reciprocity, its scope, provisions and
timeframes are based on a delicate, negotiated and multilaterally-accepted balance
that cannot be widened, altered or renegotiated.
Iran’s Commitments—By implementing the JCPOA, Iran committed to keep its
enrichment capacity at Natanz at up to a total installed uranium enrichment capacity
of 5060 IR-1 centrifuges for 10 years and also to keep its level of uranium enrichment
at up to 3.67%. It also committed to convert the Fordo facility into a nuclear, physics
and technology center, refrain from any uranium enrichment and uranium enrichment
R&D and from keeping any nuclear material.
Iran keeps its uranium stockpile under 300 kg for 15 years, redesigning and
rebuilding a modernized heavy water research reactor in Arak, keeping its accu-
mulation of heavy water at the level of 130 tons, shipping out all spent fuel for all
future and present power and research nuclear reactors, not engaging in any spent
fuel reprocessing or construction of a facility capable of spent fuel reprocessing or
reprocessing R&D activities leading to a spent fuel reprocessing capability for 15
years, provisional application of the Additional Protocol, and full implementation
of the “Roadmap for Clarification of Past and Present Outstanding Issues,” are also
among other commitments that have been accepted by Iran under the Deal.
Commitments by of other Participants—Annex II to the JCPOA is based on two
main parts, which are lifting of sanctions and sanction lifting effects. According
to the Deal, all sanctions, including in the following areas should be terminated:
financial, banking and insurance measures; oil, gas and petrochemical sectors; ship-
ping, shipbuilding and transport sectors; gold, other precious metals, banknotes and
coinage; nuclear proliferation-related measures; metals, software, arms; and listing
of persons, entities and bodies. It is to be said that sanctions should not be terminated
only on paper, rather as a result of sanction lifting specified above, all those activities,
shall be practically allowed, beginning on implementation day.
Unilateral Withdrawal of the USA—Unlike Iran, which has fulfilled its under-
takings under the JCPOA, as repeatedly and consistently verified by the IAEA, the
United States has consistently failed—since “implementation day”, and particularly
after the assumption of office by President Trump—to abide by its commitments
under the JCPOA.
On 8 May 2018, the President of the United States announced his unilateral and
unlawful decision to withdraw from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, in
material breach of Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015) to which the JCPOA is
annexed.9 From the day of withdrawal, the United States continues to exert maxi-
mum pressure to dismantle the JCPOA and the UNSC resolution 2231 and had been
persistently violating the terms of the agreement almost from its inception, even pre-
venting other JCPOA Participants from fully performing their obligations. Sanctions
by the USA have nullified the lifting of sanctions by the European Union.
9Remarks by President Trump on the JCPOA, 8 May 2018, available at: https://www.whitehouse.
gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-joint-comprehensive-plan-action/.
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Needless to say that the United States of America is in the forefront of imposing
exterritorial unilateral sanctions and has spared no efforts to resort to trade sanctions,
interrupt financial and investment flows, freeze assets, travel bans, to name just a few,
in order to impose its will over other States. Acting as a self declares global police,
it is trampling on every international law and norm.
Joint Commission and the Sanctions—During this time, the Islamic Republic of
Iran invoked the mechanism envisioned in Paragraph 36 of the JCPOA, and the Joint
Commission met twice at the level of political directors and twice at the ministerial
level. In these meetings, the remaining participants explicitly acknowledged that the
lifting of sanctions—and the economic dividends arising from it for Iran—constitutes
an essential part of the deal. The foreign ministers of remaining JCPOA participants
committed to design “practical solutions” aimed at normalizing and even enhancing
economic cooperation with Iran.10
The Islamic Republic of Iran, in response to the request of the Heads of Gov-
ernments of the remaining JCPOA participants, pledging prompt remedial actions,
agreed to postpone adoption of the measures envisaged under paragraphs 26 and 36
of the JCPOA, and exercising utmost prudence, while continued to fully implement
all its commitments under the JCPOA. Nevertheless, apart from issuing numerous
political statements and support, no operational mechanism has been put in place to
counter US sanctions and to compensate for them in terms of sanction lifting effects,
as specified in Annex II of the JCPOA that allows for the normalization of trade and
economic relations with Iran.
Iran’s Decision: Legal Basis—In the absence of effective and meaningful mea-
sures by the other JCPOA participants to remedy the most devastating effects of the
US actions, Iran has decided to undertake practical measures to exercise its recog-
nized rights under Paragraphs 26 and 36 of the deal, to secure its rights and restore
balance to the obligations set forth. As Para 26 of JCPOA states: “…Iran has stated
that it will treat such a re-introduction or re-imposition of the sanctions specified
in Annex II, or such an imposition of new nuclear-related sanctions, as grounds to
cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA in whole or in part”.
Also according to Para 36 of the JCPOA: “If Iran believed that any or all of the
E3/EU+ 3 were not meeting their commitments under this JCPOA, Iran could refer
the issue to the Joint Commission for resolution … if the complaining participant
deems the issue to constitute significant non-performance, then that participant could
treat the unresolved issue as grounds to cease performing its commitments under this
JCPOA in whole or in part …”.
In response to US withdrawal from the JCPOA and the re-imposition of its uni-
lateral sanctions, Iran has decided “to cease performing its commitments in part”
as of 8 may 2019 on a 60 day basis.11 Indeed, the aforementioned violations by the
US administration, and provocative actions, inter alia, the US decision to halt Iran’s
oil trade and sanctions on international nuclear cooperation with Iran, provided for
10Chair of the JCPOA Joint Commission Statements, 28 July 2019, 28 June 2019, 24 September
2018, 6 July 2018.
11Decisions by Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, 8 May 2019.
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Iran “grounds to cease performing its commitments under the JCPOA in whole or
in part”. Therefore, the decision by Iran is fully consistent by the terms of the Deal,
including those related to dispute resolving mechanism enshrined in paragraph 36
of it.
JCPOA and Providing Access to the IAEA—All the above mentioned took place,
while Iran exercised maximum restraint and patience and fully implemented its
commitments under the deal, which has been verified by 15 reports of the IAEA’s
Director General. The IAEA has the most robust verification mechanism in Iran. It is
worth noting that while Iran has only 3% of total global nuclear installations, receives
20% of all IAEA accesses. In 2018 only, 258 out of 421 (85% of inspections in 50
states that are implementing CSA and AP without broader conclusion in place) took
place in Iran and 88% of present day inspections amounting to 1000 person-days in
the same group, were conducted in Iran.12
Conclusion—Starting negotiations for disarmament with strong monitoring and
implementation verification mechanisms in a reasonable time frame, is a dire need.
A real progress towards disarmament is essential to the sustainability of the Non-
Proliferation regime in the long run.13 The treaty survival depends on whether a
comprehensive and non-discriminatory framework for disarmament will be estab-
lished or not.14 As former Secretary General of the UN said: “The only world that is
safe from the use of nuclear weapons in a world that is completely free of the nuclear
weapons themselves.”15
The establishment of theMiddleEastNuclearWeaponFreeZone is of great impor-
tance. The exertion of sustained pressure on Israel to accede to the NPT, promptly
and unconditionally, as a Non-Nuclear Weapon Party, and to place all of its nuclear
installations and activities under the IAEA Safeguards should be one of the main
actions.
It is to be said that the JCPOA served as a good base for confidence building
between Iran and other parties to the deal. What has been proven so far is that the
deal not only has turned Iran’s nuclear program from an unnecessary crisis to a
framework for cooperation in the field of peaceful use of nuclear energy and non-
proliferation, but also has established Iran’s position to a region free from nuclear
weapons and now it’s the high time to extend it to the whole region.16
It has become crystal clear by now that Iran has shown its utmost restraint in
response to the decision of unilateral and illegal withdrawal by the US from the
JCPOA and continued tomeet its obligations under theDeal. In turn, Iran should con-
tinue to receive the economic benefits it is entitled to. So, this imbalanced approach to
the rights and obligations cannot be sustainable. Iran still believes on the importance
12The IAEA Safeguards Implementation Report for 2018, GOV/2019/22, 6 May 2019.
13Mohamed ElBaradaei, “Some Major Challenges: Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and
Terrorism,” Statement to the Symposium on International Safeguards, 29 October 2001.
14Beenish Pervaiz, ibid.
15Ms. Izumi Nakamitsu, ibid.
16Dr. Javad Zarif, Iran’s Foreign Minister, Iran Has Signed a Historic Nuclear Deal and Now it’s
Israel’s Turn, Guardian, 31 July 2015.
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of diplomacy and multilateralism as a practical means to resolve disputes and will
continue to support the JCPOA and is ready to consult with international community,
in particular with remaining participants to find effective practical ways to preserve
the deal.
Now, it is the remaining countries’ turn to prove their good-will and take serious
and practical steps to preserve the JCPOA. Instead of demanding that Iran unilaterally
abide by a multilateral accord, remaining parties should uphold obligation.
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Chapter 18
The Pakistani National Perspective
on Nuclear Non-proliferation
Muhammad Naeem
I would like to thank the organizers of the 21st Amaldi Conference for giving me
an opportunity to speak on Pakistan’s perspectives on nuclear non-proliferation. In
doing so I shall cover aspects of nuclear safety, safeguards, nuclear security and other
measures to strengthen non-proliferation efforts in Pakistan.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Pakistan is a country of over 220 million people which makes us the 6th most
populous country of the world. Pakistan is a developing economy, which is seri-
ously threatened by climate change and we are making best efforts to meet the UN
sustainable development goals.
In the contemporary world, concerns about nuclear proliferation and security
have taken a centre stage as these are thought to be dangerous threats to interna-
tional peace and stability. Pakistan remains committed to the objectives of enhanc-
ing non-proliferation efforts. For the purpose Pakistan has been fully engaged with
international community for promotion of nuclear safety, security and safeguards.
The areas where Pakistan has instituted measures in the broader realm of nuclear
non-proliferation and nuclear security are, legislative, legal, regulatory, institutional
development, enforcement and international cooperation. I shall dilate upon each of
these, but let me first underscore that Pakistan appreciates the measures taken by
IAEA and UN through various conventions and initiatives.
This conference would enable us to coordinate and synergize the work of the
international community in the theme areas of this conference.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
The genesis of Pakistan’s nuclear program was when we joined the US ‘Atoms
for Peace’ programme in late fifties. We were among the founding members of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
M. Naeem (B)
Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, Islamabad, Pakistan
e-mail: chairman@paec.gov.pk
© The Author(s) 2020
L. Maiani et al. (eds.), International Cooperation for Enhancing Nuclear Safety,




Since the establishment of Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission in 1956, we have
been working to use nuclear science & technology for socio-economic development
and have made some significant strides.
To follow the military path of nuclear energy was forced on Pakistan by events
of separation in 1971 and so-called peaceful nuclear explosion in our neighborhood
in 1974. Despite this, our military nuclear capability is for self-defence and we
have always demonstrated restraint and responsibility. From 1974 to 1998, Pakistan
made several proposals for keeping South Asia free of nuclear weapons; which
also included proposals for application of Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements
in South Asia. However, the events in 1998 ended the prospects of a nuclear weapons
free South Asia.
I would like to raise here briefly the spectre of serious developments taking place
in our region,marked by one county’s quest to establish its hegemony despite pending
UN resolutions. Its relentless accumulation of arms and nuclear capabilities coupled
with aggressive policies & doctrines is likely to affect the regional stability. Suffice to
say that Pakistan is compelled to take certain measures in safeguarding our security
and sovereignty.
For us, the best guarantee, for peace and stability and against any arbitrary actions
by bigger powers, remains a strong non-discriminatory rule-based global order. A
robust non-proliferation regime is the central pillar of such a rule-based order, and
the IAEA safeguards are a critical component of this regime.
Since our nuclear testing in 1998, Pakistan started formalizing its nuclear insti-
tutions under unified authority called ‘National Command Authority’ (NCA) estab-
lished in 2000, with Strategic Plans Divisions (SPD) as its secretariat. NCA is the
apex decision making body, chaired by the PrimeMinister which exercises complete
control over all aspects of policy, procurements, operations, employment and nuclear
security; in open and military aspects. Within this framework, SPD develops techni-
cal solutions, personnel and human reliability programs, and intelligence capabilities
to deal with nuclear security, non-proliferation and WMD terrorism.
When it comes to non-civilian area, I can assure this August House with confi-
dence that all our strategic assets are fully secure and under the effective centralized
command and control of the National Command Authority.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Pakistan is among the oldest operators of nuclear power plants. Currently, PAEC
operates five nuclear power plants while two 1100 MWe each near Karachi are
expected to be connected to grid in next two years. In line with our Govern-
ment’s vision, our national goal is to expand our nuclear energy capacity to about
40,000 MWe as envisaged in our National Nuclear Energy Vision 2050.
In pursuance of our commitment to the global non-proliferation objectives, Pak-
istan continues to support the IAEA safeguards system and has always worked with
other IAEAmember States in strengthening the safeguards systemwhile ensuring its
credibility, objectivity and robustness. Pakistan accords highest priority to the nuclear
safety at the plant and the regulatory levels. A system peer reviews is supplemented
by WANO and IAEA’s missions. After Fukushima accident, Pakistan carried out
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detailed assessment of its NPPs. We revised all safety parameters, emergency pre-
paredness and response besides improving the operator’s training, response protocols
and procedures.
All our civilian nuclear power plants remain under IAEA safeguards with an
excellent implementation record and we intended to continue this approach in the
future as well. In order for safeguards to remain as guarantor in the non-proliferation
regime, it is essential that there be no loopholes, which could allow any state to
pursue pathways of diversion. States with similar safeguards measures without any
exception. Non-discriminatory and even-handed approaches are essential for the
credibility of the IAEA safeguards system.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Nuclear safety and security continues to remain subjects of paramount importance
for Pakistan. We take them seriously because of our own national interest. I earlier
spoke a little about our extensive civilian nuclear program. It is of utmost importance
that the civilian nuclear program continues to enjoy the public confidence in Pakistan
and that can happen only when nuclear technologies are pursued in safe and secure
manner.
Safe and sustainable nuclear energy is essential to advance our development
agenda. We believe that it is imperative for the sustainability and expansions of
nuclear power. Pakistan has been running a safe civilian nuclear power program for
about five decades.
Overtime, the Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA), an autonomous
body, has developed a sustainable nuclear safety regulatory system for the power
reactors, and established response and recovery capabilities for radiological sources.
Our efforts in nuclear safety were publicly recognized by the late Director General
Yukiya Amano when he visited Pakistan in early 2018.
PNRA continues to review and update its regulations in light of extensive national
experience and IAEA safety standards. For instance, during preceding year three
additional regulations have been issued. The regulatory oversight program of PNRA
is based on International proven practices and has been subjected to peer reviews
by the experts from other nuclear regulatory bodies through various IAEA Expert
Missions such as International Regulatory Review Team (IRRT), Education and
Training Appraisal (EDuTA) and International Regulatory Review Service (IRRS).
In pursuit of safe use of nuclear technology, PNRA is now building capacity
of other embarking countries. Pakistan has provided expert services to different
countries in Asia, Africa and Europe for developing nuclear safety and physical
protection infrastructure for nuclear power programs. For instance, it has recently
concluded an agreement with Nigerian Regulatory Authority under IAEA aegis and
arranged a training course for Malaysian Atomic Energy Licensing Board.
As a party to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Convention on Early Notifi-
cation of Nuclear Accident, and the Convention on Assistance in case of a Nuclear
Accident or Radiological Emergency, Pakistan has been contributing to the nuclear
safety framework. We are also implementing instruments such as Code of Conduct
on Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, along with its two Supplementary
Guidance documents, and the Code of conduct on the Safety of Research reactors.
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Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission is running 18 nuclear oncology medical
centres where approximately one million patients are treated each year. We have
been actively using radioactive sources in cancer therapy in these medical centres in
the country to treat local and patients from our neighboring countries. Besides this,
PAEC also runs four agriculture and bio-technology research centres, which have
produced over a hundred high yielding, drought and pest resistant crop varieties and
are also working in other nuclear techniques for pest management. Our regulatory
authority maintains and inventory of all radioactive sources in the country and also
conducts periodic physical inspections to ensure their safe management throughout
their lifecycle.
Having made considerable progress in the nuclear research and development,
Pakistan has also attained significant supplier’s capability. We have in the past and
are currently also manufacturing heavy parts and equipment and providing technical
assistance to CERN.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Now Iwill highlight some of the effortswe havemade in nuclear security. Pakistan
strongly supports the fundamental principle that nuclear security is a State Respon-
sibility. Effective measures taken at the national level contribute to nuclear security
internationally.
Pakistan has always maintained that the IAEA has a central role in coordinating
international activities in the field of nuclear security, which leads to strengthening
nuclear security globally. We acknowledge the IAEA’s role in assisting states, upon
their request, in their efforts to put in place effective nuclear security measures.
As a responsible state with advance nuclear technology, Pakistan has developed
and deployed a comprehensive nuclear security regime that encompasses not just
physical protection of materials and facilities, but also material control and account-
ing, transportation security, prevention of illicit trafficking, border controls, and have
prepared plans to deal with any future radiological emergencies.
Our large security force is professional and agile and it also includes a Special
Response Force (SRF)which has a rapid air lift capability based on dedicated aviation
resources. An integrated intelligence system has been instituted to provide depth in
defense. Multi layered defence is the corner stone of Pakistan’s nuclear security
architecture and deploys a variety of physical and technological systems. We run
a strict Personnel Reliability Programme to deal with non-proliferation and insider
threats,maintaining aMaterial ProtectionControl&Accounting (MPC&A)Program
with a holistic goal of physical security, safety, accountability and verification.
We regularly review and update our nuclear security regime in the light of
IAEA guidance documents and the international best practices. We have developed
“Regulations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Installation
(PAK/925)”, which are based on IAEA nuclear security recommendations contained
in INFCIRC/225/Rev5.
Pakistan is party to important international instruments and conventions related
to nuclear security; for instance, the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear
Material and its 2005 Amendment. We have been participating in the IAEA Incident
and Trafficking Database (ITDB).
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Pakistan’s Centre of Excellence for Nuclear Security has grown into a regional
and international hub for nuclear security training and has conducted various IAEA
courses with participants from over 45 countries. It won accolades from the late DG
IAEA when during his visit to the Centre in March 2014, said “It is very impressive
that you organize the training in a very systemic and operational manner”. The
previous US Under Secretary Rose Goettemueller had also appreciated the Centre
of Excellence on record during a US Congressional hearing.
As a further demonstration of our commitment towards nuclear security, Pakistan
has recently joinedNuclear Security Contact Group by subscribing to INFCIRC/899.
Moreover, Pakistan is also actively considering undertaking an IPPASMission at the
earliest opportune time.
A systematic effort to upgrade nuclear security at all Nuclear Power Plants
(NPPs) and nuclear medical centres is being continuously undertaken. Under
the IAEA-Pakistan Nuclear Security Cooperation Program, physical security at
Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP) is being upgraded through installation
of a sophisticated land-based physical protection system. Moreover, in order to
address threat from sea-side, an integrated Maritime surveillance System (IMSS)
is being installed to enhance detection and response capabilities. Similarly, physi-
cal protection measures at the 14 nuclear centres with category-1 sources are being
upgraded.
As part of its safety and security regime, Pakistan has established PAEC Emer-
gencyResponse andCoordinationCentre (PERCC),which remains operation around
the clock to coordinate response activities in case of any emergency at PAEC facili-
ties. ANuclear EmergencyManagement System (NEMS) has been established at the
national level to handle nuclear or radiological emergencies. Under NEMS, 30 Radi-
ological Assistance Groups (RAGs) have been established and trained to perform
response actions in the affected areas. Several training courses for the first respon-
ders, emergency response personnel and officers have been conducted for emergency
preparedness and response.
National Radiation Emergency Coordination Centre (NRECC) and nuclear secu-
rity Emergency Coordination Center (NuSECC) have been established at the head-
quarters of our regulatory authority as a national contact point with the international
community and the IAEA.
Over the years, Pakistan has acquired considerable experience as well as expertise
in the field of nuclear safety and nuclear security. We are willing to offer assistance
to interested States in response to specific requests in this area.
In furthering our non-proliferation efforts, Pakistan has also instituted stringent
national export control regime, which is at par with best international standards. The
regime consists of legislative, regulatory, administrative and enforcement measures.
Comprehensive Export Control legislation was enacted in 2004, also published as
IAEA document (INFRCIRC/636 Nov 30, 2004).
Strategic Export Control Division was established in 2007 at our Ministry of For-
eign Affairs as an implementing arm which contributes towards non-proliferation
and security through effective export management of sensitive goods and technolo-
gies. Pakistan’s National Control List (NCL) are harmonized with the export controls
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maintained by NSG, Australia Group and MTCR, which are regularly updated, last
one published as INFCIRC/928 in January 2019.
The national Detection Architecture (which is a work in progress) includes use of
detection devices at several entry and exit points as well as other random check points
to deter, detect and prevent illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials. The
integrated Cargo Container Control (IC-3) facility at Port Qasim near Karachi is a
Container Security Initiative (CSI) compliant port. Pakistan is among the few states
who have submitted five reports to the UN Security Council’s 1540 Committee.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Pakistan recognizes its obligations as a responsible nuclear State. We have
strengthened our national control systems, nuclear export controls and nuclear secu-
rity system at par with international standards. Pakistan has clean sheet with regards
to nuclear safety and security incidents. In last two decades there has not been even
the slightest of blemish on Pakistan’s part with regards to nuclear proliferation.
Having said this, it is imperative for global non-proliferation norms to flourish
in such a way that no amount of political, strategic or commercial interests should
be allowed to side-step it. Civil nuclear cooperation should follow only after such
sufficient legally binding assurances on non-proliferation are obtained. However,
unfortunately we have seen instances where cooperation increasingly taking place
despite the fact that pathways exist for diversion. This is resulting in huge imports
of fissile materials and technologies thereby significantly adding to their military
capability. On the other hand, barriers are placed in the way of gaining equitable
and non-discriminatory access to the international civil nuclear market for legitimate
peaceful uses.
Pakistan believes in an equitable, non-discriminatory and criteria-based approach
to advance the universally shared goals of non-proliferation and promotion of peace-
ful uses of nuclear energy. Pakistan applied for membership of the Nuclear Sup-
pliers Group (NSG) in May 2016. As a country with significant nuclear program
and advance nuclear technology with ability to supply items controlled by the NSG,
Pakistan’s participation will further the non-proliferation objectives of the Group.
Pakistan, therefore, sees its NSG membership as a mutually beneficial proposition.
We also strongly believe that there is a need to strengthen global non-proliferation
norms. But any progress will only be sustainable, if it is based on non-discriminatory
criteria and does not seek to maximize the interests of few at the expense of global
and regional strategic stability.
Let me thank the organizers of Amaldi Conference once again for inviting me and
providing me the opportunity to present Pakistan’s perspective on these important
issues.
Thank you indeed.
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to a Changing World: A European
Expert’s Viewpoint
Caroline Jorant
Introduction—The first reflections over the development of nuclear energy and the
need for a non-proliferation regime were engaged in the aftermath of WW2 and
publicized in 1953 by President Eisenhower in his historical speech, “Atom for
Peace”.
The peaceful uses of nuclear energy developed very significantly since then,
demonstrating the success of the non-proliferation policies and mechanisms, contra-
dicting President Kennedy ‘s fears expressed in 1963 that as many as 15–25 Nations
would be possessing nuclear weapons in the 1970s. We are some 50 years and this
number is “limited” to 9 States.
In terms of non-proliferation, the regime instituted in the late 50s/60s has also
evolved in response to specific challenges or crises, in particular with the peaceful
atomic explosions in India or the findings in Irakwhere the IAEAwas not empowered
to detect non declared activities. Other situations (Iran- DPRK) have not been met
with an evolution of the institutional framework but rather have demonstrated some
flaws or weaknesses of the system.
In 2004, Libyan clandestine activities were put to an end thanks to the negotiations
launched by the US and the UK. Finally, another major violation of non-proliferation
commitments was discovered with the clandestine construction of a reactor in Syria.
This situation was met by the unilateral Israeli military action that destroyed the
plant.
In terms of nuclear energy, the period is characterized by an expansion both in its
contribution to the energy balance and geographically. Today asmany as 30 countries
have at least one NPP (1) with major developments in Northern America but also in
Europe, Russia and Asia, mainly Japan and China.
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However, the Chernobyl accident in 1986 seriously impacted the development
of nuclear energy namely in the EU and the prospects for an anticipated “nuclear
renaissance” was just killed.
The perspectives for nuclear energy development in the next 30 years are uncertain
but the global nuclear landscape will be very different.
The nuclear non-proliferation regime covers both horizontal and vertical prolif-
eration and thus includes efforts towards the elimination of nuclear weapons. How-
ever, although there are connections between both aspects, this paper focuses on the
horizontal proliferation, that is on efforts to deter, or possibly detect and react to
proliferation attempts from States not possessing nuclear weapons.
The non-proliferation regime today is a complex but rather comprehensive global
framework with some weaknesses—The nuclear non-proliferation regime is heavily
dependent on the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that was open to signature
in 1968. It is the most universal International Treaty while being subject to recurring
criticisms as being unfair given the different status and obligations of NNWS and
NWS. It is flawed with the legal and practically the political impossibility to offer
any derogatory status to allow the adherence of news States or “de facto” States,
possessing nuclear weapons. It also lacks any efficient provisions to deal with the
case of non-compliance or breakout. It’s limits where demonstrated when DPRK
chose to step out of its commitments under the Treaty using a “national security”
clause without allowing a proper international response.
However, the NPT has gained almost universal adherence, has been indefinitely
prorogated in 1995, and is complemented with a series of agreements that can be
seen as implementing tools.
The NPT calls for States to put nuclear material under the safeguards of the IAEA.
Although the obligations are different between a comprehensive safeguards agree-
ment, a Verification Offer Agreement and a facility type agreement, all States with
significant nuclear activities do have a safeguards agreement in place. This includes
the 5 Nuclear Weapon States but also India and Pakistan although not Parties to the
NPT.
Nuclear non-proliferation assurances are delivered by the IAEA thanks to
the safeguards strategy and verification work implemented by its Department of
Safeguards.
“The objective of IAEA safeguards is to deter the spread of nuclear weapons
by the early detection of the misuse of nuclear material and technology. The IAEA
verifies that nuclear facilities are not mis-used and nuclear material is not diverted
from peaceful uses”.
The safeguards’ approaches and the concepts applied have been refined over the
years.
Today the State level Approach based on the analysis of an acquisition Path
assessment is implemented in 54 States whereby all plausible way for a State to
obtain nuclearmaterial usable in a nuclear weapon or in a nuclear device are analyzed
and technical objectives are to be met to detect any diversion.
Most but not all safeguards agreements are now complementedwith anAdditional
Protocol that allows the IAEA to get extended access and information to be able
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to detect not only the diversion of declared material but also possible clandestine
activities.
The task of the safeguards Department has been growing with those new agree-
ments but also with specific efforts that have to be devoted when a situation arises
(in particular nowadays with the Iran case) where new inventories are to be taken
and new safeguards schemes are to be designed and implemented. This calls for
additional financial and human resources. Out of the 2019 IAEA budget of 375.2
Million 145 Me are allocated to the Department of Safeguards, which represents
about 39% of the total budget, with a staff of 918 persons in 2018.
Other safeguards activities are carried out at a regional level, in the EU under the
EuratomTreaty and betweenBrazil andArgentina through a common body,ABBAC.
These safeguards and controls in turn can partly support IAEA’s activities in the
countries covered by such arrangements.
The safeguards system is itself complemented with the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group
export control guidelines. These Guidelines only reflect political commitments of its
Members and are not legally binding. However, it is a very useful tool to disseminate
good practices, review and agree on the nuclear and dual use items and technol-
ogy which export should be subject to specific conditions, restraint or even refusal
(denials). Most of supplier States and States of transit are Members of the NSG.
NSG suppliers require to have a bilateral agreement in force to allow the export of
sensitive nuclear goods and services. Thanks to the NSG, the main conditions that
are requested to importing States and contained in bilateral nuclear arrangements are
more and more standardized (full scope safeguards agreement, export control, or no
export without agreement, adoption of international safety and security Conventions
and implementation of IAEA’s recommendations).
Such cooperation agreements can also be required at a regional level as it is the
case with Euratom.
The intersection between security and non-proliferation—Nuclear non-
proliferation policies as described above generally address attempts by a State to
acquire a nuclear weapon or device. However, individuals or groups of individu-
als may try to acquire, nuclear material, technology or even weapons for terrorist
purposes or in exchange of money or other goods or favors from proliferating States.
In that respect, nuclear security measures may be considered as part of nuclear
non-proliferation policies.
Measures to deter, detect, and possibly recover material obtained through theft do
complement the institutional, legal, or political measures described above.
Responsibility over security issues are left to eachState,with the IAEAdeveloping
guidelines, technical support and a forum for exchanging on good practices. At the
international level however, the CPPNMwas adopted in 1980 and entered into force
in 1987 in particular to ensure international transport of nuclear material would
be covered by agreed security measures/levels. An amendment to the Convention
entered into force about 30 years later, in 2006. This amendment extends the scope
of the CPPNM to material, facilities and storage at domestic locations and in case of
sabotage. It also extends the scope for international cooperation to recover material
or mitigate the radiological effects of acts of sabotage or terrorism.
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Fig. 19.1 Population size by region, 2019, 2050 and 2100 (billions)
Both Convention and Amendment are legally binding instruments.
Another Convention to be mentioned here is the International Convention for the
Suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism that was adopted in 2007. This convention
aims at promoting international cooperation to prevent acts of terrorism and punish
the perpetrators.
A changing nuclear landscape—When Looking ahead with a 20/30 years horizon
and trying to assess what may be the major challenges to the regime apart of political
risks of breakouts, it is necessary to have a fair vision of the nuclear landscape; where
nuclear will be developing and what types of technologies will be available.
Changing Nuclear distribution—The world population is predicted to go up to
2 billion in 2050, with 9.7 billion persons, with the largest increase in sub-Saharan
Africa (double by 2050).1
The distribution of the world population will be changed as illustrated on the
following graph (Fig. 19.1).
This increase in populationwill go together with the growth of energy demand and
a larger share of electricity demand. In that context, IAEA2 predicts in both its high
and low scenarios, a net increase in nuclear energy output, (more than double the 2018
output in the high scenario and about+16% in the low scenario), although thiswill not
1“Report of the UN issued on 17/06/2019 “Nine countries will make upmore than half the projected
population growth between now and 2050 The largest increases in population between 2019 and
2050 will take place in: India, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia,
the United Republic of Tanzania, Indonesia, Egypt and the United States of America”.
2The 39th edition of the IAEA report Energy, Electricity andNuclear Power Estimates for the Period
up to 2050.
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Table 19.1 World total and nuclear electrical generating capacity
Electrical capacity 2018 2030a 2040a 2050a
Low High Low High Low High
Total [GW(e)] 7188 9782 11,811 13,633
Nuclear [GW(e)] 396 366 496 353 628 371 715
% of total 5.5 3.7 5.1 3.0 5.3 2.7 5.2
aNuclear capacity estimates take into account the scheduled retirement of older units at the end of
their lifetime
Table 19.2 World total and nuclear electrical productiona
Electrical production 2018 2030 2040 2050
Low High Low High Low High
Total (TW h) 25,196 33,538 41,101 49,032
Nuclear (TW h) 2563 2836 3844 2804 4977 2990 5761
% of total 10.2 8.5 11.5 6.8 12.1 6.1 11.7
aThe nuclear production data presented in this table and the nuclear electrical generating capacity
data presented in Table 19.1 cannot be used to calculate average annual capacity factors for nuclear
plants as Table 19.1 presents year-end capacity
be matched equally by an increase in the capacity: there should be a slight decrease
of the capacity in the low scenario (6%) but a large increase in the high scenario
(80%). This is explained by performance gains. Given the expected retirement of
older plants, this trend will undoubtedly equate with a significant number of new
builts.
This is illustrated in the following Tables 19.1, 19.2 and 19.3.
More importantly for our discussion, this global growth is expected to go along
with a new distribution of capacities worldwide. As evidenced in the tables below,
there should be a decrease in Northern America and more significantly, a very sharp
decrease in Europe (Northern, Western and Southern) and an increase in all other
parts of the world, especially in China and India. Nuclear is predicted to develop in
Africa, Latin America, Western, South eastern Asia, and southern Asia even in the
high scenario in Oceania.
Although it would need a detailed analysis of the social, political, economic
development prospects of all countries likely to embark into nuclear to assess the
vulnerability of the non-proliferation regime in the future, the indication of the new
distribution of nuclear worldwide already hints to some obvious challenges that will
have to be overcome to maintain a high degree of confidence that the expansion of
nuclear will not result in a higher proliferation threat.
Changing technologies—A vast majority of reactors in operation or under con-
struction in the world are Pressurized water reactors (54 under construction) with
rather large capacities mostly around 1000 MWe and up to 1600 MWe. There are
also some Boiling Water reactors and fewer Heavy water reactors.
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Table 19.3 World nuclear electrical generating capacity, GW(e)
Region 2018 2030 2040 2050
Low High Low High Low High
Northern America 112.6 88 111 64 109 40 113
Latin America and the Caribbean 5.1 6 8 7 14 9 19
Northern, Western and Southern
Europe
110.5 75 94 50 88 42 67
Eastern Europe 51.3 52 68 52 80 55 79
Africa 1.9 3 4 3 11 7 15
Western Asia 0.4 8 9 12 19 15 24
Southern Asia 8.5 19 27 32 47 51 84
Central and Eastern Asia 106.2 115 175 132 257 149 304
South-Eastern Asia 1 3 3 8
Oceania 2
World total 396.4 366 496 353 628 371 715
These reactors will likely still be in operation in 2050 but many countries and
industries are now working on advanced technologies aiming at smaller and some-
times modular reactors (averaging 300 MWe) based on a more diversified array of
technologies (PWR but also environments or needs.
Fabrication technologies will also probably evolve as they do in other areas, using
computerized support, using 3D printers for modelling and fabrication purposes,
using new materials, and facilitating reproduction of parts and their assembly.
This may help in the production or replication area and represent an additional
challenge for the detection of clandestine facilities.
Matching the challenges—To match the upcoming challenges and ensure the
efficiency of the non-proliferation regime, policies and actions should be taken in
the following areas to
• strengthen the legal/institutional framework
• review the fuel cycle arrangements
• make use of technology evolution
• consider emergency preparedness in the verification system.
The legal/institutional framework—The legal or institutional framework that was
consolidated until the beginning of the Twenty-First Century with in particular the
adoption of the Additional protocol, represents a solid basis that should not be
fragilized by new and possibly attractive initiatives like the recent “Nuclear Ban
Treaty”.
Except for Israel, India and Pakistan that never signed the NPT, and Korea that
stepped out, NPT is almost a universal Treaty and this is a major achievement.
However, the system would be strengthened by improving the decision-making
process within the IAEA and at the UN level. When a case of violation is detected or
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even perhaps suspected, appropriate pre- defined actions should be quickly adopted
by the international community. This kind of increased agility in reacting to any
crisis will need leadership and increased cooperation. For instance, the possibility of
retrieving specific nuclear material like HEU or under irradiated spent fuel could be
devised as a means to gain time and de-escalate a proliferation attempt.
The universality of the adoption and implementation of Additional Protocols
should be pursued.
Once this goal reached, a simplification and a merge of safeguards agreements
and APs could facilitate their transparency and implementation.
In connection with the implementation of Additional Protocols and the increased
number of countries and possibly less accessible locations where nuclear facilities
will have to be safeguarded, the resources of the IAEA devoted to safeguards should
keep pace with the growth of the nuclear fleet and be disconnected from the increase
of the budget of the three other Departments. This will need political engagement
to break the very politicized divide between “western countries” and the Group of
77, proponent of budget sharing. With the access to nuclear of new entrants, and
developing countries, there should be some opportunities to have a more successful
discussion on this aspect.
To meet the financial and more broadly the resource constraint, regional bodies
like Euratom or ABACC could increase their contribution to the IAEA findings
through joint inspections and sharing of equipment. They could for instance work
under the IAEA responsibility in special cases when there is an urgent need to deploy
inspectors to re-establish an inventory or carry out unexpected tasks following an
agreement with a country where a situation has been detected. In the future such
cooperation could be instituted in case North Korea was willing to get back into the
international safeguards system.
In view of the future expansion of nuclear in other parts of the world could specific
regional bodies similar to ABACC or using CoEs be in charge of some work and be
in turn verified by the Agency?
Increased cooperation between NSG and IAEA could benefit both communi-
ties; the NSG could be more sensitized to weaknesses or difficulties in carrying
out IAEA’s inspection duties in some countries while IAEA would certainly benefit
being informed of denials and of certain contracts.
Lastly, the IAEAshould consider boosting existing regional offices or creatingnew
offices in regions where nuclear energy is expanding (Asia) and promote training in
national safeguards and security and in non-proliferation culture. This effort should
not only address the future national Authorities but also the industry to stimulate
exchange of good practices and raise awareness among the actors while promoting
a better public acceptance of nuclear energy.
Fuel cycle arrangements—Back in 2005 the IAEA launched a wide-ranging
reflection about a multinational approach to the fuel cycle.
Non-proliferation friendly nuclear production and trade or market rules could be
devised.
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In the perspective of increased quantities of fuel to be produced and then pro-
cessed/stored worldwide, together with an increased number of countries with only
one or a few power plants, new types of arrangements could be discussed.
The idea would not only be to minimize the number of locations where sensitive
nuclear facilities could be localized but also under what kind of arrangements the
security of supply to “dependent” States would be ensured.
Existing enrichment or reprocessing facilities should be first incorporated in such
a network of “secured supply” and when located in NWS, should be subject to IAEA
safeguards in perpetuity.
This kind of reflection would entail the participation of governments, industry,
possibly NGOs and IGO like WTO.
Indeed, certain world trade regulations might have to be adapted to the needs of a
specific nuclear market and elevate non-proliferation considerations as an absolute
priority.
The innovative approach, foregoing the right to enrich and reprocess nuclear
material that the Emirates agreed to follow in their bilateral agreement with the US
was welcomed by many as a progress. Some argue that this should set the standard
for any future agreement.
It remains to be seen if this one-sided commitment is the best way to address the
non-proliferation concern.
As efficient andmore equitable a scheme,might be that a real assurance of security
of supply/treatment is given to the state unless such aState starts developing a capacity
of its own.
The technology evolution—Although until now, the developments have occurred
mainly with LWRs and rather with large and larger capacity reactors, the advent
of smaller modular reactors or small and medium reactors (SMRs) and advanced
technology systems (e.g. GEN IV) will mean new concepts and different fuel cycles
to assess and to safeguards. A greater number of small facilities in different countries,
sometimes difficult to access, or with specific features (e.g. the transportable nuclear
power plants) will pose increased challenges in terms of resources for the IAEA but
will also probably require developing new tools to facilitate safeguards.
An assessment of the safeguardability of threemain types of advanced technology-
fast reactors, triso fueled and molten salt fuel reactors—in comparison with safe-
guards applied to LWRwas conducted by PGS and NEI3 involving different experts.
The report concluded that “all types of reactors presented specific challenges or
weaknesses that might require to define a new safeguards approach or that could
involve some changing in the design or the development of new tools to facilitate
safeguards implementation.”
Safeguards and security by design concepts will need to be implemented during
the course of the conceptual phase of these new reactors.
The IAEA should ensure a very efficient technology watch on the general tech-
nology advances and be aware of likely advances that proliferators could use to serve
their projects and defeat its strategy and current tools.
3https://partnershipforglobalsecurity.org/advancing-nuclear-innovation/.
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In addition, the IAEA should benefit from the use of novel technologies and
keep developing specific equipment, like new detectors, sensors, cameras, trackers,
and automated recognition devices that may increase its efficiency; new The use of
specific robots, and why not drones to carry out inspections in remote areas should
be envisaged.
This will need a legal frameworks and the acceptance of the country where those
could be deployed but it could save human resources and be sent in case of emergency
or social/political unrest.
A great attention should be devoted to the detection of tampering attempts, or to
the cyber attacks on IAEA’s and operators’ data regarding safeguards and security
aspects. Very robust, perhaps redundant systems should be adopted to ensure that no
major damage could be inflicted to the IAEA’s or the States and operators’ barriers
to proliferation.
Emergency preparedness—With the climate change phenomenon, natural events
or catastrophes are predicted to be more intense and more frequent in the years
to come. This will have undoubtedly, many geo-political, and economical conse-
quences. It is predicted to affect more importantly developing regions of the world
where nuclear is already expanding or will be deployed. It will certainly affect the
security of nuclear facilities and require specific actions in terms of safeguards and
non-proliferation.
What were the learnings from the Chernobyl nuclear accident and the conse-
quences of the tsunami on the Fukushima power plant, from a safeguards point of
view? How tools and strategies of the IAEA (i.e. the redundancy principle) are resis-
tant enough or reactive enough to ensure that no diversion or theft has taken place
during unprecedented, unexpected natural disasters? Should the IAEA perform its
own “safeguards stress tests “or assessment of the emergency preparedness structure
and needs for adapting the approaches and tools? Increased international cooper-
ation and integration of such learnings in the future concepts might be taken into
consideration.
Conclusions—If we look back at the history of nuclear development and nuclear
non-proliferation, we can only agree that no system is perfect and complete when
designed, that efficient systems can hardly be defined once and for all.
The system has shown a good capacity to react to crises and adapt to an evolving
environment.
Recent critical situations have occurred, demonstrating the weaknesses of the
regime. Because the political stability of the regime is fragile, because the stake is
so high there is little choice but to preserve, and strengthen the system based on the
international legal instruments, the NPT and related safeguards agreements.
Continuous improvement of the system, including through political commitments,
early voluntary implementation of legally binding texts pending their entry into force,
increasing international cooperation is the only way forward.
Involvement of all actors including industry and the civil society, and between
sectors will be needed.
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To stimulate this “leap forward” of the non- proliferation regime, determined State
or group of influential States should take the leadership and propose a bolder, more
visionary approach similar to that crafted after World War 2.
The shift from traditional nuclear countries to new comers, will be accompanied
by the shift from historical Western/Japanese suppliers to China, Russia or Korea as
main suppliers.
Indeed, western nuclear industry is nowadays in a difficult position for different
reasons and might disappear (Westinghouse, Areva). This trend will only be accel-
erated if there is no or only a shrinking domestic demand and no financial scheme to
support exports of nuclear facilities.
In this situation new alliances may need to emerge, international cooperation will
be needed more than ever not only to adapt the system but more importantly to
anticipate changes and be prepared in a timely manner.
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In the second panel on Perspectives on Nuclear Non-Proliferation, experts from the
Israeli government, a South Korean non-governmental organization, and Pugwash
provided interesting and contrasting views on the role played by ambiguity in nuclear
security and nonproliferation.
Israel maintains a policy of deliberate ambiguity concerning its nuclear weapons
program. Although Israel is widely believed to maintain a substantial nuclear stock-
pile, it neither confirms nor denies the possession of nuclear weapons. Israel believes
ambiguity is stabilizing because the likelihood that Israel has an unacknowledged
nuclear arsenal serves as a potent deterrent, while avoiding the cascade of nuclear
proliferation in the region that likely would result if an arsenal were acknowledged
officially. Israel insists that it is fully committed to nonproliferation but cannot join
theNon-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) because violations by Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Iran
have demonstrated the inability of the NPT to prevent proliferation in the region. It
also points to the use of chemical weapons by Syria and other countries as requiring
a treaty that bans all weapons of mass destruction from the Middle East. In mak-
ing these arguments, Israel does not acknowledge the role that its imputed nuclear
weapons have played in stimulating interest in nuclear and other weapons of mass
destruction by other countries in the region. There is increasing reason to question
whether ambiguity is stabilizing. Iraq, Iran, and Syria did indeed pursue clandes-
tine nuclear programs. Ambiguity has undermined Israel’s position in international
debate on nuclear security and nonproliferation. Israel has not signed the NPT and
has generally linked this to progress on broader regional security issues and a durable
peace settlement in theMiddle East. David Nusbaum notes that past violations of the
NPT by Iran, its failure to provide a full accounting of its nuclear weapon activities,
and its acquisition and continued maintenance of relevant equipment and knowl-
edge indicate that Iranian promises cannot be trusted and that Iran’s nuclear program
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can be restored. But it would be difficult to argue that the region would be safer or
more stable with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in danger of dissolving
completely. Nusbaum presents the Israeli position in its most cogent form.
Unlike Israel, NorthKorea visibly demonstrated its nuclear capabilitywith a series
of nuclear tests, including a high-yield explosion in September 2017 that NorthKorea
claimed was a thermonuclear weapon. North Korea demonstrated the potential to
deliver nuclear weapons with a series of missile tests, culminating in the November
2017 launch of a missile capable of reaching the continental United States. But a
different kind of ambiguity is at play in the negotiations between theUnitedStates and
North Korea. As Young-Ho Park notes, North Korea and the United States have both
committed to “complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” but they have
different definitions of “denuclearization.” The lack of specificity has enabled the
parties to lower tensions, at least temporarily, and to claim they are working toward a
commongoal. But the same lack of a commondefinition and understandingwillmake
progress difficult. Negotiated denuclearization is possible only if North Korea agrees
to a definition close to that offered by the United States—in particular, to declare and
verifiably dismantle all nuclear weapons and to declare and place under safeguards
all nuclear materials and nuclear facilities. But Park argues that the North Korean
government values its nuclear program more than it values the general welfare of
its citizens, and for that reason it is unlikely to agree to true denuclearization. Park
sees only two alternatives to negotiated denuclearization: forced denuclearization or
living with a nuclear North Korea, neither of which is desirable.
Trust is the missing element for Middle-East peace, according to Paolo Cotta-
Ramusino. Although the United States and Israel focus on Iran’s nuclear program
as the motivation for sanctions, it is clear that a broader distrust of and opposition
to the Iranian government is the basis for their efforts to undermine the JCPOA.
Cotta-Ramusino also notes that efforts in South Asia to eliminate ambiguity about
the circumstances under which nuclear weapons would be used have laid the seeds
for disaster. India has promised not to use nuclear weapons first but has pledged to
retaliatemassively to any nuclear attack on India, including on Indian forces. Pakistan
has announced it would use nuclear weapons first to stop and repel an invasion by
India, and to make this threat credible has developed and deployed a large number
of tactical nuclear weapons for use against enemy forces on Pakistani soil. This
is similar to NATO’s plan during the Cold War for stopping a Soviet and Warsaw
Pact invasion of Western Europe. A key difference is that Pakistan’s faith that its
nuclear arsenal would deter an Indian invasion has given it the confidence to support
insurgents and other attacks against India. Pakistan could miscalculate, supporting
or engaging in actions that India deems unacceptable threats to its national security
that warrant a forceful military response; and India could miscalculate by responding
in a manner forceful enough to threaten the security of Pakistan and prompt it to use
nuclear weapons to stop India. It is not difficult to see how this could lead to rapid
escalation and nuclear attacks and counterattacks that could kill hundreds of millions
in the densely populated cities of South Asia.
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Israel and the Non-Proliferation Regime—Israel is fully committed to non-
proliferation of nuclear weapons, and to participation in international efforts to pre-
vent their spread. Israel thus recognizes the value of the Non-Proliferation Treaty,
and supported its adoption in 1968 in the UN General Assembly. However, a global
regime like the NPT has limited relevance in the Middle East. Its weakness in the
Middle East, has been demonstrated by four cases of violations of the Treaty’s basic
obligations, namely by Iraq, Libya, Syria and Iran. Syria’s use of chemical weapons
is a recent use by a Middle Eastern country of Weapons of Mass Destruction.
Based on the poor track record of NPT compliance in the region, Israel does not
see NPT membership as a goal in and of itself, but rather, as potential means for
enhancing security for all states. In this regard, Israel does not believe that NPT
membership serves or would enhance its national security.
Israel’s long held vision of a more secure and peaceful Middle East, requires that
all regional states engage in a process in direct and sustained dialogue to address the
broad range of regional security challenges in the Middle East.
Such a dialogue, based on the widely accepted principle of consensus, can only
emanate from within the region, and address in an inclusive manner, the threat per-
ceptions of all regional parties with a view to enhance and improve their security.
Direct contact, combined with trust and confidence building, is an essential basis for
the creation of a new security paradigm in a region that is increasingly fraught with
wars, conflicts, disintegration of national territories and human suffering. However,
this noble idea is unfortunately detached from the volatile regional realities.
It is clear that the prerequisite for regional discussions on establishment of amutu-
ally, effectively, and verifiable zone free of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD),
is mutual recognition. Mutual recognition do not currently exist in the Middle East,
where themajority of Arab States, as well as the Islamic Republic of Iran, do not even
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recognize the existence of the State of Israel, and some even openly and explicitly
threaten to destroy it.
Anti-Israel Initiatives, like the one in New York (November 2019), will only
succeed in undermining the real regional security challenges, including those in the
nonproliferation realm. Israel hope that the day would come where the Arab group
will become interested in creating a constructive work plan to promote confidence
and security in the region and not in singling out Israel and play into the hands of
Iran.
Israeli Perspective on the Non-Proliferation Challenges—Israel cope with many
non-proliferation challenges. Themajor challenge relates to Iran’s persistent strategic
aspirations to acquire nuclear weapons, coupled with it ballistic missile program,
terror support, and destabilizing regional behavior.
Iran’s threats to expand its nuclear program are a blatant attempt to extort the inter-
national community. The recent revelations of Iranian undeclared activities require
a clear and collective message to be sent to Iran—the world will not accept Iran’s
continued reprehensible conduct in the nuclear realm.
The information revealed by Israel in the nuclear archive clearly proves that Iran
continued its activities related to the development of a military nuclear weapons pro-
gram. These activities included the protection, preservation andmassive concealment
of capabilities, information, undeclared activities and nuclear materials.
Iran continues to deceive the international community, while failing to provide
clear and honest information regarding its nuclear program, as part of its CSA and
safeguards commitments. These are not activities, which indicate a civilian nuclear
program. These activities clearly indicate that a nuclear weapons program existed,
is being maintained, and can be restored in the future.
The second challenge concerns Syria’s nuclear program. This is an unfinished
business, since the IAEA’s investigation has never been exhausted due to lack of
cooperation from Syria. As is well known, Syria built jointly with the DPRK a
clandestine nuclear reactor, which was revealed and destroyed in 2007. Had this
nuclear reactor been completed and operated, it would have been ideally-suited to
produce plutonium for nuclear weapons purposes. Needless to say, the construction
of such a reactor was done in blatant violation of Syria’s NPT safeguards obligations,
as it should have been declared to the IAEA.
The third non-proliferation challenge concerns potential proliferation from the
DPRK to the Middle East. After its cooperation with Syria to build a secret nuclear
reactor, Israel is concerned about future potential cooperation in the nuclear domain
and other weapons of mass destruction with state and non-state actors in our region.
The forth challenge in Israel’s perspective concerns nuclear energy in the Middle
East. In recent years there is a growing interest in the construction of nuclear research
and power reactors in our region. Israel does not object to the peaceful uses of nuclear
energy in the Middle East, (conditioned upon):
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• As long as its guaranteed exclusive use for peaceful purposes.
• Complete respect by countries that would like to embark on a nuclear energy
program for relevant international non-proliferation obligations and commit-
ments. Joining the Additional Protocol is a prerequisite for the supply of nuclear
technology to new countries.
• Associated fuel cycle technologies, which are the proliferation risk, must be
avoided. The suppliers should avoid the sale of any such technologies to new
countries. Second, regional countries themselves must commit not to build or
purchase such technologies as a condition for the supply of nuclear reactors.
• Certain nuclear reactors should be supplied as a “black box”, according to the
build-own-operate model. By certain reactors we mean those that are more prolif-
eration resistant (light water, low enrichment fueled reactors). In order to sustain
a black box model, the supplier has to guarantee a life-time fuel supply. It is also
necessary to agree in advance on solutions for spent fuel take-back.
• Finally, the buyer country must commit to adopt and implement international
standards for nuclear safety and security, including emergency preparedness and
response.
One of the major non-proliferation challenge in Israel’s view generally concerns
the presence and active involvement of non-state actors in our region, which pose a
potential nuclear security threat for the region. Non-state actors already pose a direct
threat to Israel’s national security, having been a victim of terrorist and rocket attacks
against civilian population. Regional non-state actors enjoy state support as they are
actively supported, funded and trained mainly by the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Additionally, they possess a large number of rockets and missiles, which cover
the entire territory of the State of Israel. Non-state actors’ interest in getting access to
non-conventional weapons is a serious threat and challenge in Israel’s view. For its
part, Israel has taken comprehensive measures to reduce the risk of theft or sabotage
in its nuclear centers, as well as radiological materials used in medicine, industry
and other sectors.
Israeli Perspective on Nuclear Security—Today, more than ever, nuclear security
and safety must be at the forefront of global concern. Threats to nuclear security
and safety know no boundaries. In light of these destabilizing elements, we cannot
ignore the repeated and explicit threats made by Iran and its proxies to attack Israel’s
nuclear sites.
These outrageous threats require Israel to take action and continue to protect and
defend its nuclear facilities. These facilities are constantly upgraded and reinforced,
in line with IAEA safety guidelines, in order to withstand any attack.
Israel strongly encourages regional cooperation in this context. Israel has repeat-
edly expressed its willingness to collaborate with all of its neighbors on safety and
security issues. Israel is committed to act jointly with all states in its region for
the shared goal of promoting and strengthening nuclear security. Israel supports the
2016 NSS Joint Statement on Sustaining Action to Strengthen Global Nuclear Secu-
rity. We also joined the Nuclear Security Contact Group, aiming towards facilitating
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cooperation and engagement on nuclear security, following the conclusion of the
NSS process.
A further key aspect of this goal is the development of technologies the make
nuclear materials safer, and assists in responding to an incident of nuclear terrorism.
In this regard, Israel has established a national forensics laboratory, which takes
part in the global effort to promote the science and applications of nuclear foren-
sics. This laboratory collaborates with the parties to the Global Initiative to Combat
Nuclear Terrorism. The Israel National Laboratory for Nuclear Forensics aims to
assist in investigation of criminal events and emergencies involving radioactive or
nuclear materials.
The laboratory uses a variety of techniques to characterize materials, includ-
ing nuclear counting, analytical chemistry, radiation measurements, and various
radiography techniques. The main roles of the laboratory are:
• Characterization of the radioactive or nuclear material in order to determine its
production site, production date, intended use, and the route from production site
to the crime scene;
• Assisting the police in handling “classic” forensic evidence contaminated with
radioactive material;
• The laboratory operates in collaboration with the Division of Identification and
Forensic Science (DIFS) of the Israel Police and with Israel’s emergency response
organizations, as well as with the world’s leading nuclear forensic laboratories.
Israel is a country, which faces explicit terrorist threats, including the launching of
rockets at its civilian population and nuclear research centers, is deeply aware of the
threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism. Israel is ready to assist and contribute to
any international effort to curtail it. Israel’s highly developed technology, bilateral
collaborations, and active participation in IAEA training and professional programs
maintain Israel at the first line of defense against such threat.
Israel continues to followclosely IAEAguidance, regarding the security of nuclear
facilities, and the protections of materials used in nuclear research and applications.
Israel has ratified the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection
of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM), and has fulfilled its commitments, including the
submission of a report on its national legislative implementation of the Convention,
as required by Article 14. The international community can rest assure that Israel
upholds the highest standard of physical protection measures in its nuclear centers,
in accordance with international standards and obligations, as well as national leg-
islation and best practices. Israel has also signed the International Convention for
the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. Periodic national preparedness and
response exercises are conducted, with the participation of international observers
and partners.
Israel’s national representatives regularly engaged in IAEA Incident and Emer-
gency Center exercises. Moreover, Israel has joined the IAEA Response and Assis-
tance Network as part of its commitment to global and regional collaboration. Israel
continues to contribute both financially and in kind to the IAEA’sDivision ofNuclear
Security, by providing radiation detector systems to IAEA member states.
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Israeli Perspective on Nuclear Safety—An International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), Integrated Nuclear Safety Assessment of Research Reactors (INSARR),
mission held in Israel few years ago. The purpose of the mission was to conduct a
peer-review of the safety of the IRR-1Reactor, located in the SoreqNuclear Research
Center (SNRC). The mission included IAEA safety experts as well as international
experts in the field of nuclear safety from five countries. The INSARR is a peer
review of the safety of research reactors that is conducted based on the IAEA safety
standards. Israel’s decision to invite the IAEAmission is part of international efforts,
led by the IAEA, to study and apply the lessons learned from theMarch 2011 nuclear
accident in Fukushima, Japan. The IAEApeer review teamnoted the strengthening of
the national regulatory system to enhance independence and the efforts of the operator
to enhance reactor safety. The team also noted areas of good practices and provided
the Israel Atomic Energy Commission with recommendations and suggestions for
further safety improvements. “By requesting this mission, Israel has made a strong
statement about their commitment to nuclear safety and to continuous improvement,”
INSARR Team Leader, James Lyons, said.
Along with other IAEAMember States, the State of Israel dedicates considerable
resources to upholding and strengthening nuclear safety. The Government of Israel
affirmed the independent status of the Nuclear Licensing and Safety Office. Further-
more, Israel established a Nuclear Safety Committee, which is a public committee
made up of former public figures and security, and reports directly and annually to
the prime minister.
Israel also maintains cooperation with several leading countries in the field of
nuclear safety. Israel is actively participate in four IAEA’s safety standards commit-
tees: nuclear safety (NUSSC); radiation safety (RASSC); the safety of radioactive
waste (WASSC); the safe transport of radioactive material (TRANSSC) and above
all in the Commission on Safety Standards (CSS) which oversees the IAEA safety
standards program.
Though it considers the chances for radiation emission from its nuclear centers
as very low, Israel conducts national preparedness exercises and has put in place a
contingency plan for such a scenario.
This article could not be completed without the quote from Salvador De
Madariaga:
The trouble with disarmament was (and still is) that the problem is tackling upside down and
at the wrong end…Nations don’t distrust each other because they are armed; they are armed
because they distrust each other. And therefore to want disarmament before a minimum
of common agreement on fundamentals is as absurd as to want people to go undressed in
winter. Let the winter be warm, and they will undress readily enough without committees to
tell them so.
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Chapter 22
Options for Addressing the DPRK
Nuclear Program
Young-Ho Park
North Korea’s Nuclear and Missile Capability—Nuclear Capability:
• TheDPRK conducted six times of nuclear test, including a thermonuclear weapon
(hydrogen bomb) in September 2017.
• As of June 2019, it is estimated that North Korea has up to 30 nuclear warheads1
(SIPRI) and sufficient fissile material2 for an additional 30–60 nuclear weapons
(Arms Control Association).
• It declared itself a globe-spanning nuclear weapons power on November 29, 2017
and insisted that the United States deal with it on those terms.
Missile Capability:
• The DPRK successfully launched an ICBM (Hwasong-15) from the vicinity of
Pyongsong on November 28, 2017.
• U.S. Forces Korea acknowledges that North Korea’s Hwasong-15 (ICBM) can hit
targets anywhere in theUnited States, with an estimated range of nearly 13,000 km
(8000 miles) (2019 Strategic Digest, USFK).
• North Korea carried out around 25 tests of ballistic missiles, including SLBM,
IRBM, ICBM, since February 2017. UnderKim Jong-un,3 more than 90 tests have
been undertaken. Under water-platform launched ballistic missile—SLBM—
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Implications of North Korea as a ‘Nuclear Weapons State’—North Korea as a
nuclear weapons state challenges international order in three respects.
• First, it is a significant challenge to the NPT regime centered on five nuclear-
weapon powers (P5). If North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons program
cannot be controlled, stopped and finally eliminated, those states with the capacity
to develop nuclear weapons, such as Japan and South Korea, may be tempted to
become next nuclear aspirants.
• Second, it can bring about a structural change to the international security order in
Northeast Asia. With US-China strategic collusion underway, this may lead to a
reprise of the confrontation between naval and land-based powers that played out
around the Korean peninsula during the Cold War. While no country in Northeast
Asia accepts North Korea as a nuclear weapons state, strategic calculations are
different from one another.
• Third, in terms of inter-Korean relations, under the UN and international sanc-
tion regime, South Korea’s policy toward the North, putting priority on economic
cooperation and exchanges, can hardly be implemented without North Korea’s
concrete actions toward complete denuclearization. While the Trump administra-
tion reiterates maintaining sanctions until risk from North Korea “substantially
reduced”, the Moon administration wants the US to ease sanctions.
As a nuclear state, the North Korean leadership began to display increased
confidence in various areas.
• First, North Korean leader, Kim Jong-un, has confidence in the strength of grip on
power and regime security. A powerful nuclear deterrent is Kim’s most important
tool for guaranteeing regime security as well as personal political survival.
• Second, the North Korean leadership believes they have secured a safety valve
in terms of military and security strategy. North Korea can pursue self-reliant
security strategy, tactics, and diplomacy against not only the U.S. but also China
and Russia.
• Third, for North Korean dictator, nuclear weapons give him the means and the
excuse to strengthen his basis of internal rule and exercise absolute control over
the North Korean society.
• Fourth, North Korea can raise its voice that peace talks should be held to replace
Armistice Agreement with a peace treaty between North Korea and the United
States. Toward theU.S. it will grow bolder in its demand for security assurances as
well as the withdrawal of U.S. troops and the breakup of the ROK-U.S. alliance.
• Finally, nuclear weapons enable North Korea to essentially use South Korea as
a hostage in its foreign and inter-Korean policies. Since before the nuclear test,
North Korea had argued that its “nuclear deterrent” would “protect peace and
stability” not only for itself but for South Korea as well.
Kim Jong-un’s goal: (1) secure his rule against internal challengers, (2) achieve
and demonstrate a reliable nuclear deterrent, (3) improve his people’s quality of life,
and (4) elevate North Korea’s international standing as a nuclear state.
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Contending Issues—The Trump-Kim joint statement, on June 12, 2018, states
that the two countries (1) commit to establish new US-DPRK relations, (2) will join
the efforts to build a lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, and
(3) the DPRK commits to work toward complete denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula.
Since June 2018 summit, there have been onemore summit (Feb 2019, Hanoi) and
one meeting (June 2019, Panmunjom DMZ) between Trump and Kim and several
high- and working-level talks between the US and North Korea, but no specific
agreement on denuclearization is achieved.
At the moment, there are fundamental differences between the US and North
Korea in terms of definition, approach, and roadmap concerning ‘complete denucle-
arization.’
Meaning of denuclearization—TheUS’s definition (goal) is Final, FullyVerifiable
Denuclearization (FFVD). It is denuclearization of North Korea. It means: North
Korea is
• To halt the testing of nuclear weapons and launches of ballistic missiles.
• To permit U.S. and international technical experts’ access to key WMD-related
sites throughout the process.
• To declare and shut down all nuclear facilities.
• To completely dismantle and remove its nuclear weapons, delivery systems,
facilities, and associated material with an agreed timeline.
• To provide a comprehensive declaration of its nuclear and ballistic missiles, as
well as chemical and biological programs.
• To rejoin the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula of 1992:
• “shall not test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear
weapons.”
• “shall not possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities.”
9.19 Joint Statement of 2005:
• “Abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs and returning to
NPT and to IAEA safeguards.”
North Korea has yet to provide its version of ‘complete denuclearization’ at the
negotiation table. But DPRK government spokesman’s statement on July 6, 2016,
shows what it means by ‘denuclearization,’ that North Korea has long used. The
statement says:
“The denuclearization being called for by the DPRK is the denuclearization of
the whole Korean peninsula and this includes the dismantlement of nukes in South
Korea and its vicinity.” North Korea’s specific conditions:
• First, all nuclear weapons of the United States must be publicly disclosed.
• Second, all the nuclear weapons and their bases should be dismantled and verified
in the eyes of the world.
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• Third, the U.S. should ensure that it would never bring again the nuclear strike
means to South Korea and its vicinity.
• Fourth, it should commit itself to neither intimidating the DPRK with nuclear
weapons nor using nuclear weapons against the DPRK in any case.
• Fifth, the withdrawal of the U.S. troops holding the right to use nuclear weapons
from South Korea should be declared.
Approach and Roadmap—The US:
• US objective is ultimately the denuclearization of North Korea.
• US position: “Nothing is agreed to until everything is agreed to.”
• The US doubts if North Korea has made a strategic choice to denuclearize. But
the US believes there’s a possibility that North Korea can make the choice to
completely denuclearize.
• Before the completion of denuclearization process, the US wants to get the full
extent of the North Korean WMD. In the process, North Korea is required to pro-
vide a comprehensive declaration at some point. The DPRK should allow expert
access and monitoring mechanisms of key sites to international standards. And
ultimately, the removal and destruction of stockpiles of fissile material, weapons,
missiles, launchers, and other WMD.
• All of this must be addressed in a roadmap at the working-level negotiations.
The roadmap also includes the transformation process of the US-North Korean
relations and the establishment of a permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula.
• Once the definition and the roadmap are agreed, the implementation can be
simultaneously and in parallel.
The DPRK:
• The DPRK regards powerful self-defense capacity as a cornerstone of the exis-
tence of a state/regime/one-man rule dictatorship and a guarantee for safeguarding
peace.
• It demands that the ROK-US joint military exercises be stopped and the intro-
duction of war equipment including strategic assets from outside completely be
suspended.
• NorthKorea holds a step-by-step process. It does not offer its version of a roadmap
to the final stage of denuclearization.
• North Korea is very reluctant to provide a full declaration that is necessary for
the completion of the process of denuclearization. But the US wants that the full
declaration will become well before the end.
It seems that while the US is prepared to negotiate concrete steps toward the final
denuclearization along with those of the normalization of bilateral relationship and
the signing of a peace treaty, theDPRK (Kim Jong-un) is not ready tomake a strategic
decision to give up nuclear weapons program.
Options for Addressing the DPRK Nuclear Program—Option 1—Negotiated Denu-
clearization, most desirable:
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• The US and the DPRK agree on the definition of denuclearization and the end
state and a roadmap to get to that end state.
• Denuclearization process goes along with steps toward normalization of relations
and building of a permanent peace regime through a peace treaty.
• The completion of denuclearization comes alongwith the normalization of theUS-
DPRK relations and the establishment of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.
To get the negations to move on, the US and North Korea should take a step back
from their respective ‘excessive’ demands and seek a stage-by-stage package deal to
be followed by simultaneous actions.
There needs to be total agreement on what the end objective is, that is definition
of denuclearization, and a roadmap to get to that end objective and working level
meetings to unpack each of those elements.
Option 2—Forced Denuclearization:
While diplomatic approach, including negotiations, continues,UNand theUS’s sanc-
tions and coercive diplomacy remain until Kim Jong-un makes a strategic decision
to denuclearize.
• To put in place a punishing set of sanctions that can create every incentive for the
North Korean leadership themselves to make right choices.
• But, military option is not preferable; seeking of regime change in the DPRK is
not an option.
• The effect of economic sanctions and diplomatic coercion.
• Internal political change, including a new leadership.
• Policy changes, including the top decision-maker’s thinking, to re-engage with
the international community and the US in particular.
Option 3—Living with nuclear North Korea, undesirable:
• Negotiations are protracted.
• A nuclear North Korea is tacitly and implicitly accepted.
• Coexist with a nuclear North Korea while South Korea fall under North Korea’s
nuclear blackmail.
• It is highly likely that growing emerge to go nuclear in Japan and South Korea.
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Chapter 23
Regional Rivalries and Their
Implications for the Security and Nuclear
Non-proliferation Regimes
Paolo Cotta-Ramusino
In this note I will consider two regions where the risks of nuclear proliferation and
of possible nuclear use are particularly relevant. These two regions are the Middle
East and South Asia. I would not discuss here the situation of North East Asia and
the crisis of the US-Russia arms control regime, that are also a very relevant part of
a global “nuclear” picture, that is worrisome on many aspects. Also I need to add
that the nuclear problems are themselves part of a global situation where conflicts,
antagonistic attitude, economicwarfare and internal unrests are verymuch on the rise.
Some remarks have been added here about the wars that are affecting in particular
the Middle East. These are not easy times.
Risks of Nuclear Proliferation coupled with instability and wars in the Middle
East—The discussion about eliminating the presence of nuclear weapons in the
Middle East, as well as the possibility of introducing new ones, has been going on
for about five decades. In 1974 Iran and Egypt proposed to create a nuclear weapons
free zone in the Middle East. In 1995 the Review and Extension Conference of
the NPT “noting the danger of nuclear proliferation, especially in areas of tension”
declared to “endorse the aims and objectives of the Middle East peace process and
recognizes that efforts in this regard, as well as other efforts, contribute to, inter
alia, a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass
destruction”.1 The above declaration was a key element that guaranteed the approval
of the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995.
In the conclusions of the 2010 NPT review conference, it is stated that “The
Secretary-General of the United Nations and the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution,
in consultation with the States of the region, will convene a conference in 2012, to be
attended by all States of the Middle East, on the establishment of a Middle East zone
1Resolution on the Middle East (1995 NPT Review Conference).
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free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, on the basis of
arrangements freely arrived at by the States of the region, and with the full support
and engagement of the nuclear-weapon States. The 2012 Conference shall take as
its terms of reference the 1995 Resolution”. We all know that this conference was
never convened in 2012 or in the following years.
Israel is, up to now, the onlyMiddle Eastern state that possesses nuclear weapons.
Israel is of course not a member of the NPT. Israel, while refusing to participate in
the proposed 2012 conference (or in any similar initiative2), stressed the fact that
the elimination of nuclear weapons from the region should not be disconnected form
a general discussion about enforcing or strengthening the general security of the
region. Yet, a lasting security for all in the Middle East cannot be achieved without
the resolution of the Palestinian issue, and Israel refuses the two-state solution or
any meaningful accommodation with the Palestinians.
The questions we would like to ask here are: (1) Has the risk of nuclear prolif-
eration in the Middle East been reduced? (2) Has the general security of the region
improved? (3) Are nuclear risks in the (extended) region decreasing? I am afraid that
the answers to these questions are in general negative. And unless some steps are
taken to pacify the situation, the dangers will increase possibly to a critical level.
Present risks of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East—Let us start with the
Iranian nuclear deal a.k.a. the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action). It
was an excellent deal as it was putting all nuclear activities of Iran under close
scrutiny of the IAEA. And this was the most important element. Moreover, it was
limiting the level of enrichment of Uranium, the production of Plutonium in heavy
water nuclear reactor(s), the number and the efficiency of centrifuges, forbidding
reprocessing, etc. Iran was subjected to many constraints that are not applied to any
other country, that has a peaceful nuclear energy program. Iran accepted these very
severe constraints, in exchange for the removal of the sanctions and the access to
the financial and commercial international market that would be very important in
promoting economic development. Iran, in particular, was and is interested in selling
oil. When President Trump decided to abandon the JCPOA and to reinstate the full
array of sanctions, this created a chain reaction that lead to the impossibility for Iran
to have a sanction-free environment, even though all other signatories of the JCPOA,
but the US, did not formally abandon the agreement. The key issue was of course
the problem of secondary sanctions imposed by the US on companies and entities
that did not abide by the US sanction regime. The EU tried to create a mechanism
(INSTEX) that in principle could allow to preservation of economic interactions with
Iran, despite the US sanctions. But as the Iranians clearly pointed out, up to now,
there is “no money in INSTEX”, the list of goods that can be exchanged with Iran is
limited, export of Iranian oil is not guaranteed by INSTEX, and so on. The present
Iranian Government, that supported the JCPOA, has not been able to deliver the
result of opening Iran economically and financially to the outside world. And this has
been visibly noticed by the more conservative opponents to the present government.
The consequence of the sanctions on the quality of life of the Iranian people is
2The last of these initiatives has been the Conference held at the UN in NewYork (November 2019).
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severe, as it has been shown recently by the popular revolts that happened after
the doubling of the price of gasoline. Hence other sectors of the Iranian leadership
may be interested in promoting a more aggressive attitude towards that part of the
international community that is pressuring Iran, despite the “good will” showed by
Iran in accepting the JCPOA. One year after the US exiting from the JCPOA, Iran
decided to increase slightly the level of enrichment allowed by the JCPOA (from
3.67 to 5%) and to keep in Iran a larger quantity of enriched uranium. This has
been a clear message that Iran wanted to convey to the signatories of the JCPOA.
It should be noted that paragraph 36 and 37 of the JCPOA recognizes the right of
Iran to exceed the limit set by the JCPOA itself, if the sanction system will not
be eliminated or reduced as stated in the JCPOA. As the Iranians clarified openly,
this exceeding the limits set by the JCPOA, is fully reversible if the European (and
the other) countries that are still member of the JCPOA, will help maintaining the
economic and financial opening with Iran. Otherwise other steps in the nuclear area
could be taken by Iran. Thismay increase the possibility of Iran acquiring an effective
military nuclear capability. At this point, other countries inside or outside the region
can decide to attack the places of Iranian nuclear activities, generating a conflict
with possibly very severe consequences. Finally, the possibility of Iran exiting the
JCPOA and even the NPT itself is somehow discussed in Tehran and should not be
considered as an empty threat. Although, Iran has stated on several occasions that it
is committed to the Fatwa forbidding acquisition and use of nuclear weapons, it has
to be seen what will happen in the future if the threats against Iran keep increasing.
Other countries in the region are developing (civilian) nuclear energy programs.
Of course, we know that access to civilian nuclear energy is an “inalienable right”
for all the NPT countries. The problem arises when, as in the case of Saudi Arabia,
the country does not accept the additional protocol with the IAEA and does not
accept any specific limits to its nuclear activities. We all know that there is no clear-
cut distinction between civilian and military nuclear programs. The key issues are
the level of enrichment and, mainly, the international control over nuclear activities
(by IAEA). Setting a system of centrifuges that can perform any required tasks
maybe not easy. But if one combines instruments provided by some states with some
technical (engineering) assistance provided by other nations (such as Pakistan e.g.
as far as this region is concerned), then the result in terms of risks of proliferation
can be serious. Saudi Arabia said very clearly that if Iran develop a military nuclear
capability, they will do the same. The US has announced that it is willing to help the
Saudi (civilian) nuclear efforts. Hence the risks of further nuclear proliferation in the
region of conflicts not to be underestimated.
All in all we can safely say that, under the Trump presidency, the U.S. has stimu-
lated in various ways the possible nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, by killing
the JCPOA, by supporting other countries that are planning to develop nuclear activ-
ities and by keeping refraining from pressuring Israel to participate to the meetings
addressing the issue of a Middle Eastern zone free of Weapons of Mass Destruction.
As far as otherWeapons ofMass destructions are concerned, notice that theMiddle
East is the only region that, in recent times, saw the systematic use of chemical
weapons (in Syria, Iraq, and Iran) and this is far from being reassuring.
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Increasing tensions and instability in the Middle East—The Israeli-Palestinian
antagonism reached recently new heights. Abu Mazen suspended all existing agree-
mentswith Israel. The situation inGaza is catastrophic for the civilian as it has always
been in the last ten years: Gaza is like a large prison camp where we had thousands
of civilian deaths and the large-scale destruction of the civilian infrastructure. Israel
declared that the settlements in Palestine should be part of Israel. Moreover Trump
declared that Jerusalem should be the location of the US Embassy.
The war in Syria, that caused up to now more than 400,000 deaths, is far from
being over despite the collapse of ISIS in both Syria and Iraq. ISIS has been organi-
zationally supported by some rich donors possibly in the Wahabi communities. The
US withdrew its troops by leaving the Kurds at the mercy of Turkey.
The Yemen war that caused the direct death of about 18,000 civilians, while the
number of deaths including the effect of famine can be in the order of magnitude of
100,000.
The civil war in Libya between the Haftar and Al Sarraj camps is likely not going
to end soon.
In all these wars, we have seen the participation in various ways of different
countries in and outside the region: Russia, Iran and Turkey operate in Syria; the
Saudi and the Emirates3 supported the attacks on the Houthis in Yemen who are in
turn supported by the Iranians; the Saudis supported the military coup against the
Government of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt; the Saudis, Emirates, Egypt are
supporting Haftar in Libya while UN recognized Al Sarraj government, etc.
Moreover, there is a general hostility between the different branches of theMuslim
religion: Shias against Sunnis, Alawites against Sunni, Zahidis in Yemen against
Sunnis. The Sunni Shia antagonism is particularly visible in the relations between
Iran and Saudi Arabia, but also affects Lebanon, Bahrain and Syria as well (in Syria
the Alawites are considered de facto close to the Shias). But this sectarian infight
affects also the internal climate of several countries, including Iraq, Saudi Arabia,
Pakistan, Afghanistan and some central Asian republics. The slaughtering of the
Yazidi should also be mentioned when talking about religious antagonism.
In all the region the term “terrorists” is used in a sectarian and instrumental way:
the antagonists often accuse their opponents of “supporting terrorism”. Even Qatar
has been accused of supporting terrorism by Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E.
Moreover, the collapse of the JCPOA has induced hostilities among different oil
producers. If Iran is forbidden to sell oil and send around oil tankers, then Iran will
try to do its best to block oil tankers belonging to other countries in the Hormuz strait
in particular.
In conclusion there is hardly a region in the world where antagonism, sectarianism
and hostility are larger than in the (extended) Middle East.
Nuclear risks and tensions in South Asia—India and Pakistan are antagonistic
countries that possess significant arsenals of nuclear weapons (about 140–150 each).
The situation in this (extended) region can evolve easily in a catastrophic way. For
instance if there is a serious “terrorist attack” in India, and India believes that Pakistan
3Fortunately, just recently the Emirates stopped to support the military activities in Yemen.
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has organized it, then India will likely attack Pakistan with conventional weapons,
and Pakistan, that is largely inferior to India in terms of conventional weapons, is
in principle oriented to use tactical nuclear weapons in response to a conventional
Indian attack.
Things changed for the worse on Aug. 5th, 2019. On that date the Indian Govern-
ment obtained from the Parliament the removal of all the specific regional autonomy
laws for the Jammu and Kashmir state. The valley of Kashmir, where Muslims are
the large majority, has been isolated from the rest of India. As we speak now, it is
forbidden for normal citizens or foreigners to go to the Kashmir valley. Political
leaders of Kashmir are either in jail or under house arrest. This applies also to the
former “chief ministers” of the state of Jammu and Kashmir (Mehbooba Mufti and
Omar Abdullah) who were democratically elected and who are under house arrest
without being accused of any crime. The people in general in the Kashmir valley
have been under extreme pressure: they have been repressed politically, they lack
jobs, the economy of the valley without visitors and tourists being allowed to come
and is under severe strain. In conclusion the internal problems for the Indian State
of Jammu and Kashmir are extreme. The Kashmiris who leave in Pakistan are of
course sympathetic to the Kashmiris who live in India. Some of the groups of Kash-
miri supporters from Pakistan may very well attack the Indian military in the Indian
Kashmir. This can happen very well without direct or indirect intervention from the
Pakistani State or its structures (like the Secret services known as ISI). But it is in
the Indian interest to portray all possible troubles as the result of Pakistani malicious
intervention.
In this way the tension between India and Pakistan increases. Any serious attack
against Indian structures can be ascribed to Pakistan. If a serious attack happens in
India, India’s strategy is to occupy militarily the part of Pakistan where the attack
has been supposedly originated. Pakistan strategy, in the case of a serious Indian
conventional attack, is reportedly, to use tactical nuclear weapons against India. And
this will start a nuclear war. Notice that the Pakistani strategy is in fact similar to
the NATO strategy during the cold war, when NATO and the US were planning to
use tactical nuclear weapons to compensate a conventional inferiority vis a vis the
Warsaw Pact.
As a final remark we should notice that the Indianminister of defense has declared
that India should abandon its nuclear no-firs-use policy, lowering further the nuclear
threshold.
What could be done?—There is of course no easy recipe for a solution to the severe
problems we have just mentioned. Few points should be nevertheless be highlighted.
The international community should work seriously to calm down the difficult situa-
tions in the Middle East and in South Asia. In particular the international community
should work in order to
• Restore the substance of the Iran nuclear agreement and guarantee that the respect
of the JCPOA will yield Iran’s access to the financial and commercial world
market.
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• Refrain from granting international support to local nuclear programs, unless the
IAEA will be able to fully supervise the programs (incl. the additional protocol)
and reasonable limitations to the programs will be set.
• Promote international dialogue and cooperation among the Middle eastern coun-
tries with the aim of achieving a reciprocal understanding and the limitation of
hostile activities.
• Guarantee the freedom of movement of people and goods in the region to the
maximum possible extent.
• Promote the end of conflicts in Syria, Yemen and Libya.
• Operate in order to restart the Israeli-Palestinian dialogue.
• Promote India-Pakistan dialogue with the aim of preventing nuclear use.
• Pressure India in order to reduce the political tension in the State of Jammu and
Kashmir and make again the State open to Indian nationals and Foreign visitors
as it was before.
• Induce India to free the political leaders who have not been accused of any wrong
doing.
• Induce India and Pakistan to put back in place the aerial communications between
the two countries. Bring back the road communications between the two countries
and particularly the communications across the line of control in the Kashmiri
region.
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One way to understand the range or breadth of roles is to use the taxonomy articu-
lated in the Royal Society andAmericanAssociation for theAdvancement of Science
(AAAS) report New Frontiers in Science Diplomacy (2010):1 Diplomacy for science
is what we call international relations that facilitate cooperation on science. Science
for diplomacy is where technical cooperation helps international relations by con-
necting people and providing an example of mutually beneficial cooperation. The
collateral benefits of those interactions are relationships and better understanding of
underlying culture, which is acquired only through interaction. And the third type,
science in diplomacy is where scientists use information and analyses to address
diplomatic issues. In a sense, the scientist-to-scientist engagements on security issues
embodied by the Amaldi Conferences combine science for diplomacy and science
in diplomacy.
Three organizations illustrate some of these roles of scientists in addressing prob-
lems between and among nations. The Nobel Peace Prize winning International
Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) has brought new energy and new
people, including scientists, to the disarmament effort. The International Organiza-
tion of the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER), a joint project
of 35 nations to build the world’s largest magnetic fusion energy facility, was born
out of the Cold War. The Laser Interferometry Gravitational Observatory (LIGO),
which detected gravitational waves directly for the first time in September 2015,
draws members from across the United States and the world.
Scientists developed nuclear weapons and, because of that role, according to Ali-
cia Sanders-Zakre, they had a sense of responsibility for controlling nuclearweapons.
1The Royal Society and AAAS [1].
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The organizations founded by scientists illustrate this history, including the Federa-
tion of Atomic Scientists (later the Federation of American Scientists), the Bulletin
on of Atomic Scientists, the Union of Concerned Scientists, the Russell-Einstein
manifesto and Pugwash, and others. Scientists continue to research and share their
findings on the terrible consequences of nuclear war, including recent analyses of the
effect of a limited nuclear exchange on the climate. ICAN has engaged scientists in
support of the Treaty on the Prohibition ofNuclearWeapons (TPNW). Someworking
within the nonproliferation regime criticize the TPNW as counterproductive, redun-
dant to and therefore distracting from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT),
and providing no path to arms reductions and disarmament. ICAN sees the TPNW as
complementing theNPT, not interferingwith it, but also not accepting the inaction on
disarmament, and therefore inspiring scientists and others to develop frameworks for
disarmament. ICAN utilizes the strength of youthful impatience and impertinence
to speak up when told to be quiet, evident in other major social movements such as
the current push for action on climate change.
Born of a desire to use science to demonstrate cooperation between rivals, the
agreement to pursue ITER was a product of the 1985 Geneva summit between U.S.
and Soviet leaders, a kind of multilateral descendent of the Soyuz-Apollo mission.
Fusion is often touted as a future limitless energy source. ITER is the world’s largest
effort to bring that future nearer, and it illustrates how difficult practical international
cooperation is. As Sergio Orlandi explained, ITER grew to have many partners
and, through a selection process, the facility was located in Southern France. The
partners provide in-kind contributions, such as the magnets, the vacuum vessel, and
the cryoplant. It has been an enormous challenge as an engineering project to marry
together these essential components from so many different places. There have also
been considerations of export controls and security restrictions of the host country
with respect to tritium. Rules enable these partners to make progress and, we hope
for the benefit of humankind, succeed.
Barry Barish shared the 2018 Nobel Prize in Physics for “for decisive contribu-
tions to the LIGO detector and the observation of gravitational waves.” This set of
observations in 2015, verifying Einstein’s 1916 prediction of gravity waves, is one
of the great successes of modern physics and was achieved with participation of
an international team, despite being located in the United States. Barish argues that
cooperation among scientists in different countries is essential. Science is an interna-
tional sport, trying to solve problems that do not yet have solutions. In LIGO, because
the solutions were unknown, the project had to be organized and operated in a less
hierarchical way than say a project to build a bridge with a known design. They came
together and worked on a common problem and successfully developed solutions,
which should give us hope for how scientists can help solve other problems.
Although these experts are optimistic about the potential for scientific cooperation
to help the world avoid calamity, several concerns were raised. First, as valuable as
international science institutions are for Science Diplomacy, a participant argued that
their impact on real-world problemswould be higher if the institutionswould develop
positions on issues for humankind. Dual-use technology, that is to say technology
that has both benign and potentially harmful uses, is another concern. For example,
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if scientific results are openly available, then they could be misused. On the other
side of that coin, are concerns about the securitization of science. According to
Dr. Barish, scientists worry about these issues, not so much for the scientific results,
but more for the new technologies used to reach those results. Pure science has to be
open; this is a core principle. But the new technologies developed, such as artificial
intelligence used for LIGO, raise several concerns about misuse. The scientists worry
about that and are talking about it, but they have no solutions yet. For ITER, sensitive
technologies are produced and controlled by the host country and not all partners
and participants get access to the knowledge. A different kind of concern closed the
session. The average age of scientists addressing nuclear issues has been rising for
many years. ICAN has been effective in engaging young people around the world
by having a simple, clear message on an important issue. It is easily understood and
people are inspired to work on it.
Reference
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and International Youth in Diplomacy
to Abolish Nuclear Weapons
Alicia Sanders-Zakre
The role of scientists, citizens and international youth in abolishing nuclear weapons
is a topic that the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons knows quite
a lot about. As a campaign of over 500 partner organizations in over 100 countries,
we bring together scientists and activists and citizens of all ages in pursuit of one
common goal—banning and eliminating nuclear weapons.
I have great respect for the historic contributions of scientists to educate the public
on the dangers posed by nuclear weapons and to press for nuclear abolition.
Scientific involvement in nuclear disarmament activism is not new—in fact it is
nearly as old as the bomb itself. Many of the original scientists who developed the
first nuclear weapons during theManhattan Project later renounced nuclear weapons
and began to advocate for their total and complete elimination.
Before the bombwas even dropped onHiroshima, scientists were concerned about
possessing and using this new weapon of mass destruction. Seventy scientists who
worked on theManhattan Project signed a petition drafted byLeoSzilard in July 1945
to express concern about the moral responsibilities of possessing nuclear weapons.1
In 1946, Leo Szilard and Albert Einstein created the Emergency Committee of
the Atomic Scientists to warn the public about the danger of nuclear weapons.
In an initial fundraising letter for the committee in December 1946, Einstein
wrote: “We scientists recognize our inescapable responsibility to carry to our fellow
citizens an understanding of the simple facts of atomic energy and its implications for
society. In this lies our only security and our only hope—we believe that an informed
citizenry will act for life and not for death.”2
1“A Petition to the President of the United States,” July 17, 1945, https://www.atomicheritage.org/
sites/default/files/B04_03-03_01.jpg.
2Letter: Emergency Committee of the Atomic Scientists, December 11, 1946.
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Other scientists took up the call and formed organizations that still exist today to
raise awareness of the dangers of nuclear weapons.
The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists was first founded in 1945 by Manhattan
Project scientists who could not remain aloof to the consequences of their work and
continues to exist today as a platform for scientists, policy makers and activists to
speak out about nuclear weapons risks and consequences.
Einstein and others formed Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
in 1955 to draw attention to the dangers of thermonuclear weapons and the need to
peacefully resolve conflicts.
The Union of Concerned Scientists was formed in 1968 “to express determined
opposition to ill-advised and hazardous projects such as the ABM system, the
enlargement of our nuclear arsenal, and the development of chemical and biological
weapons.”3
In addition to forming organizations, individual scientists, including physicians
and climate scientists documented the catastrophic humanitarian and environmental
consequences of nuclear weapons use by publishing articles and speaking out.
Soviet physicist Andrei Sakharov, whoworked on Soviet thermonuclear weapons,
began publishing articles in the 1950s on the hazards of radioactive fallout, while
pushing Soviet officials to stop atmospheric testing.
Dr. Helen Caldicott used her scientific expertise and concern about the medical
effects of radioactive fallout to form Physicians for Social Responsibility and mobi-
lize a mass movement to freeze the nuclear arms race in the 1980s. In large part
due to her efforts, one million people rallied in New York City in 1982 to call for a
nuclear freeze.
In the early 1980s, astrophysicist Carl Sagan also began to warn the public about
“nuclear winter”—the terrifying long-term consequences of nuclear war that could
lead to global famine and starvation.
Updated studies on nuclear winter indicate that the consequences could be even
more devastating than previously expected.Anupdated climatemodelling study from
Owen B. Toon and nine other leading researchers was published on 2 October 2019.
It shows that a relatively limited nuclear exchange involving 250 nuclear weapons
dropped on urban areas in India and Pakistan would result in dramatically reduced
sunlight, precipitation and global cooling—choking off food production as we know
it for the next decade at least.4 Beyond the unacceptable immediate deaths, billions
could die from the resulting famine in the long term.5
Nuclear weapons aren’t just city destroyers, they could be humanity destroyers.
We cannot wait to act.
Many scientists today recognize the growing risks nuclear weapons pose and are
following in the footsteps of their predecessors to call for nuclear weapon abolition.
3“FoundingDocument: 1968MIT Faculty Statement,” Union of Concerned Scientists, https://www.
ucsusa.org/about/history/founding-document-1968-mit-faculty-statement.
4Toon et al. [1].
5Helfand [2].
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In July 2017, over 3700 scientists from around the world signed a letter in support
of the negotiations of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, urging their
national governments to support the treaty as well.
They wrote: “Scientists bear a special responsibility for Nuclear Weapons, since
it was scientists who invented them and discovered that their effects are even more
horrific than first thought.”6
The letter was organized by Max Tegmark, a physics professor from the Mas-
sachusetts Institute of Technology and included StephenHawking and 27 otherNobel
Laureates in Chemistry, Physics and Physiology and Medicine, including two indi-
viduals who won Nobel Prizes in two disciplines. Former U.S. Secretary of Defense
William Perry also signed the letter.
The over 3700 scientists got their wish—in July 2017, 122 countries voted to
adopt the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. 79 countries have signed
the treaty and 32 have ratified it—over half of the required 50 ratifications for it to
enter into force.
The treaty prohibits states-parties from developing, testing, producing, manu-
facturing, transferring, possessing, stockpiling, using or threatening to use nuclear
weapons, or allowing nuclear weapons to be stationed on their territory. It also pro-
hibits them from assisting, encouraging or inducing anyone to engage in any of
these activities. According to research from the Norwegian People’s Aid, 155 num-
ber of states currently maintain policies and practices that are compliant with these
prohibitions.7
It includes positive obligations for states to provide victim assistance and envi-
ronmental remediation for people and places harmed by nuclear weapons use and
testing.
The treaty requires that all countries have aComprehensiveSafeguardsAgreement
with the International Atomic Energy Agency as a minimum, just like the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty. However, the TPNW goes a step further than the NPT on
safeguards. Unlike the NPT, the TPNW actually requires the Additional Protocol for
states that already had one in force at the time of the treaty’s entry into force.8
Scientists played a key role during the negotiations of the TPNW and continue to
do so as the treaty nears entry into force. A team of Princeton University physicists
and political scientists published a paper outlining a possible structure for negotiating
and verifying the irreversible elimination of nuclear weapons if a nuclear armed state
joins the TPNW.9
6“An Open Letter From Scientists In Support of the UN Nuclear Weapons Negotiations,” Future of
Life Institute, https://futureoflife.org/nuclear-open-letter/.
7Norwegian People’s Aid, “NuclearWeapons BanMonitor 2019, October 2019, https://banmonitor.
org/.
8See Article 3: “Each State Party to which Article 4, paragraph 1 or 2, does not apply shall, at a
minimum, maintain its International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards obligations in force at the
time of entry into force of this Treaty, without prejudice to any additional relevant instruments that
it may adopt in the future.”
9Patton et al. [3].
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And ICAN is currently working with scientists and researchers to better under-
stand and educate the public on the increasing nuclear weapons risks caused by
emerging technologies like artificial intelligence and cyber technologies.
Scientists have been instrumental in educating the public on nuclear weapons
dangers and the need for nuclear abolition. But they need a mobilized public—and
engaged young people in particular—to transform their warnings into real change.
Luckily, there is a new generation of young people who refuse to accept the failure
of adults to take action on existential threats to their future.
16 year old Greta Thunberg, whose simple act last year of refusing to go to school
to protest political inaction on climate change, has spread into a global movement.
One ofGreta’s strengths is youthful impatience. Impatience to demand that change
happens now and impertinence to speak up for values even when others tell her to
be quiet.
We need to all be impatient when it comes to these existential threats, including
nuclear weapons. We can’t afford to wait.
Greta was sick of waiting for powerful people to solve climate change. She was
sick of inaction and excuses, as minute by minute we track closer to armageddon.
So she took power into her own hands.
Like with climate change, scientists have warned that nuclear weapons threaten
the future that young people will inherit.
Like with climate change, the reality of nuclear weapons caused a global response
of denial. Seven decades of denying that these weapons have to be eliminated as a
matter of urgency. We must destroy them, before they destroy us.
Martin Luther King, Jr. eloquently explained while accepting the Nobel Peace
Prize.
He said, “The fact that most of the time human beings put the truth about the
nature and risks of the nuclear war out of their minds is because it is too painful and
therefore not acceptable does not alter the nature and risks of such war. The device of
“rejection” may temporarily cover up anxiety, but it does not bestow peace of mind
and emotional security.”10
Young people are sick of inaction on nuclear disarmament, like Greta is sick of
inaction on climate change. Grassroots pressure is bringing democracy to nuclear
disarmament in a movement spearheaded by young people, bold female politicians,
diplomats and municipalities, and grounded in the leadership and moral authority of
the survivors of nuclear bombings and testing.
ICAN is full of young people around the world like Greta. Just look at our inter-
national staff team. When we won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2017, none of our staff
members were over the age of 35. Our campaigners around the world are young and
passionate activists, who like Greta, are taking their future into their own hands.
We are helping to educate more young people about the threat of nuclear weapons
by bringing young people to Hiroshima for an intensive course to learn first-hand
about the terrible effects of nuclear weapons. This summer, through fieldwork and
10“Martin Luther King Jr.—Acceptance Speech,” December 10, 1964, https://www.nobelprize.org/
prizes/peace/1964/king/26142-martin-luther-king-jr-acceptance-speech-1964/.
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lectures the participants learned about the humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons,
global trends on nuclear weapons and met with UN officials, diplomats, and civil
society members.
One of our partner organizations, Peace Boat, has connected over 100 hibakusha,
the survivors of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, with hundreds of young
people to ensure that their stories are passed on and the humanitarian impact of
nuclear weapon use is not forgotten.
We are also shedding light on the links between universities and the nuclear
weapons complex in the United States, so that students can decide if they want their
university to continue to contribute to developing weapons of mass murder.
An ICAN report documents how U.S. universities have been involved in research
about and production of nuclear weapons since the Manhattan Project through direct
lab management, institutional partnerships and research and training programs for
students to become nuclear weapons scientists.
We call on universities to provide greater transparency about their links to nuclear
weapons research and production, dissolve partnerships with nuclear weapons pro-
duction sites and contracts directly related to nuclear weapons and reinvest weapons
activities funding to non-proliferation and environmental remediation efforts.
In conclusion, the nuclear abolition movement owes much to scientists, who have
spoken out about the medical and environmental hazards of nuclear weapons and
have called for their elimination. As a network of young activists, ICAN works to
amplify the concerns and follow the advice of these scientists who demand a world
free of nuclear weapons.
References
1. O.B. Toon et al., Rapidly expanding nuclear arsenals in Pakistan and India portend regional and
global catastrophe. Sci. Adv. 5, eaay5478 (2019). https://advances.sciencemag.org/content/5/
10/eaay5478. (2 Oct)
2. I. Helfand, Nuclear famine: two billion people at risk? in International Physicians for the Pre-
vention of Nuclear War (2013). https://www.ippnw.org/pdf/nuclear-famine-two-billion-at-risk-
2013.pdf
3. T. Patton, S. Phillippe, Z. Mian, Fit for purpose: an evolutionary strategy for the implementation
and verification of the treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons. J. Peace Nucl. Disarmament
2, 387–409 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2019.1666699. (24 Sept)
168 A. Sanders-Zakre
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing,
adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate
credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s Creative
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not
included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by
statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from
the copyright holder.
Chapter 26
ITER Project: International Cooperation
and Energy Investment
Sergio Orlandi
General Overview—The ITER project, established by an international agreement
among sevenMembers (China, the EuropeanUnion, India, Japan, Korea, the Russian
Federation and the United States of America) Fig. 26.1, is a critical step in the
development of fusion energy: its role is to confirm the feasibility of exploiting
magnetic confinement fusion for the production of energy for peaceful purposes by
providing an integrated demonstration of the physics and technology required for a
fusion power plant.
Rapid progress has been made in the design, manufacturing, construction and
R&D activities, and, as shown in Fig. 26.2, the facility is now taking shape at St-
Paul-lez-Durance in southern France.
Fusion Technology is going beyond what is currently known and looks for
Materials having strong mechanical capacities at very high temperatures in Nor-
mal/Accidental Scenarios and beyond design Basis Scenarios. Electromagnetic
Loads, Disruption Loads, impulsive burst explosion loads, seismic loads and Air-
craft Crash loads have to be considered in design loads combinations when Plasma
Temperatures is above 150 million of degrees Centigrade and severe confinement is
required to assure Primary Barrier decoupled from Plasma functional Scenario. It is
difficult, but challenging. The major objective of the ITER project is to demonstrate
that a future power producing fusion device can be maintained effectively and offer
practical levels of plant availability.
Fusion powers the Sun and stars: two hydrogen nuclei combine, form a heavier
nucleus and release energy (Fig. 26.3). Our objective is to reproduce this reaction on
Earth.
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Fig. 26.1 ITER—International agreement among seven members
Fig. 26.2 Aerial viewof the ITER site at St-Paul-lez-Durancewith the construction of theAssembly
Hall and Tokamak Complex
The process of nuclear fusion is summarized in the following steps:
• Heat Deuterium-Tritium plasma to 150 million °C.
• Confine and shape the plasma with magnetic fields.
• Sustain a “burning plasma” with helium nuclei.
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Fig. 26.3 Fusion reaction
deuterium tritium
• Transfer neutron energy to the metal walls.
• Heat water → Steam → Electricity.
Nuclear Fusion Energy production advantages are listed:
• Massive, continuous, baseload energy;
• Safe, no meltdown possible;
• No CO2 or other greenhouse gases;
• No long-lived high-activity radioactive waste;
• Unlimited fuel for millions of years.
ITER Mission (Fig. 26.4) is concentrated in getting demonstration to be able to
produce industrial-scale fusion producing a “burning plasma” having:
• Q ≥ 10—Gaining Factor;
• 50 MW of heating input—Required energy to work;
• 500 MW of thermal output—Energy produced.
The mechanism to assure nuclear fusion into the chamber (called VacuumVessel)
is achieved running an electrical current in the DT gas in order to create a plasma
status, heating with electromagnetic waves and inject high-energy neutrons.
The result: is to reach the temperature for fusion equal to 150,000,000 °C.
A giant magnetic cage is going to be built assembling together the central solenoid
(13m high and 1000 t), eighteen toroidal magnets (17m high and 360 t each one) and
six poloidal magnets (8 up to 24 m of diameter, 200 up to 400 t each one) Figs. 26.5
and 26.6.
The current situation in installation progress is summarized in the picture
(Fig. 26.7).
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Fig. 26.4 ITER machine global assembly
Fig. 26.5 Poloidal field coils
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Fig. 26.6 Integration PF/TF coils and VV-cage
Fig. 26.7 ITER plant overview
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Fig. 26.8 General overview of the Vacuum Vessel and Tokamak poloidal overview
Fig. 26.9 Vacuum Vessel
overall arrangement
Systems Description—Vacuum Vessel: The main component of ITER, where the
fusion reaction takes place, is theVacuumVessel (VV), composed by themain vessel,
the port structures and the VV supporting system (Fig. 26.8).
The Vacuum Vessel is a torus-shaped double wall structure with shielding and
cooling water between the shells (Fig. 26.9). The basic vessel design is an all-welded
structure where the inner shell serves as the first confinement barrier for the in-vessel
radioactive inventory. The Vacuum Vessel is divided into nine toroidal sectors joined
by field welding using splice plates at the central vertical plane of alternate ports (of
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the odd numbers). The sectors are connected to each other with the splice plates with
the provision for twofold cutting and re-welding.
At the upper level, there are 18 ports of a similar design. At the equatorial level,
there are 14 regular equatorial ports and three ports for the neutral beam injection
(NB ports). At the lower level, there are five ports for divertor cassette replacement
and/or diagnostics (the divertor Remote Handling/diagnostic ports), and four ports
for vacuum pumping (the cryopump ports). Between these ports, there are local
penetrations for ELM coil penetrations, divertor piping, in-vessel viewing and glow
discharge cleaning of the in-vessel components. The port structure is attached to the
port stub (integral to the main vessel) and includes the port stub extension, and the
port extension (normally equipped with the connected duct extended to the cryostat).
The port components are connected to each other with the splice plates.
The main characteristics of the Vacuum Vessel are summarized in Table 26.1.
Water Cold Sinks: The Cooling Water system is designed to remove the high
heat deposition on the Vacuum Vessel either during normal operation (the total heat
deposition is non-uniformly deposited and mainly due to nuclear heating) or during
off-normal operation (the decay heat of the VV and thermal radiation from the in-
vessel components such as blanket and divertor—Fig. 26.10).
The ITER Cooling Water System is composed of four main systems (Fig. 26.11):
• the Tokamak Cooling Water System (TCWS);
• the Component Cooling Water System (CCWS);
• the Chilled Water System (CHWS);
• the Heat Rejection System (HRS).
The TCWS removes heat from the Vacuum Vessel (through the Vacuum Vessel
Primary Heat Transfer System, VV-PHTS), from the in-VacuumVessel Components
(through the Integrated loop of Blanket, Edge LocalizedMode-Vertical Stabilization
Coils, and Divertor PHTS, IBED-PHTS) and the Neutral Beam Injectors (through
the NBI-PHTS).
The Tokamak CoolingWater System also employs some supporting systems such
as the Draining and Refilling System (DRS), the Drying System (DYS) and the
Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS).
The Component Cooling Water System is an intermediate closed loop that trans-
fers heat to the Heat Rejection System (HRS) for final disposal to the atmosphere.
CCWS-1 also provides cooling for some other nuclear systems (e.g. Tritium Plant
Systems components, etc.).
The non-nuclear systems (power supply, busbars, cryoplant, chillers etc.) are
cooled by four independent trains CCWS-2A, 2B, 2C, 2D (based on pressure, tem-
perature and water chemistry demanded by the systems) which again transfers heat
to the HRS.
Two ChilledWater Systems (CHWSs) are also present: CHWS-H1 provides cool-
ing for Protection Important Components (PICs) via direct air heat transfer, whilst
CHWS-H2 provides cooling for non-PICs.
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Table 26.1 Vacuum Vessel main parameters
Size
• Toroidal extent of sector 40°
• Toroidal outside diameter 19.4 m
• Torus inner diameter 6.5 m
• Torus height 11.3 m
• Shell thickness 60 mm
• Rib thickness 40, 60 and 80 mm in some locations
Structure Double wall
Configuration
• Inboard straight region Cylindrical
• Inboard top/bottom Double curvature
• Outboard region Mainly double curvature
Resistance
• Toroidal 7.9 µ
• Poloidal 4.1 µ
Water inlet temperature at normal operation
during baking
100 °C
200 °C for VV
240 °C for blanket water cooled ports
Water inlet absolute nominal pressure for
main vessel at normal operation during baking
0.8 MPa
2.1 MPa
Absolute pressure inside plasmach amber and
cryostat chamber during normal operating
conditions
0 MPa (vacuum)
• Volume of coolant in main vessel (including
the port stub extensions)
200 m3 (in all 9 sectors)
• Volume of coolant in the port extensions
(cooled by the VV PHTS)
35 m3
• Volume of coolant in port extension parts
cooled by the FW/B1PHTS
~0.142 m3 per upper port
~0.045 m3 per equatorial port
Design pressure (absolute values) 2.6 MPa for main vessel + extensions
5.0 MPa for ports extensions cooled by First
Wall and Blanket cooling system
Coolant Water
Design temperature 200 °C for VV
250 °C for ports
Surface area/volume
• Interior surface area ~850 m2
• Interior volume
• Excluding volume of in-vessel components ~1090 m3
(continued)
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Table 26.1 (continued)
• Including volume of in-vessel components ~1600 m3
Mass of the assembled vessel (360°)
• Main vessel (without shielding) 1611 t
• Shielding 1733 t
• Port structures (excl. connecting ducts) 1487 t
• Connecting ducts 294 t
Total 5125 t
Allowable leak rate − Helium vacuum leak
test
1 × 10–7 Pa m3 V–1 (air equivalent)





The Tokamak Cooling Water System, directly connected with Vacuum Vessel,
has the following main functions:
• remove heat deposited in the in-vessel components (FW/BLK and DIV PHTS
components) and the VV and NBI PHTS components during a plasma pulse and
rejects this heat to CCWS-1;
• control the coolant temperature, flow rate and pressure for the in-vessel compo-
nents VV and NBI during normal operation as required;
• control differential temperature between in-vessel components and the VV during
all modes of operation;
• provide SIC signals to initiate drainage of the VV to the safety drain tanks during
postulated Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) or Loss of Flow Accident (LOFA)
events;
• remove decay heat during normal operation from the in-vessel components and
the VV after plasma shutdown;
• provide decay heat removal by the VV PHTS after postulated loss of offsite power
(LOOP) events;
• provide the primary confinement boundary of the radioactive inventory of the
TCWS PHTS coolant for postulated failures of in-vessel components;
• measure the heat removed from the in-vessel components and VV to contribute
to the determination of the overall fusion power balance.
The ITER vacuum vessel operates in normal operating condition at p ~ 0 MPa
(vacuum) and in any case themaximum internal pressure shall be limited to 0.15MPa
absolute, in case of loss of coolant accident from the in-vessel components (coolant
coming from the TCWS) or LOVA (loss of vacuum accident) event. In order to
fulfil this Project Requirements the Vacuum Vessel has been equipped with an addi-
tional sub-system: theVacuumVessel Pressure Suppression System (VVPSS directly
connected to VV).
In Fig. 26.12 plant layouts view of the Vacuum Vessel and the VVPSS.
The sub-system includes four Vapor Suppression Tanks (VST), one Small LOCA
Tank and three Large LOCA Tanks, containing enough water at room temperature to
condense the steam resulting from the Design Basis coolant leaks into the Vacuum
Vessel, thus limiting over-pressurization to 0.15 MPa absolute. The system can also
be utilized in a variety of other situations, such as a simple loss of vacuum, to provide
over pressure protection and enhanced confinement by maintaining low pressure in
the system.
Four types of events are considered in the design of the VVPSS:
• Type 1 event: Pure LOVA;
• Type 2 event: Small Pure LOCA;
• Type 3 event: Large Pure LOCA;
• Type 4 event: Combination of LOVA and LOCA.
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Fig. 26.12 Plant layout view of the VV and VVPSS
Event type 2, 3 and 4 are considered as Beyond Design Basis Accident (BDBA)
when the amount of steam generated exceeds the condensation capacity of the Vapor
Suppression Tanks (in case of failure of the isolation valves on TCWS).
Cryogenic Cold Sink: While the cold sink for VV is the TCWS, the cold sink
for Magnets assuring the confinement function of plasma is the cryogenic system.
The purpose of the ITER cryogenic system is to provide the required operational
conditions for the magnet system, vacuum system and small users like diagnostics.
The magnet system consists of superconducting magnets coils, structure and current
leads, and is supported by 80 K thermal shields system. The vacuum system consists
of cryo-pumps for torus and cryostat, cryo-pumps for Neutral Beam Injection (NBI)
and Pellet Injection System (PIS). The users of the cryogenic system require helium
cryogen at temperature levels of 4.5, 50 and 80 K and nitrogen at either 80 K or
ambient temperature. The cryogenic system needs to satisfy all operational modes of
the users at various stages of plasma operation. To satisfy the operational modes and
resulting requirements, the ITER cryogenic system has been divided according to the
ITER Geographical Breakdown System (GBS) in two different locations namely the
cryoplant System (in cryoplant buildings and cryo-bridge) and the cryo-distribution
system (in the Tokamak).
The ITER cryogenic system, see Fig. 26.13, has to guarantee stable operation
conditions for the magnets and cryosorption panels over a wide range of plasma
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Fig. 26.13 Cryogenic system global architecture
Fig. 26.14 Cryoplant system 3D layout
scenarios ranging from short (~100 s) plasma pulses with enlarged fusion power
(700 MW) to long plasma burn times (3000 s) at reduced fusion power of 365 MW,
whereas the baseline is 500 MW for 400 s.
As one of the world’s largest cryogenic infrastructure, see Figs. 26.14 and 26.15,
the ITER cryoplant will provide an average cooling power of 75 kW at 4.5 K during
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Fig. 26.15 Comparison of ITER cryo-plant helium cooling capacities
plasma experiments and up to 87 kW in pure refrigeration mode through three LHe
plants. For the thermal shield of the Tokamak and cryo-distribution, two 80 K helium
loops with an average capacity of 40 kW equivalents at 4.5 K (2 × 4 kg/s loops in
between 80 and 100 K) will be installed.
Two liquid nitrogen (LN2) refrigerators with a maximum capacity of 1300 kW at
80 K will support the nitrogen pre-cooling system of all helium plants. ITER will
have its own nitrogen production facility on site, provided by a nitrogen generator of
~1550 N m3/h capacity for blanketing, leaks, purifier, regeneration of dryers as well
as a redundancy in case of instrument air network failure.
An impurity processing system recovers and purifies helium from safety valves
and other open circuit users. A heat recovery system (HRS)will recover up to 12MW
of heat from the cooling water circuits of the screw compressors for heating of the
ITER buildings.
Storage and recovery of the helium inventory is managed via warm and cold (80
and 4.5 K) helium tanks.
ITER will have to store an overall helium inventory of 27 t. The storage system
has been optimized and its cost reduced with the replacement of part of the warm
storage vessels with a 175 m3 LHe dewar. The storages, including those for large
volumes of gaseous and liquid nitrogen, are summarized in Table 26.2 and its layout
in Fig. 26.16.
For the first time a large and distributed cryogenic system has to consider the
constraint of a nuclear installation while aiming at maximizing the efficiency, flexi-
bility, availability and reliability of operation required to demonstrate the economic
viability of fusion for future energy production. As a nuclear installation, the ITER
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Table 26.2 Storage inventory and capacity
Volume (mc) Total volume (mc)
Pure gas helium tanks at ambient temperature 5 × 400 2000
Impure gas helium storage at ambient temperature 1 × 400 400
LHe tank 1 × 175 175
Helium quench tanks 2 × 360 720
Helium gasbag 7 × 120 840
LN2 storage 1 × 300 300
Gas nitrogen storage 1 × 100 100
Fig. 26.16 Cryogenic system installed in buildings 51/52
project is under the French Quality Order 1984 (French decree relating to the qual-
ity of design, construction and operation) which has been rolled-out to contractors
and sub-contractors. Codes (mainly for pressure vessels) are imposed and strictly
followed unless proper counter measure could be implemented. One of the main
issue for IO as a nuclear operator is maintenance of all vacuum insulated pressure
vessels which forces the design to take all measure to assure or avoid such activities
of periodic inspections and requalifications.
AReliabilityAvailabilityMaintainability Inspectability (RAMI) analysis is devel-
oped and detailed along all design phases, with contractors and re-integrated to IO
overall RAMI analysis.
For protection of investment aswell as personal,Hazard andOperability (HAZOP)
and Safety Integrity Level (SIL) studies are systematically conducted.
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Fig. 26.17 Engineering innovation—robotics
In order to meet RAMI, HAZOP and SIL requirements, the cryoplant technical
specification refers to the European or International standard such as EN ISO 10440-
1 for rotary-type positive-displacement compressor or EN ISO 10438 for lubrica-
tion, shaft-sealing and control-oil systems and auxiliaries. All rotating machineries
have to follow either an ISO standard or its equivalent from the American Petroleum
Institute (API). The heat exchanger will follow the TEMA (Tubular Exchanger Man-
ufacturer Association) or ALPEMA (Aluminium Plate Fin Exchanger Manufacturer
Association) standards.
Maintenance and In Service Inspection (ISI)—The World of Remote handling
system and Robotics: A major objective of the ITER project is to demonstrate that a
future power producing fusion device can be maintained effectively and offer prac-
tical levels of plant availability. During its operational lifetime, many systems of the
ITERmachine will require maintenance andmodification; this can be achieved using
remote handling methods. The need for timely, safe and effective remote operations
on a machine as complex as ITER and within one of the world’s most hostile remote
handling environments represents amajor challenge at every level of the ITERProject
organization, engineering and technology. Remote handling (RH) is the synergistic
combination of technology and engineering management systems (Fig. 26.17) to
enable operators to safely, reliably and repeatedly perform manipulation of items
without being in personal contact with those items. ITERmission requires scheduled
upgrades of the machine, by means of exchanging internal components, executing
scheduled and unscheduled maintenance and/or repair operations.
To accomplish such tasks, ITER has adopted a RH maintenance plan (IRHMP).
This is based on the maintenance system (IMS) equipment, on the IMS facilities (hot
cell, test stand) and on a set of operational procedures. The RH approach required
184 S. Orlandi











































































Fig. 26.18 Logic of the ITER IRHMP and its relation with the IMS
for a fusion device like ITER is characterized by: (a) geometrically complex work-
ing environment, (b) large, heavy components with close tolerance fits, (c) limited
access through narrow ports; (d) poor visibility, (e) the RH equipment comprises
combination of large transporters, specialised end-effectors (including teleoperated
manipulators) and tooling, (f) relatively long distance between reactor and hot cell,
(g) hot cell dimensions and functions. To complicate matters further, the environ-
mental conditions in which the RH equipment is required to operate are: (a) ultra
high vacuum clean conditions, (b) high gamma radiation, (c) contamination, e.g.
beryllium dust, tritiated carbon dust, gaseous tritium and activated tungsten dust,
(d) some level of magnetic field. The ITER Remote Handling Management Plan
(IRHMP) (being developed, Fig. 26.18) will be the reference for the management of
the specification, design, procurement and operation of all the ITER remote handling
equipment and facilities, including the RH compatibility of ITER components.
The objectives of the IRHMP are to: (a) establish and manage the ITER require-
ments for in-vessel components maintenance and upgrade, on the basis of the IMS
equipment and facilities availability, (b) define the IMS performance parameters and
operational limits, (c) define the IMS deployment strategy for planned and unplanned
maintenance based on the IMS operational & safety limits and on the established
machine experimental program, (d) develop an IMS information package, to allow
good planning of in-vessel components’ maintenance & upgrade campaigns, (e)
define and facilitate the use of best practice and standards for the specification, design
and manufacture of the IMS, (f) define the best practice and standards for the design,
manufacture and qualification of RH compatible ITER components, (g) define the
best practice and standards to be used for the preparation and implementation of RH
operations, (h) define and control the RH classification of ITER components.
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Fig. 26.19 Blanket RH 3D simulation
Fig. 26.20 Blanket RH trials using the IVT and manipulator
Fig. 26.21 The equatorial transfer cask (a) and the divertor transfer cask (b)
The blanket RH equipment design has progressed in the JA-DA to include the
CATIA modeling of the blanket In Vessel Transporter (IVT) system and its deploy-
ment process simulation (Figs. 26.19, 26.20 and 26.21). The process requires using
dedicated, multiple pairs of IVT transfer casks (main IVT cask and intermediate IVT
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Fig. 26.22 Electrical power distribution
cask) required for the support of the IVT rail, for the deployment of the IVT vehi-
cle/manipulator system, for the system support services and for the blanket modules
exchange system. Some key technology aspects have also been or will be validated
through a dedicated R&D program (manipulator gears lubrication, IVT rail hinge
mechanism, cable handling, etc.), as well as the development of a simulator for the
positioning control of the IVT vehicle and gripper.
Electrical Networks and electrical conversion: The network that will control the
power supply to the ITER plant basically consists of two parts: a network for steady
state and a network for pulsed operations (Fig. 26.22). The steady state electrical net-
work (SSEN) supplies the power needed to operate the plant including offices and
the operational facilities. The major consumers are the cooling water and cryogenic
systems requiring together about 80% of the total demand of 120 MW. The power is
taken from the 400 kV network that winds across Southern France past Cadarache.
The ITER pulsed power electrical network (PPEN) is also connected to the powerful
high-voltage grid, it provides the large pulsed power needed to supply the supercon-
ducting coils and the heating and current drive (H&CD) systems. The AC power is
received from the 400 kV high-voltage grid and transformed to intermediate levels
(66 and 22 kV) via 3 step-down transformers. The total peak active pulsed power
demand will be limited to 500 MW. This includes power required to operate and
control the Poloidal Field coils, the power needed for the positioning and the shape
control of the plasma current, and including the vertical stabilization, and power to
supply the H&CD systems.
A so called “reactive power compensation” system, one of the largest ever built
so far, will make sure that the power taken off the grid does not exceed the level
impose by the French grid operator.
The pulsed power supply is summarized in the attached scheme (Fig. 26.23).
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Fig. 26.23 Pulsed Power Supply
The main function of the Central Solenoid and Poloidal Field AC/DC converters
are the following:
• Power converters supply the magnets. However this is not the ultimate their main
function. The main function is to control the plasma current and the plasma wall
gaps.
• Using the Coil Power Supply Converters, the CS and PF coil currents are con-
trolled and affect the configuration of the magnetic flux, which determines the
plasma shape and position as well as the plasma current (Fig. 26.24).
The Coil Power Supply system is a large and intricate system that includes chal-
lenges, not only during the design and qualification, but also in the installation of the
components into a very complex configuration:
• About 2 GVA installed power of high current (up to 68 kA), thyristor based, 4
quadrants, ac/dc power converters (most likely the world largest, high current
conversion plant);
• 80 kA, 2.4 kV Switching Power Converters, which are quite beyond the industry
practices;
• 750 Mvar, Static Var Compensator and Harmonic Filtering system, connected to
66 kV ac (the largest in Europe, most likely the 3rd largest in the world);
• 5 km bipolar busbars (max. cross-section: 420 × 270 mm);
• high reliable circuit breakers capable to carrying and interrupting up to 70 kA dc
currents, and large resistors capable of discharging up to 50 GJ in about 30 s (first
of its kind and key items for safety and investment protection).
ITER Vacuum System: The vacuum system will be one of the largest, most com-
plex vacuum systems ever to be built. There are a number of large volume systems
including: the cryostat (~8500 m3), the torus (~1330 m3), the neutral beam injectors
(~180 m3 each) and a number of lower volume systems including: the service vac-
uum system, diagnostic systems, and electron cyclotron transmission lines. In total
there aremore than 400 vacuum pumps of 10 different technologies required to pump
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Fig. 26.24 Plasma shape
and position
the systems. The most demanding vacuum pumping applications are served by 18
large cryogenic pumps of 3 distinct custom designs. All of the vacuum systems are
progressing from design, validation and into manufacturing (Fig. 26.25).
The ITER vacuum vessel and cryostat are to be directly pumped by a total of 8
cylindrical cryo-sorption pumps (Fig. 26.26) with integral 800 mm all metal vacuum
valves.
The “build-to-print” design of these pumps is complete and the first pump is well
advanced in manufacturing. All component parts have been manufactured, qualified
and are now being assembled with completion expected in 2017. The 8 t flange of
this cryopump, known as the “pump plug”, is seen in Fig. 26.27.
The ITER neutral beam systems are each to be pumped by a pair of open structure
panel style cryo-sorption pumps (Fig. 26.28) with a length of 8 m, and height of
2.8 m. They will achieve a pumping speed of 4500 m3/s for hydrogen. The final
design of these pumps has involved development of new fabrication methods so as to
significantly reduce the cost andmanufacturing time for the thousands of cryo-panels
and thermal shields within the pumps. The procurement process of the first pump,
to the ITER “build-to-print” design, has commenced, this first pump is destined for
the ITER neutral beam test facility (MITICA) in Padua.
Conclusion—ITER is a fantastic challenging adventure for scientists, engineering
and physics. It is the dream of each of us to achieve the highest level of knowledge
in technology and scientific applications. ITER is a fantastic opportunity to produce
26 ITER Project: International Cooperation and Energy Investment 189
Fig. 26.25 ITER vacuum system global view
Fig. 26.26 Torus and cryostat cryo-pump (1.8 m diameter)
transversal technologies to be applied in Medicine, aeronautics, aerospace, waste
management, nuclear applications.
For all these reasons the Project belongs to all of us: we cannot fail in this fantastic
effort.
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Fig. 26.27 Machined flange of the first Torus Cryo-pump
Fig. 26.28 Nuetral injection cryo-pump
Let us work together to achieve with contributions generated all over the World
the primary objective to get ITER Plant getting First Plasma within December 2025
and Nuclear Phase within 2035.
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It is the way to get the Sun on Earth.
We are all sure: ITER is the way to a new, clean, safe and nearly unlimited energy.
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Chapter 27
LIGO and Science Diplomacy
Barry Barish
The discovery of gravitational waves in LIGO captured the imagination of the pub-
lic, worldwide. Why? The answer is one that is fundamental to the human race. A
universal feature that sets humans apart from other living species is our curiosity
about nature and the world we live in. Some of this knowledge is self-serving, like
how to cope with diseases or how to improve our way of life. However, our curiosity
goes well beyond just satisfying needs, as it includes our fascination with the stars,
the origin of the universe, or just simply our understanding how things work.
Physics is one of the more obtuse areas of curiosity-driven science. It includes the
study of the basic constituents that make up our physical world and how they interact.
Yet, discoveries in this general area of science are considered front-page news! It
is quite understandable that my colleagues from other areas of science often ask
me about LIGO and gravitational waves, or the Higgs particle, or whether neutrinos
move faster than the speed of light, etc.More interestingly, someone Imeet often asks
me the same questions on airplanes, at parties, or almost any gathering of people,
when my identity as a physicist is revealed.
A key common interest of people all over the world are the science questions
that physicists study. This universal interest, coupled with the international and non-
political nature of the field,make physics research an ideal and unique tool for science
diplomacy. Ironically, one of the most fundamental areas, particle physics, was born
following World War II, out of the Atomic Bomb effort. The original research that
led to the Atomic Bomb originated from the development of quantum mechanics
and nuclear physics in the 1930s and the tools built in the bomb effort led to the
peaceful worldwide physics research using particle accelerators after the war. Many
of the same physicists, who were integral to the Atomic Bomb efforts, moved on to
exploring fundamental questions in particle physics after the war, using ever-larger
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particle accelerators, culminating in very large international facilities like those at
CERN in Geneva, Switzerland.
A second area of fundamental physics is LIGO, an experimental facility to study
Einstein’s theory of general relativity, his prediction of the existence of gravitational
waves and a new astronomical science with gravitational waves. These research
topics are conducted by large international collaborations that grew up first with
university facilities, but soon required larger collaborative facilities. Even though
particle physics evolved from weapons laboratories after WWII, the field now has
totally free access and requires no security clearances. Scientific results are published
in scientific journals without censorship and with worldwide ‘open-access.’
The public excitement with the science of gravitational waves and particle physics
has created strong connections between the public and the science. This, along with
the international nature of the fields, provides special opportunities for them to play
special roles in relations between people from different countries.
Science for Diplomacy—The Royal Society in the UK and the American Associ-
ation for the Advancement of Science in the U.S. have defined three types of science
diplomacy: (1) “Science in diplomacy”: Science can provide advice to inform and
support foreign policy objectives; (2) “Diplomacy for science”: Diplomacy can facil-
itate international scientific cooperation; and (3) “Science for diplomacy”: Scientific
cooperation can improve international relations. All three of these aspects of science
diplomacy are important, but it is the third where fundamental physics has had and
will continue to have the largest direct impact. Much of the research in fundamental
physics is carried-out through international collaborations using large experimental
facilities.
One of the best examples is the development of international collaborations to
build and do science on large particle accelerators. As accelerators became larger and
more international, the International Union of Pure and Applied Physics (IUPAP)
took special interest in the international aspects of this field. As an organization,
IUPAP, was formed in 1922 with the specific aim to “to stimulate and promote
international cooperation in physics; to sponsor suitable internationalmeetings and to
assist organizing committees; to foster the preparation and the publication of abstracts
of papers and tables of physical constants; to promote international agreements on
other use of symbols, units, nomenclature and standards; to foster free circulation of
scientists; to encourage research and education.” IUPAP is presently composed of
59 member countries, representing their identified physics communities.
IUPAP has played a special role in internationalizing particle physics by estab-
lishing a standing committee, the International Committee on Future Accelerators
(ICFA) to coordinate particle accelerator facilities on an international scale. In 1980,
ICFA made a statement that has to a large extent been responsible for the almost
total internationalization of the field. The statement, “ICFA Guidelines for the Inter-
regional Utilization of Major Regional Experimental Facilities for High-Energy Par-
ticle Physics Research” contained two key guidelines that have operationally opened
up the use of large particle accelerators to physicists from around the world, inde-
pendent of politics or the wealth of the country. It passed a resolution that for the use
of these expensive large accelerators:
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• “The national or institutional affiliations of the teams should not influence the
selection of an experiment nor the priority accorded to it,”
• “Operating laboratories shouldnot require experimental groups to contribute to the
running costs of the accelerators or colliding beam machines nor to the operating
costs of their associated experimental areas.”
These principles are being followed by everymajor accelerator laboratory, and this
has resulted in creating an international model for participation in particle physics
research that is truly open to scientists from around the world. Major accelerator
laboratories in Europe, Asia, the US and Russia follow this model for participation.
More and more, these large facilities have become the primary tools for addressing
the forefront problems in the field, and the research is performed by international
teams of scientists through partnerships between countries that provide the major
resources and jointly share the governance of the research organizations.
LIGO: AModel of Independent Worldwide Scientific Collaboration—Albert Ein-
stein gave us a new theory of gravity in 1915, more than 200 years after Newton
introduced his Unified Gravity theory. Einstein’s theory was the next big step in
understanding gravity, especially as it applies to understanding our universe. As an
outcomeof this theory, Einstein predicted the existence of gravitationalwaves in 1916
and they were detected 100 years later in LIGO (Laser Interferometer Gravitational-
waveObservatory). LIGO is a self-organized collaboration of scientists and scientific
institutions from18 countries and about a hundred institutions fromaround theworld.
LIGO is the natural extension of scientists collaborating across borders to accom-
plish joint scientific goals. LIGO has extended that model to a large collaboration
having its own governance that is open to scientists from around the world.
The fact that such complex science done over decades is being accomplished
without formal agreements between countries, funding agencies or the scientist’s
institutions bodes well for achieving complex goals jointly by nations, without the
burdens of complex government agreements. The success opens the door for other
cooperation between countries on complex problems with formal agreements being
employed, only as required.
CERN: A European Particle Physics Laboratory—International scientific col-
laborations are also carried out through much more formal international treaties or
other cooperative vehicles, like for the CERN Laboratory in Geneva Switzerland.
The Large Hadron Collider (LHC) has become the centerpiece of the field of particle
physics. Following World War II, Europe was no longer a world leader in physics
research. Rebuilding European science represented a major challenge, but a group
of physicists, including Edoardo Amaldi in Italy, Pierre Auger in France and Niels
Bohr in Denmark had the idea of jointly creating a European laboratory for particle
physics. They prophesized that such a laboratory would unite European scientists to
share the costs of developing world-class future facilities.
CERN was established at an intergovernmental meeting of UNESCO in Paris in
December 1951, where the first resolution concerning the establishment of a Euro-
pean Council for Nuclear Research was adopted. In 1953, the 12 founding Member
States: Belgium, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Italy,
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theNetherlands,Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, theUnitedKingdom, andYugoslavia
ratified the agreement, soon after the European Organization for Nuclear Research
(CERN) was established and Geneva was chosen as the location. The laboratory was
established as a treaty organization and this has given it stability over the vicissitudes
of economies, politics, etc. over its 60 years.
At present, CERN having built the Large Hadron Collider (LHC), a ~10 billion
dollar facility, is the most important particle physics laboratory in the world. It has
made more than its share of major discoveries in particle physics, including the
discovery of the Higgs boson, and more are likely to come. Following the guid-
ance from ICFA, the experimental program at LHC is carried-out by international
collaborations that extend far beyond the European countries who support and are
member-states for CERN.
In addition to the direct science coming from CERN, it has had a major impact
on technological developments that are being exploited around the world. Perhaps
the invention that has had the broadest impact on our everyday life is the worldwide
web invented by TimBerners-Lee in 1990. He developed this distributed information
system, in order to meet the demand for information sharing between scientists all
over the world. In 1991, he had developed an earlyWeb systemwith browsers, URLs,
etc., and it was released to the particle physics community. Rather quickly, the Web
was adopted throughout the academic world in universities and research laboratories.
As systems developed to use the web on PCs, the usefulness spread from high tech
laboratories having powerful computers to all of us, and it has quickly become an
indispensable tool for everyday life.
Interestingly, the World Wide Web was developed in an international particle
physics laboratory, where information is shared across national boundaries without
restriction. Just as this policy has enable particle physics to advance as a world-
wide joint enterprise, the associated resulting technologies are now available to be
exploited openly without borders.
The Next Particle Accelerator: A Global Initiative—We have learned much about
the benefits of international collaboration in science, such as those on large accelera-
tors for particle physics. International collaboration has enabled us, both by combin-
ing resources and talents, to make scientific breakthroughs that may not have been
possible, otherwise. Further, the same international partnerships produces technical
innovations and breakthroughs that can benefit society more broadly, and ones that
can be disseminated throughout the world with few political obstacles.
This effort to develop a next generation particle accelerator are broadening yet fur-
ther the science for diplomacy benefits being realized at CERN and, more generally,
in particle physics. There are many issues involved in bringing scientists together
in such an undertaking, such as obtaining visas for all participating scientists, intel-
lectual property rights agreements between participating laboratories, industry and
countries, importing sensitive scientific equipment, etc. These are all ways in which
particle physicists are solving problems that are integral to enabling countries to
work together.
Particle Accelerators are expensive, so one might well conclude that it is an area
of science only available to scientists from richer countries. As I mentioned above,
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the guidelines from ICFA have made even the largest and most expensive accelera-
tors, like the LHC, available to scientists from all around the world. The two large
experimental collaborations at the LHC have more than 10,000 collaborating scien-
tists and engineers from over 100 countries, as well as from hundreds of universities
and laboratories. The global design effort for the next particle accelerator has sev-
eral thousand scientists from around the world collaborating on the formative ideas
and design stage. In these collaborations, all these scientists have equal access to
the data and participate in small international groups on the specialized technical or
physics efforts on the experiments. For scientists from developing countries, particle
physics collaborations provide an almost unique opportunity to work with the most
advanced.
SESAME: Science for Diplomacy in the Middle East—In addition to physicists
from the developing countries participating in particle physics research at the major
accelerator facilities, as discussed above, there are also important initiatives in the
developing countries. Perhaps the most ambitious is an International Centre being
developed in Jordan is calledSESAME(Synchrotron-Light forExperimental Science
and Applications in the Middle East). SESAME is an accelerator facility built in the
Middle East as first established by UNESCO. The facility is located near Amman,
Jordan, on a site donated by the Jordanian government, who also has built a very
large modern building to house the accelerator and laboratories. The primary goal of
the laboratory is to create a state-of-the-art synchrotron light research facility.
A synchrotron light source is a special particle accelerator that accelerates elec-
trons to high energy and then converted them into a photon or light beam. Synchrotron
light facilities are broadly used around the world for a wide range of research topics,
including condensed matter physics, material science, biology and medicine. They
also have many practical applications, such as doing precision lithography.
However, the importance of this initiative goeswell beyond the scientific goals and
is truly an example of how science can be used for diplomacy that cannot be accom-
plished otherwise. SESAME is a major intergovernmental scientific facility, whose
members are Bahrain, Cyprus, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Pakistan, the Palestinian
Authority, and Turkey. Like for the creation of CERN, the SESAME accelerator
facility requires more resources than are possible for the individual member science
budgets, as well as requiring the combined skills and talents to develop such a facility.
The stated aims of SESAME are admirable. They are: (1) “Foster scientific and
technological capacities and excellence in the Middle East and the Mediterranean
region (and prevent or reverse the brain drain) by constructing an outstanding scien-
tific device and enabling world-class research by scientists in a diverse range of fields
including biology and medical sciences, materials science, physics and chemistry,
and archaeology; and (2) “Build scientific links and foster better understanding and
a culture of peace through scientific collaboration. As the language of science is
universal, scientists can try to build a bridge of understanding and perhaps trust for
the benefit of all.”
SESAME is the first major collaborative research facility in the Middle East and
it is being formed following the success and organization of CERN as a model.
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SESAME is being built using the CERNmodel for regional collaboration and scien-
tific success. In addition, being undertaken in a region with so many long-standing
political issues, it is an inspiring model how to bridge these differences. The project
continues to face challenges and uncertainties, but a lot of progress has been made
both technically and politically, due to the efforts of the members, especially Jordan.
The enthusiasm of the scientists involved and the widespread international support
have been keys to convincing the member governments having enormous political
differences to collaborate and jointly provide resources for SESAME. This is amodel
and an existence proof that governments in the Middle East can work together on
joint problems.
Science for Diplomacy: Long Term Benefits—Physics has proven to be a field
where major nations are effectively pooling resources to develop the most advanced
and ambitious forefront scientific instruments in the form of large particle acceler-
ators, LIGO and large astrophysics facilities. The broad and open participation in
physics research has provided a very successfulmodel of Science forDiplomacy. The
next generation of facilities is being developed through a truly global model, where
the ideas, concepts, design and implementation are being done through global col-
laboration. The concept is being extended to building similar collaborative structures
for particle accelerator facilities in less developed countries.
The most important benefit of the collaborations and partnerships formed for car-
rying out particle physics is less tangible, but very real. The close collaboration of
particle physicists from all over the world to carry out today’s research is creating
a generation of scientists, for whom, working together across borders to solve com-
mon problems is both natural and effective. Hopefully, these attitudes can spread to
influence positively countries working together on common problems, whether they
be climate change or nuclear disarmament.
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Luciano Maiani and Raymond Jeanloz
As note in the introduction to the forum talk given by Ambassador Grossi, the forum
speakers would address broad topics that crossed some of the topics of the day’s
presentations and discussions, and time was allowed for other participants to ask
questions or remark upon the whole day.
The forumspeaker for the second andfinal day of the conferencewasAntonioMis-
siroli, NATO’sAssistant SecretaryGeneral for EmergingSecurityChallenges.NATO
is a military organization that has nuclear forces. NATO sees nuclear weapons as a
core component of its deterrence and defense capabilities, and is committed to arms
control, disarmament and non-proliferation, like the nuclear weapon states within the
alliance (see https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50068.htm). The organizing
committee is committed to addressing problems in the real world, engaging thought
leaders, moral leaders, and leaders in international security.
Dr.Missiroli discussed the overall environment of international security and trends
in thinking in Brussels concerning non-nuclear emerging threats and the instruments
that might be useful in addressing them. Deterrence remains a key element of inter-
national security in addressing some threats, but there is no operational model of
deterrence in others, such as attacks in the cyber domain. In his talk and in the
discussion that followed, Missiroli talked about means of reducing risks other than
treaties: If we cannot limit the weapons, perhaps we can limit the targets. There is
crossover between the cyber and the nuclear. Participants noted that any system, even
air-gapped systems, can be attacked, so it is critical to protect nuclear command and
control systems. Cooperation among the nuclear weapon states was suggested to try
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to prevent use of cyber tools to, in one way or another, catalyse nuclear war. Major
new efforts like that are often undertaken only in response to major incidents. It will
be a test of our rationality and humanity to see if we can work together without the
prompting of a major incident.
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Chapter 29
Promoting International Security During
Difficult Times for Arms Control
Antonio Missiroli
Editor’s Note: This is a transcript of Dr. Antonio Missiroli’s talk. The views presented
in this intervention/article are personal and do not necessarily reflect those of NATO.
Good afternoon. I owe you many thanks for inviting me to speak here today, and
notably to conclude your proceedings, which is a great honour—especially as I am
old enough to have learned my first (and, sadly, only) physics at school from ‘the’
Amaldi, the handbook of physics by Edoardo Amaldi that every student in Italy used
back then. Also, as an Italian, being hosted in this building is a special privilege.
But I also owe you three apologies. The first one is that I am not a physicist. I
am by training a boring historian and a superficial political scientist. So, please bear
with my incompetence throughout my speech. The second apology is that I am not
going to talk about nuclear disarmament and related issues. I am sure that throughout
your proceedings you have already discussed at length, and dissected in depth, the
current state of play. Addressing it would be to some extent even a little awkward on
the part of someone representing NATO here. As you know, in principle NATO is
not in favour of unilateral disarmament or the Ban Treaty. Therefore I could only go
as far as to read some sort of official statement on the demise of the INF Treaty that
would not add much to what you already know about the issue—and I do not think
that you invited me here to do this.
Instead, and this is my third apology, I will try to discuss with you what else
keeps us awake at night in Brussels—which is not unrelated to what you have been
discussing so far. And I am saying ‘in Brussels’ because Brussels is, as you know,
a city that hosts a flurry of international organizations and decision-makers and
diplomats, in particular NATO and the European Union. The EU and NATO were
famously said to be based in the same city but on different planets; and now, of course,
the orbits of the two organizations have got ever closer, they are almost intertwined.
Thus, in order to avoid collision, what we have to do is to compare notes, cooperate
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with and talk to one another. So what I am trying to relay is a set of concerns that
occupy us all over there. And it is about the evolving strategic and security landscape
at large, characterized as it is by increasing strategic competition, at both state and
non-state level, globally as well as regionally. It is also characterized, and I’m sure
you have discussed that, by a general weakening of the multilateral world order
that goes from trade arrangements to arms control agreements and that seems to be
happening ever more often.
What I would like to focus on in particular is the impact of technology on all this.
Technology, in principle, is both a boon and a bane and, right now, we probably are
in between two industrial and technological revolutions. One is the ICT revolution,
so to speak, that is arguably still underway while we are probably transitioning
already towards the next step in that revolution, which will be characterized by
artificial intelligence, 5G technology, quantum computing and all that. We have
started to realize only recently that, after enjoying all the benefits of the past or
ongoing industrial revolution(s), we are now also starting to feel the sting or realize
the ‘dark side’ of all that. We are just beginning to acknowledge the risks and the
threats that it has also generated. And nowhere is that realization more acute than
among security experts.
Let me give you a few examples. Take terrorism, which is very much in the minds
of people in this part of the world as well as across the Atlantic. With the onset of
ISIS, the Islamic State, terrorist actions in the Euro-Atlantic space have increased,
and terrorist groups now use technology in a very effective way. In particular they
use cyber space for propaganda and recruitment, for fund-raising as well as for
operational purposes (a few months ago, for instance, the New York Times reported
on the way in which militias use Whatsapp to coordinate their actions in Tripoli).
But they also use ‘physical’ tools like drones, unmanned vehicles. You may have
read that a couple of weeks ago an oil refinery in Saudi Arabia was attacked by a
‘swarm’ of drones, apparently carried out by Houthi rebels supported by Iran. In
early 2018 a Russian military base in Syria was also apparently the target of a swarm
of drones. Maybe the Middle East is a favourable ground for this kind of operations
because there are large ungoverned spaces and big infrastructure is concentrated
in small spaces. But perhaps it is not unconceivable to see drones operating even
in urban environments, in our cities. You may remember that, less than one year
ago, Gatwick airport in the UK was basically brought to a halt for two days right
before Christmas by two drones that nobody has yet identified. The potential for
harming entire communities is indeed enormous, especially if terrorists groups can
load drones (that are easily accessible, available and operable) with CBRN agents or
even improvised explosive devices.
Or take what we call cyber-attacks. A cyberattack is cyber against cyber, basically.
There has been a spectacular increase in cyberattacks in the past few years, especially
in 2017, when two major malware campaigns (WannaCry and NotPetya) affected
critical infrastructure inside Europe and beyond, including hospitals in the UK and
commercial shipping across the world. Malicious cyber activities occur on a daily
basis, even routine incidents could easily escalate and be used to damage critical
infrastructure: energy (including nuclear energy plants), transport, communication
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and also finance. The recent Nuclear Posture Review by the United States also high-
lighted the fact that cyber means could be used to disrupt and disable command and
control systems for nuclear warfare. As you know very well, the first every cyber-
attack was Stuxnet, launched against Iran in 2010–2011. Disabling the other side is
part of the game, but there is also a wider risk of disruption and loss of control we all
have to be aware of. Less than one year ago, Russia’s attempt to hack into the website
of the Organization against the Proliferation of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in The
Hague was discovered and exposed. And, in that particular case, the international
community called out Russia for what it was doing.
This is an area in which the spectrum of potential hostile actors is wide and huge:
from the so-called ‘hacktivists’ to the proverbial ‘kid in the basement’, from criminal
gangs to terrorist groups, up to state sponsored actors: we call these APT (Advanced
Permanent Threat) and most of them are located in China, Russia, North Korea and
Iran. In some of these countries ministries are also directly involved in coordinating
and directing all this. Hackers can steal our credentials, they can steal our money,
they can steal industrial secrets, but they can also steal critical military information
and carry out all sorts of online espionage. They can also exfiltrate data and perform
large scale sabotage—all of which, in turn, could also be(come) part of a phased
operation leading to overt conflict.
Insofar as these operations are covert actions for an intelligence operation, they
are not even against international law as we know it: international law does not
address espionage as such although law enforcement, especially at domestic level,
can of course help address this issue. These operations are comparatively low cost
and low risk, high impact and high reward; they are easy to deny, because tracking
back algorithms rarely brings certainty in terms of attribution; they are difficult to
detect, too, and difficult to deter. It is almost impossible to aim at absolute deterrence
in this particular field, simply because the offence is at a structural advantage. They
have the advantage of space and time: they can attack anywhere anytime as the attack
surface in the digital world is virtually infinite.
Finally, and this is probably more of interest to you, traditional arms control and
non-proliferation mechanisms cannot really work in this domain. Firstly, the legal
framework at international level is very weak, as there is no such thing as the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna or the OPCW in The Hague to regulate
this particular field. Secondly, traditional mechanisms of inspection, verification and
disposal are not really applicable, if anything because the ‘weapons’, so to speak,
range from a laptop to a code: not only cannot they be conclusively detected or
destroyed, they can also be easily recreated. And, thirdly, there is no state monopoly
on the legitimate use of code (as opposed to the legitimate use of force) and the threat
actors in this domain are often beyond state authority or control.
It is also worth recalling that the kind of effects and the damage that these
‘weapons’ can create are not as visible or painful as physical effects. Therefore,
it is also more difficult for the international community to mobilize against them,
because there is no resulting moral or visual horror comparable to that produced
by nuclear weapons. There has been no single case so far in which a cyberattack
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has brought so much damage that the international community was prompted to act
against the perpetrators.
Even confidence building measures—as those traditionally applied in the WMD
domain—do not really work. The Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe
in Vienna has tried to engage its members in a dialogue to this end but with modest
results, in part because some of the actors who have capabilities in this domain feel
they have an edge and do not want restrictions that may erode it.
Last but not least, there is what we now call hybrid. By nature and definition, a
‘hybrid’ is a combination of different types of elements or, in this case, actions: mili-
tary and non-military, covert and overt. It is what Russia did in Georgia in 2008 or in
Ukraine in 2014. Interestingly, however, the original use of the term ‘hybrid’ in the
context of warfare dates back to the conflict betweenHezbollah and Israel in Lebanon
in 2006, whenHezbollah used amultiplicity of differentmeans—fromhi-tech to very
primitive tools, from urban guerrilla to conventional techniques against Tsahal, the
Israeli Defence Force. That also included what we call the ‘weaponization’ of social
media—something that is now probably familiar to you as citizens, something we
have seen happen over the past few years in our democracies, on both sides of the
Atlantic. Basically, ‘hybrid’ techniques entail and encompass a mix of disinforma-
tion, destabilization, disruption, deception, subversion, coercion—along a spectrum
that ranges from espionage to sabotage. And virtually all are, now, cyber-enabled.
We have seen all this already, of course, especially during the ColdWar. But what
is indeed different now is the use of modern technology, which makes it much faster
and more effective. Technology acts as a multiplier and accelerator and, potentially,
as a game changer (also) in this field. First of all, it is changing the balance of power(s)
worldwide, notably between the ‘haves’ (which are not necessarily the usual suspects,
or at least not only) and the ‘have-nots’. But it is changing also the internal balance
of power in our own societies. You are surely familiar with the notion of the ‘digital
divide’: some people have access to these technologies while some are excluded or
are even victims of these technologies. An additional risk is a represented by the fact
that some of the ‘haves’ may not be guided by the same values and principles that
we are, thus raising the concerns about their future use of such new and potentially
disruptive technologies—at least as long as there is no international legal framework
to constrain and restrain their behaviour.
The UN is doing a lot of work in this particular domain, especially in terms
of soft law and codes of conduct. As you know, there is ongoing work in New
York on the so-called lethal autonomous weapons systems, and a group of selected
governmental experts is working (again) on cyber-related issues. The general state of
international relations, however, appears hardly favourable for anymajor multilateral
breakthrough, at least at this stage. Therefore, our expectations have to be modest.
The emphasis is increasing on what we call ‘responsible state behaviour’: since it
is impossible to entirely deter these kinds of operation, it is important to be able to
identify what they should not aim at. In other words, since it is impossible to limit
the ‘weapons’, it should be advisable to limit at least their ‘targets’.
Yet the new technologies are not simply changing the balance of power(s)—
they are also altering the balance of players, mainly because their peculiarity is
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that they are mostly privately generated, privately owned and privately operated.
Cyberspace is themost relevant case in point.Most of the technologies we are talking
about have been developed in and by the private sector. That was not the case with
nuclear, chemical, biological or radiological weapons: they were state-generated and
therefore largely controllable through interstate negotiations. The new ones are not
being developed privately but the time required to hit markets is much shorter than in
the past. Although most of these technologies are intrinsically dual-use, more often
than notmarket considerations trump security considerations (that applies even to our
mobile phones). Therefore, we are confrontedwith a scale of risks and vulnerabilities
that certainlywas unconceivable before. TakeGoogle, Facebook,Amazon,Microsoft
or Apple, but also Huawei, Alibaba or Tencent. These are the new superpowers—and
nothing comparable to the so-called ‘military-industrial complex’ of decades past.
The next industrial or technological revolution is about 5G technology, artificial
intelligence, machine learning and quantum computing. That is the next stage in the
Great Transformation. As American futurologist, RoyAmara, famously coined a law
whereby we tend to overestimate the short-term impact of new technologies and to
underestimate their long-term impact, and wemay indeed be confronted exactly with
this phenomenonnow.We tend to be extremelyworried aboutwhatmayhappen3, 4, 5
years fromnowwith the introduction of IG technology, butwemay not be sufficiently
foresighted to see what may come in 20 years from now. Another one, Alvin Toffler,
also said that the future always comes too fast, and in the wrong order. In other words,
we do not know what may truly happen not only five but especially ten or twenty
years from now—as much as we surely did not see coming a few years ago what is
on now. But we have to be sufficiently lucid to try and seize the opportunities that the
new technologies offer. In the field of human health it is quite evident that artificial
intelligence, for instance, offers a range of unprecedented benefits, especially for an
aging mankind. But there are other areas in which we tend, instead, to be much more
concerned about their possible effects. You are certainly familiar with the discussions
on ‘killer robots’, ‘Terminators’, ‘Robocops’ and so on and so forth—especially, as
I said, since there are rising powers that are not constrained by the same rules of
the game or moral principles that we have developed and would like to maintain
and foster. Therefore, mitigating and managing the risks is the other side of the coin:
seizing the opportunities and exploiting the potential benefits, yes, but alsomitigating
and managing the risks.
However, the name of the game is no longer just deterrence, which probably
cannot have the same meaning as the type of strategic and absolute deterrence that
we have seen at work since 1945. It is also resilience—and resilience supported by
education. Explaining to people what can be done with the new technologies, but
also what should not be done is essential. Even countering the manipulation of public
opinion that is happening with the weaponization of social media requires a lot of
education—as well as a healthy information landscape, that is not always a given.
As Western and democratic societies, we suffer some limitations in this field.
Externally, we do not necessarily want to replicate or imitate the behaviour of those
whowant to do us harm,we do not want to do tit-for-tats—an approach that somehow
constrains our response options. And internally, of course, we do not want to limit
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our own freedoms in order to combat disinformation or disruption: we do not want
to limit free speech or restrain ownership of media or industrial assets. So our very
nature of open societies—our declared strength—may come to represent, at the same
time, a potential vulnerability and a structural weakness.
My last point is that any effective action in this field must be a coordinated one, a
team effort: at national level (whole of government as well as whole of society), at
transnational level (especially between like-minded countries), and at international
level (between and across multilateral and regional organizations). As these hostile
activities—terrorist, cyber and hybrid attacks—knowno geographical borders and no
jurisdictional boundaries, we have to be able to do exactly the same: build trust, coop-
erate and exchange information between and across nations, organizations, public
and private actors.
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